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ABSTRACT

POLITICAL CURRENTS: DAVID E. LILIENTHAL

AND THE MODERN 7VMERICAN STATE
MAY

1994

GREGORY FIELD, B.A., DUKE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Robert Griffith
This dissertation examines the political economy of
the United States in the second quarter of the twentieth
century, focusing on the public career of David E.

Lilienthal. This is not a biography, but rather, uses

Lilienthal's career as a lens for viewing the American
At-

economy at a time when the relationship between the state
and private economic enterprise underwent a profound

transformation.
A student of Felix Frankfurter at Harvard Law School,

Lilienthal went to work as a labor lawyer with Donald

Richberg in the aftermath of the 1922 railroad shopcraft
strike and helped craft the legislation that culminated in
the Railway Labor Act of 1926. During 1931-1933, Lilienthal

reorganized the Wisconsin Public Service Commission under
as a
Governor Philip La Follette, establishing a reputation

to the
regulatory activist that resulted in his appointment

Authority
board of the newly-chartered Tennessee Valley
(TVA)

.

After a protracted struggle with TVA chairman

vi

Arthur

E.

Morgan, Lilienthal gained control of the agency,

where he remained until the end of World War II.
During the interwar period, Lilienthal was a

participant in the formation of what has come to be known
as a "Keynesian" political-economic perspective. Working

with colleagues such as Frankfurter and social reformer
Morris

L.

Cooke, as well as elements from both corporate

capital and organized labor, Lilienthal designed an agenda
for aggressive federal intervention in the marketplace with
a macroeconomic approach for coordinating the relationship

between mass production and mass consumption. Through the
Electric Home and Farm Authority's low-cost appliance
program, through high-wage, pro-union labor policies at the
agency, and most importantly through the TVA's promotion of

cheap and plentiful electricity, Lilienthal was

experimenting with the growth-oriented policies that came
to characterize Keynesianism. This position became

prominent in the New Deal during the mid-1930s, creating
salients within the federal government of a social

democratic state. By the end of the decade, however,
political opposition and the conservative implications of
for
this growth perspective moderated the Keynesian agenda

the TVA and the New Deal.
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION.
DAVID E. LILIENTHAL AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW POLITICAL
ECONOMY IN THE UNITED STATES

One of the central issues of the twentieth century has

been the relationship of the state to private economic
enterprise. The rise of corporate capitalism rendered

obsolete much of the political system of nineteenth century
America. Both the scope and the nature of state

intervention underwent extensive transformations, as the
struggles among shifting political coalitions altered the

country's political economy

—

with the rules of the

marketplace redefined and the economy's institutional
terrain reshaped. Out of this, the federal government
emerged with greatly expanded influence in American
society. The origins of this transformation in the American

political system rest in the quarter century from the mid1890s to 1920. Issues such as the merger movement, labor

relations, and industrialism's impact on the social fabric

dominated the ideological landscape at the turn of the
century. By 1917-1919 the administrative arrangements of

the wartime state signaled the culmination of certain of

these political tendencies, while prefiguring a new
framework.

The principal outlines of this nascent political

economy took form during the second quarter of the

twentieth century. At the beginning of the decade, the
prosperity
192 0s seemed to mark the beginning of an era of

2

and stability. This, of course, did not happen. The

prosperity of the 1920s was built upon

a

system that could

not sustain long-term growth. Three successive Republican

administrations cannibalized the state machinery that had

coordinated the economy during the first World War, and
turned over the levers of control to private sector trade
associations. Federal policies underwrote burgeoning profit

margins and hefty stock dividends, but undermined the
stability of financial markets and the monetary system.

Corporate capital had engineered

a

vaunted mass production

economy, but had neglected to forge a corresponding system
of mass consumption which would secure both economic growth

and their own political hegemony. Unemployment remained

persistently high and real wages of workers (and thus
consumers)

fell as increases in industrial productivity and

profits outpaced pay hikes. By the end of the decade, the
economy approached total collapse, and the Republicans were
in political retreat and ideological disarray.

What followed the chimerical "New Era" of the 1920s

were two decades of renewed conflict over the proper limits
of state power. Slowly, the results of this process became

clear. In order to maintain social stability, the

government would regulate but not control such key sectors
of the economy as investment markets. The state also sought

to mediate class conflict by attempting to forge a

consensus between management and organized labor based upon

3

a mutual interest in a dynamic economy that would yield

material gains, however unequally distributed, for both.
What emerged was a kind of state-brokered capitalism.
It is the purpose of this study to explore the forging

of this modern American political economy by focusing on

the career of one man, David

E.

Lilienthal. A brief

overview of his activities suggests that Lilienthal is

particularly well-situated for such an enterprise. From his
practice of labor and public utility law in Chicago and

Wisconsin during the 1920s and early 1930s, through his
tenure as a director of the Tennessee Valley Authority, and
finally with his work as the first chair of the Atomic

Energy Commission, Lilienthal was intimately involved in
the processes out of which the new system would emerge.

Lilienthal

's

career provides valuable insight into the

changing role of the state, as all of his efforts dealt

directly with issues involving the legitimacy and the
nature of government intervention in the private sector.
His work spanned the ideological course of the period. As a

labor lawyer in the 1920s, Lilienthal worked with the

railway unions in their unsuccessful struggles to secure
federal legislation that sanctioned collective bargaining.

With those unions he suffered through the political defeats
that undermined their goals and paved the way for a more

limited state role as provided for in the Railway Labor Act
of 1926. As a director of the TVA, Lilienthal participated

4

in the New Deal's brief period of social democratic

experimentation in the mid-1930s. While gradually asserting
control over the Authority, he recast its role as part of

a

broader transformation of those social democratic impulses
into the more cautious, growth-oriented system that

characterized postwar America. By revealing the contours of
the postwar system, Lilienthal's work details the limits to

that order, and thus also suggests the fault lines upon

which it would ultimately split apart less than half

a

century later.
Lilienthal's career also highlights the increasing
importance of the state as an independent agent of power.

Beginning with his tenure as Public Service Commissioner in

Wisconsin in 1931-1933, Lilienthal assumed the role of

a

bureaucratic entrepreneur. His agencies served as more than
neutral instruments for policy implementation. At both the

Wisconsin post and then the TVA, David Lilienthal used his
administrative apparatus as

a

means for defining policies

and influencing public sentiment, thereby serving express

ideological goals while also enhancing each agency's

autonomy and power.
This dissertation is not a biography, although

biographical elements will almost certainly loom large, for
I

use Lilienthal as a window opening onto the complex

transformation of America's political economy. Clearly,
such a vantage point cannot sustain a sufficiently broad

5

perspective from which to view the entire process out of

which the postwar system emerged. Instead,

I

focus the

study on three themes, illuminated in the career of
Lilienthal, that set in bold relief a broader constellation
of issues. First,

I

consider the ideological composition

and political ascendancy of what is often described as

conservative keynesianism, which by the 1940s sustained
state-sponsored, demand-driven economic growth while

blunting reformist tendencies that had threatened to limit

private profit or managerial prerogative.
interplay between Lilienthal

's

I

argue that the

ideological commitment to

reform politics and his institutional agenda at the PSC and
the TVA converge in his embrace of a mass consumption
strategy. While initially informed by a social democratic

vocabulary that spoke of income redistribution and
balance of political forces, Lilienthal
carried with it

a set of

's

a new

strategy also

contradictory, and profoundly

conservative, implications. As the New Deal suffered a
series of setbacks in the late 1930s, Lilienthal

's

programs

shed their redistributive intentions, and focused instead
on using economic growth and mass consumption as means for

sustaining the prevailing arrangement of
Second,

I

examine Lilienthal

's

power.''

conception of

autonomous regulatory agencies and how he executed that
^There is no comprehensive biography of Lilienthal, although
political scientist Steven M. Neuse is currently at work on just

such a study.
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idea as he remade the Wisconsin Railroad Commission into

the Public Service Commission and then molded a new agency
at the TVA. A political strategy that embraced aggressive

public oversight of the economy with frequent interventions
in the marketplace required a bold

commitment to a larger

and more functionally agile public bureaucracy. In short,

Lilienthal was a state-builder. The expansion of state

prerogatives has been one of the telling features of the
last fifty years, and a carefully detailed study of

Lilienthal

's

efforts in this matter reveal much concerning

the creation of a state apparatus. As with his economic

policies, Lilienthal
a

's

administrative agenda was driven by

deeply contradictory set of implications that played out

dialectically and ultimately resulted in agencies far
different from his original conception. Rather than

becoming the forceful arm of the people, Lilienthal

's

design of autonomous public agencies such as the TVA

yielded bureaus that pursued policies shaped by an internal
administrative logic and lacked any well-defined mechanisms
for accountability through the political process.

Finally,

I

use the ideological struggle within the TVA

to highlight the convergence within the New Deal of the

mass consumption strategy and the expansion of state power.

Lilienthal

's

pursuit of keynesian objectives ran counter to

the regional decentralism of his antagonist, TVA chair

Arthur

E.

Morgan. The differences between the two present

a

7

vivid contrast; their personal styles and political
sensibilities were as distinct as their ideologies. A

reexamination of their power struggle highlights the
mult i faceted nature of the New Deal. Lilienthal's triumph
signals the triumph of the centralizing, consumptionist

tendencies within the Roosevelt administration, yet the

transformations that occurred within the keynesian strategy
as exemplified by Lilienthal's activities at the TVA

suggest how limited this vision truly was.
My treatment of these themes locates this study within

several crosscurrents in the historiography of modern
America. A number of scholars have begun to revive

political history by moving beyond the "Presidential
Synthesis" which exercised an intellectual hegemony within
the field for years. As with the more traditional history,

these new studies portray the New Deal and its aftermath as
an epochal transition in American life, but they range far

beyond the linear narratives of electoral battles and
legislative maneuvering and examine instead

a

more complex

matrix of linking policies, ideologies, and economic and
social developments. Most of the scholars engaged in this

enterprise point to a set of institutional and cultural
relations variously called

a

Their works do not constitute

"New Deal" or "Postwar Order."
a

uniform historical

"school," as the analyses differ over the primary causes,
the precise timing, and the relative durability of this

,
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order. Still, while not monolithic, this eclectic mix of

historians and social scientists offers vital and

compelling insight regarding the emergence of

a

new system

of political economy in the United States by the

midtwentieth century.^
In my descriptions of this new political economy,

I

frequently use the terms "keynesianism" and "conservative
(or commercial)
a

keynesianism." These terms have applied to

wide variety of scholarly formulations, but as

use

I

them, they describe an ideological constellation that

coalesced around the use of fiscal policy and regulatory

mechanisms to foster consumption-driven economic growth.
Keynesian policies embraced
spectrum

—

a

broad range of the political

from the social democratic alternatives that

sought to turn the expansion of state power toward the

redistribution of income and the legitimation of organized

^For overviews of this periodization see Steve Fraser and
The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order.
Gary Gerstle, eds
David M.
1930-1980 (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1989)
Gordon, Richard Edwards, and Michael Reich, Segmente d Work.
Divided Workers; The Historical Transformation of Labor in the
and
United States (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1982)
Robert Griffith, "The Forging of America's Postwar Order:
Domestic Politics and Political Economy in the Age of Truman," in
Michael J. Lacey, ed. The Truman Presidency (Washington, D. C.
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Cambridge
University Press, 1989), pp. 57-88.
A few examples of monographs that raise related issues are
Michael Bernstein, The Great Depression. Delayed Recov ery and
Economic Change in America. 1929-1939 (New York, Cambridge
Lizabeth Cohen, Making A New Deal.
University Press, 1987)
Industrial Workers in Chicago. 1919-1939 (New York, Cambridge
and Christopher L. Tomlins, The State
University Press, 1990)
and the Unions (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1985).
,

.

,

;

;

,

;

;

.
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labor, to the conservative variants that circumscribe the

role of the state and limit this ideology's reformist

tendencies
For these constructs,

I

rely heavily upon the work of

Peter Friedlander, Steven Eraser, and Carlos Pabon, which

describes the development among advocates of

a

mass

consumption strategy in the 1920s and early 1930s of what
came to be called a keynesian perspective. During the
twenties, planners such as Morris Cooke, union officials

such as Sidney Hillman, and business leaders such as Edward

Filene recognized the need for

a

synthesis of mass

consumption and mass production. By late in the decade,
these authors argue, this cadre began to recognize the

limitations of the Hooverian faith in voluntarism and

associational activity as means for rationalizing

production and ensuring long-term economic stability. These
mass consumptionists became proto-keynesians

,

or simply

keynesians before Keynes, when they began to see the state
as the necessary arbiter for a successful linkage of

production and consumption.^
^For a succinct critique of the "Presidential Synthesis,"
see Alan Brinkley, "Writing the History of Contemporary America:
Dilemmas and Challenges," Daedalus 113 (1984): 121-141.
See Fraser, Labor Will Rule. Sidney Hillman and the Ris e of
American Labor (New York, Free Press, 1991) and "The Labor
Question'" in, Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds. The Rise and Fall
of the New Deal Order. 1930-1980 (Princeton, Princeton University
Welfare
Press, 1989), pp. 55-84; Friedlander, "The Origins of the
State: The Keynesian Elite and the Second New Deal, 1910-1936,"
(Unpublished Manuscript, 1987); and, Pabon, "Regulating
Capitalism," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (University of
^

,

.
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In 1931-1935, during his tenure in Wisconsin and his

first years at the TVA, Lilienthal adopted a keynesian

perspective. After Felix Frankfurter, his teacher at

Harvard and his mentor for many more years, Morris Cooke
was Lilienthal

's

staunchest supporter and most consistent

confidante. Cooke provided counsel during Lilienthal

's

greatest political struggles, and shared as well the
intellectual context of his economic philosophy. But

Lilienthal drew on Cooke's advice and ideas not simply as
some sort of intellectual endeavor, but rather because the

Massachusetts Amherst, 1992)
For more on these issues, see
below, esp. chapters 4 and 5.
On commercial keynesianism, see Robert M. Collins, The
Business Response to Keynes^ 1929-1964 (New York, Columbia
University Press, 1981) On social keynesianism, see Margaret
Weir and Theda Skocpol, "State Structures and the Possibilities
for ^Keynesian' Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden,
Britain, and the United States," in Peter B. Evans, et al eds..
Bringing the State Back In (New York, Cambridge University Press,
1985), pp. 108-163. As will be noted below, I disagree with
Skocpol and her colleagues on the "state capacity" issue, but the
range of their work on the history of the American state rests on
much broader (and firmer) ground than the particulars of that one
issue
I will at times also employ the terms "fordism" or
"productivism. " As with keynesianism, I do not use fordism in any
strictly doctrinal sense, which in this case would denote a
specific production regime as most commonly exemplified by
automobile assembly plants. For the most part, I use one of these
terms when I am most concerned with issues of industrial
production typified by high output and low per-unit profit
margins, and the linkage of mass production to consumption.
Keynesianism will remain the term I use most freguently when
referring to issues surrounding the broader questions of
political economy. The reader should note that I do not
capitalize either "keynesianism" or "fordism" precisely because I
am using these terms to describe ideological responses to the
political and economic environment particular to mass
industrialism. In this study, the terms do not denote a school of
thought that owes a direct lineage to the writings of J.M.
Keynes, or to the specific manufacturing practices of Henry Ford.
.

.

,

consumptionist agenda fit his institutional interests.
Lilienthal understood that the success of the mass

consumption strategy would enhance his agencies and promote
the regulatory politics on which he had staked his career.

Lilienthal

's

efforts to strengthen the Wisconsin PSC

and the TVA raise a related set of issues regarding his

role as a "state-builder." The work of Stephen Skowronek
and Theda Skocpol in particular has turned scholars'

attention to the importance of government's ability to
intervene, or "state capacity," as a crucial determinant in

the development of modern political economies.
in the United States,
a

Especially

they argue, the historical absence of

centralized state bureaucracy served to limit the

possibilities for state intervention, confined the scope of
regulation, and fostered closer ties between the state and

large-scale business firms, which had already developed
efficient, national corporate infrastructures capable of

self-regulating the complex matrices of private enterprise.
Examples that are often cited include the various business

executives who lent administrative expertise to the

government during World War

I,

and the control that

corporate capital exercised over the National Recovery
Administration. Influenced as well by the powerful

organizational paradigm shaped by Louis Galambos and Alfred
Chandler, this work has situated the growth of bureaucratic

^

^

.
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systems as one of the central experiences of modern

America

.

But much of the work on statebuilding has portrayed

state capacity as simply a neutral tool, with little

politics or formal ideology embedded within the

bureaucratic structure itself.

The policy-makers and their

policies reflect certain ideological positions, but the

bureaucratic forms they employ do not.

The limits to state

intervention in the first half of the twentieth century
become, then, primarily a question of technological

immaturity

—

the machinery of state was insufficiently

developed, and the country lacked a political culture that

could build better tools.
"Political Responses to Capitalist Crisis:
Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the New Deal,"
Politics and Society 10 (1980): 155-201; Skocpol and Kenneth
Finegold, "State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early
New Deal," Political Science Quarterly 97 (1978): 255-278; and
Stephen Skowronek, Building A New American State. The Expansion
of National Administrative Capacities. 1877-1920 (New York,
Cambridge University Press, 1982)
Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure: Chapters
in the History of the Industrial Enterprise (Cambridge, Harvard
University Press, 1962), and Chandler, The Visible Hand: The
Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Harvard
University Press, 1977); Louis Galambos, "The Emerging
Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History," Business
History Review 44 (1970): 471-493, and Galambos, "Technology,
Political Economy, and Professionalization: Central Themes of the
Organizational Synthesis," Business History Review 57 (1983):
471-493. A valuable review (and gentle critique) of the
organizational paradigm, from the pen of a former Galambos
student, is Brian Balogh, "Reorganizing the Organizational
Synthesis: Federal-Professional Relations in Modern America,"
Studies in American Political Development 5 (1991): 119-172.
'^Theda Skocpol,

for example, "When the Depression hit, therefore, the
weak
U.S. had (for a major industrial nation) a bureaucratically
^See,

^

.

I

argue that Lilienthal's experience in rebuilding the

PSC in Madison and then creating

a

new agency in the

Tennessee Valley suggests that the speed with which an
aggressive public agency could be built and put into action
was dependent more upon administrative and statutory
intent. Detailed studies of numerous other agencies are

needed before definitive conclusion can be drawn, but it
seems clear that at the TVA, Lilienthal was unhindered by
the lack of any long-standing "state capacity." It may be

the case, for instance, that the NRA

'

s

commitment to

cartel ization and its origins as an agency designed to

address the Depression as

a

problem of overproduction

(rather than underconsumption) had as much to do with the

agency's domination by large-scale industrial firms.
Skocpol and her colleagues make other contributions

that

I

believe speak directly and accurately to my analysis

of Lilienthal's career. During his years at the PSC and
TVA,

Lilienthal came to identify himself with his agencies.

He developed what was for all practical purposes a

proprietary attitude about the agencies, and this

bureaucratic allegiance had

a

profound influence upon his

policies and politics. He became what Margaret Weir and
national government, and one in which existing administrative
capacities were poorly coordinated," in Skocpol, "Political
Response," p. 175.
see Ellis Hawley, The New Deal and the Probl em
of Monopoly. A Study in Economic Ambivalence (Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 1966)
^On the NRA,
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Theda Skocpol have called a "state manager," who made these

public bureaucracies into relatively autonomous agents in
the reshaping of America's political economy. Ultimately,
the inherently conservative nature of Lilienthal's interest
in bureaucratic self-preservation accelerates the

articulation of the equally conservative tendencies within
the keynesian program.
As a state manager, Lilienthal was constantly trying

to balance two conflicting strains in his ideology. On the
one hand, he believed that technical experts

—

lawyers,

economists, and engineers, could only be effective as

regulators if their agencies were relatively autonomous and
free from the partisan sway of politics. On the other hand,

Lilienthal understood that the administrative reformers who

staffed the New Deal's proliferating bureaucracy were

pursuing controversial and often expressly political aims
and they needed popular support to achieve these goals. The

administrators, essentially technocrats, lacked the natural

constituencies of union leaders or machine politicians, and
were also without the financial resources that accorded
corporate capital political power. To strengthen their
agencies and promote their programs, Lilienthal knew that
he had to win over the American people. In effect,

bureaucratic reformers had to sell themselves, and
Lilienthal the salesman spared no effort in this regard.
The tension between popular support and administrative

autonomy forced Lilienthal and others like him to chart a
careful course. The task for Lilienthal and others in this

administrative class was to elicit support without
relinquishing control.
As much as this study is both more and less than

a

biography of David Lilienthal, it is equally both more and
less than a history of the TVA. Readers should register

that caveat carefully, for anyone seeking a linear,

descriptive account of the Authority's first years will be
disappointed. Nonetheless, readers will,

within my thematic approach,

a

I

believe,

find

considered contribution to

the literature on the TVA.

Most accounts of the TVA conflate the rough mix of
ideas held by the first three directors into

a

single

vision. According to this standard interpretation,

decentralization was the unifying force within the new
agency.

In a recent example, historian Bruce Schulman

describes the TVA's decentralist vision as an attempt to,
restore a potentially sound agricultural economy
without undesirable heavy manufacturing, unsightly
urban growth, or fundamental change on the farms. The
TVA officials interpreted the Depression as a warning
against industrialization.... Decentralization implied
small-scale industries spread among rural
areas. .. .These beliefs became early TVA policy.

Schulman then notes that this strategy "precluded the
arrival of large firms that would bring to the Southeast
unions, high wages, and demand for labor." This is a highly

accurate portrayal of certain tendencies within the agency.

.

.
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It represents the philosophy of TVA chair Arthur E. Morgan,

whose social planning was complemented by

strong

a

attachment to the regionalist and decentralist tendencies
closely associated with the resettlement programs in the

Roosevelt administration.''
In the agency's first five years, however,

I

argue

that the TVA was for all practical purposes three separate
agencies, each with its own ideological agenda and its own
set of policies. Until 1938, when Arthur Morgan was forced
out, the TVA had no unified vision.

It is a mistake to

describe the early TVA as "decentralist." There were many
TVAs, joined at the hip, to be sure, but with separate

identities. Harcourt Morgan's TVA formulated agricultural

policies in close cooperation with the Valley's
agricultural elite

—

much to the detriment of small

farmers, tenants, and particularly farm laborers. Arthur

Morgan's TVA favored small-scale regional development and

practiced socio-cultural planning similar to the work of
Schulman, From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt. Federal
Policy. Economic Development, and the Transformation of the
South. 1938-1980 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1991), pp.
35-36. In another example, Howard Segal states, "TVA was always
more avowedly regional [than other decentralist projects]." In
Segal, "The Science of Decentralized Technology in TwentiethCentury America," 1984 ASEE Annual Proceedings, Session 2262.
Also see Nancy L. Grant, TVA and Black Americans Planning for
and
the Status Quo (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1990)
Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis. A Centu ry of Invention and
Technological Enthusiasm (New York, Viking, 1989)
For more on the decentralist elements in the New Deal, see
chapter 6. A useful introduction can be found in Paul K. Conkin's
Tomorrow A New World; The New Deal Com munity Program (Ithaca,
Cornell University Press, 1959)
''Bruce J.

.

;

—

the New Deal's rural resettlement programs. Lilienthal's

TVA pursued precisely what many scholars have neglected in
their portrayals of the Authority's decentralism
intensive industrial development and

a

mass consumption

strategy that located the TVA within the context of

a

broader national recovery.
As David Lilienthal consolidated his control over the
TVA, his vision became the TVA's vision. Lilienthal's rise

to power was paced nationally by the rise of the keynesian

perspective. That shared trajectory is the course that

chart in this study.

I

.

CHAPTER

2

REGULATION IN THE AGE OF "NORMALCY:"
THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT OF 192 6
Late in the summer of 1923 when David Lilienthal

joined Donald Richberg's law firm, the nation's railway
labor unions were engaged in a rearguard struggle to defend
the gains they had won during World War

I.

Like much of

the rest of organized labor, during the war the rail

workers had enjoyed a brief period of wage hikes,

membership gains, and limited but significant state support
for collective bargaining; by 1923, all of this was gone.

Antagonistic court decisions, hostile legislation, and an
unsuccessful strike left the railroad unions struggling to
stop the hemorrhaging within their ranks, as wages and

membership went into

a

sharp declined

Entering into labor law with Richberg, the Chicago

reformer who had succeeded the late Glenn Plumb as the
chief counsel for the railroad brotherhoods and shopcrafts,
the twenty-four year-old Lilienthal understood that his

work would be difficult and not especially remunerative. He
had done everything but break down the door to Richberg's

office in order to get the position as junior associate

with the man who would become one of Lilienthal

's

many

For overviews of labor's problems during the early 1920s,
A Histo ry of the American
see, Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years.
Worker. 1920-1933 (Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1966), esp. Part I,
House of
pp. 45-243; also see, David Montgomery, The Fall of the
Labor. The Workplace, the State, and American Labor Activ ism,
1865-1925 (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 370^
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mentors. Having recently parted ways with his father's old
partner, Harold Ickes, Richberg had little in the way of

a

client base beyond the modest retainer from the beleaguered

railway unions, and no plans to take on any staff.

Lilienthal's salary, therefore, would fall far below that
of his fellow graduates from Harvard Law School. Yet this

was just the kind of struggle that seemed somehow

appropriate for a young man who had at DePauw competed as

a

light heavyweight boxer while also serving as class

president and gaining Phi Beta Kappa membership. "The need
in the labor movement of trained men to aid in what at

times seems a pretty hopeless struggle," he wrote in his

introductory letter to Felix Frankfurter in May, 1921,
"adds fuel to my enthusiasm for the task which

awaits me."^

I

hope

The task now lay before him.

At a time when the American Federation of Labor
(AFofL)

endorsed minimal state intervention in the

marketplace, when many manufacturers adopted the antiunion, open shop "American Plan," and when Business

Republicans embraced a new decade as a return to
"Normalcy," the rail unions, Richberg, and Lilienthal moved
in another direction.

Working to expand the state's

see Thomas E. Vadney,
Wayward Liberal. A Political Biography of Donald Richberg
Lilienthal to
(Lexington, University of Kentucky Press, 1970)
Felix Frankfurter, May 1, 1921, Box 47, Papers of David E.
Lilienthal, Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University;
hereafter cited as DEL Papers.
^On Richberg 's hiring of Lilienthal,

;
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regulatory presence and strengthen the role of collective

bargaining in industry, Lilienthal joined with forces that
were building

a

new order based not on some mythic pre-war

normalcy but instead on models of state activism and
industrial relations that had flourished briefly under the

auspices of wartime necessity. But these efforts

constituted more than an attempt to stem the reversals
suffered since the end of World War

I.

Trying to recoup

gains only recently lost and to reshape industrial
relations, Lilienthal became engaged in a broader struggle
to reconstruct the country's political economy so that it

provided more permanent federal support for the rights of
organized labor and a greater union role in improving the

productive efficiency of American industry.

It was his

task to help recast the roles of the state, the railways,
and the unions.
To revive the railway unions' sagging fortunes,

Richberg and Lilienthal moved forward on several different
fronts.

Believing that favorable legislation might limit

the role of a staunchly antilabor judiciary and create

a

more favorable regulatory environment, they sought to alter

what had become an increasingly hostile political and

legislative landscape.

To do this, the labor counsels

needed coordinated action from the various railway unions,
a

difficult matter given the organizations' troubled

history of disunity marked by jurisdictional disputes and

.

ideological differences.

They also urged continued labor

support for a set of union-management cooperation

initiatives designed in concert with shopcraft officials in
order to strengthen the right to collective bargaining by

giving unions

a

greater role in implementing efficiency

measures and increasing production
The course charted by the unions and their lawyers was

deeply influenced the traditions of government regulation
of railroads.

Many trade unionists, for whom the idea of

an activist state evoked memories of union-busting

injunctions, and strikebreaking troops, embraced

voluntarist, anti-statist philosophy.

unions had

a

,

court

a

Yet most railway

more positive, if still cautious,

understanding of state intervention
different historical experience.

,

rooted in

a

very

Beginning with the

passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1888

,

the federal

government began moving slowly toward guaranteeing the
rights of railroad labor to organize and bargain

collectively. Congress continued to strengthen federal

regulation of the carriers' industrial relations with the
Erdman Act of 1898 and later the Newlands Act of 1913.

For

railway labor leaders, these acts were modest first steps

toward a sympathetic state, with even greater advances made

during World War

I."^

A very useful overview of federal railway labor
legislation up to 1926 is available in, A.R. Ellingwood, "The
Railway Labor Act of 1926," Journal o f Political Economy
^

.
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On December 26, 1917, with the nation facing a grave

transportation crisis, the government took control of the
railroads.

President Wilson appointed his son-in-law and

erstwhile political ally, Secretary of the Treasury William
G.

McAdoo, Director-General of the Railroad Administration

(RA)

and named railroad brotherhood president W.S. Carter

head of the RA's Division of Labor. For the railway unions,
federal administration was a model of a successful state

enterprise.

McAdoo issued directives that granted

significant wage hikes and extended the eight-hour day to
all railway employees.

To promote industrial peace and

enforce discipline on the shopfloor, he facilitated union

organizing and collective bargaining.

To mediate labor

disputes, he approved the formation of adjustment boards

with equipartisan representation from labor and
management.^

There was still dissent among some workers,

but most of organized labor carried with it distinctly

positive memories of the Railroad Administration.

All of

the rail unions, David Montgomery notes, had "waxed fat"

during the war.

An editorial in the Railway Carmen's

Journal put the case quite clearly: "If this is what
36(1928): 53-82; for labor's attitudes toward the state, see,
Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor Bruce Laurie,
Artisans into Workers. Labor in Nineteenth-Centu ry America (New
York, Hill & Wang, 1989), especially the epilogue, pp. 211-220;
and Victoria Hattam, Labor Visions and State Po wer. The Origins
of Business Unionism in the United States (Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1993)
;

^

Ellingwood, p. 58; Davis, "Bitter Storm," p. 85.

s

.

government control means, lets have more and plenty of
it. "5

Memories of wartime gains outlasted the gains
themselves. Defeats suffered during the period of postwar

reaction seemed all the more harsh in comparison with the
recent past.

Committed to a quixotic hope that some accord

could be fashioned to keep the roads in the hands of the
state, the rail unions rallied around the Plumb Plan for

permanent government ownership.

Named for its architect,

Glenn Plumb, the plan attracted the attention of the press
as well as support from certain members of Congress and

sectors of organized labor.

In spite of Samuel Gompers

'

long standing opposition to state enterprise, the AFofL at
its 1920 convention overwhelmingly endorsed the plan, but

the dominant conservative voices within Congress drowned
out labor's small bloc; neither house gave the plan serious

consideration.

The Transportation Act of 1920, or Esch-

Cummins, passed easily, and private management regained

control of the roads on March

1,

1920.*^

Railway labor's situation worsened as the Railroad
Labor Board, created under Title III of Esch-Cummins and
Montgomery, Fall of the House of Labor p. 400; editorial
in Railway Carmen's Journal 23(1918): p. 148, as quoted in Davis,
"Bitter Storm," p. 96.
^

,

Vadney, Wayward Liberal pp. 41-4 6; Montgomery, Fall of
the House of Labor pp. 399-401, 430; on Jewell and Stone's role,
see, Glenn Plumb to Morris Llewellyn Cooke, July 19, 1919, Papers
of Morris L. Cooke, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library,
Box 14 (hereafter cited as Cooke Papers)
^

,

,
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dominated by conservative Republican appointees, authorized
sharp wage cuts in the face of a deepening postwar
recession. The board then refused to hear union charges

that open shop systems such as the Pennsylvania were

deliberately undercutting the shopcrafts' wartime

membership gains by contracting out much of their
maintenance work to non-union shops that were not covered
by federal railway labor legislation.

satisfactory redress from

a

Unable to get

Labor Board now composed of

Republican appointees, the unions prepared to strike.

They

set a strike date for October 1921, but then backed off and

postponed the walkout.

In the midst of a fairly severe

postwar recession, the brotherhoods were reluctant to
support

a

strike focused primarily upon shopcraft issues,

particularly as management was more conciliatory toward the

traditionally stronger operators.

The shopcrafts continued

to bear the brunt of management's anti-union offensive, and

with their backs to the wall, trade unions representing
400,000 railroad workers reversed themselves and went on

strike on July

1,

1922.''

Characterized by David Montgomery as "grimly

determined defensive warfare," the strike was seriously

handicapped from the outset.

The operating brotherhoods

For a detailed discussion of the strike, see Davis,
"Bitter Storm." For other analyses of the strike, see,
Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor pp. 399-403, 422-423;
and, Bernstein, The Lean Years pp. 211-212.
,

,
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remained at work, and management quickly filled many of the

vacated jobs from the long lines of unemployed workers.
While these obstacles severely weakened the shopmen, the

Harding administration's actions ensured their defeat.

Tennessee Republican Ben W. Hooper, the new chairman of the
RLB,

charged the workers with fomenting Bolshevism,

declared the strike illegal, and approved the certification
of new company unions.

Then, on September

General Harry Daugherty sought and received

1,

Attorney

a

sweeping

anti-strike injunction from U.S. District Court Judge James
H.

Wilkerson.^

Weakened by these reversals and without the resources
needed to sustain a prolonged campaign, the unions relented
and the strike withered.

The shopcrafts' hopes of

maintaining national standards crumbled.

The unions were

able to reach an accord with some lines, but most carriers
fell in line with the vaunted Pennsylvania and broke the

shopcrafts.
Age,

The industry's leading trade journal. Railway

smugly stated that by walking out, "Mr. Jewell" and

other union leaders "have become our leading open shop

promoters."

The strike deeply scarred the unions.

Membership continued its precipitous decline; the
Machinists and other major shopcraft organizations lost
between 70 and 90 percent of their rail members over the
first half of the 1920s.
®

Montgomery, p.

4

07.

The enmity and intransigence of

.
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the open shop employers had been expected, but the federal

government's hostility left labor embittered.

James

Wikline, General President of the International Brotherhood
of Blacksmiths, voiced this anger in the AFofL organ, the

American Federa tionist

.

"The strongly organized forces of

an army of employers made the most vicious and most wicked

attack on organized labor in the history of this splendid
movement," Wikline charged.

Labor had to defend itself not

only against capital's assaults, but "also against a

political administration that permitted the use of its
officers to aid in this attack."'
With its experiences of good and bad times from World
War

I

through the 1922 strike, railroad labor understood

that either the government would recognize and protect the
rights of organized labor, or it would assist in the

trampling of those rights. In the fall of 1923 union
officials sat down to make their plans with Richberg and
Lilienthal.

Among the key figures for the unions were Bert

Unsigned editorial, Railway Age 73(1922), p. 545; James
Wikline, American Federationist 30(1923), p. 746.
Membership Losses 1920-1924:
Blacksmiths .... 90 percent
Boilermakers .... 75 percent
.... 70 percent
Machinists
The Railway Carmen were the only shopcraft to lose less than
one-half of its members over this period^- still losing 20
percent, roughly 40,000 members.
Statistics from, U.S. Senate, 68th Congress, 1st Session,
Hearings Before A Special Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Bill No. S. 2646, A Bill to
Amend the Transportation Act of 1920, March-April 1924, p. 28
(hereafter cited as Hearings on S. 2646
'

.

,

)

.

M.

Jewell,

from the Railway Employees' Department (RED) of

the American Federation of Labor, William H. Johnston,

president of the Machinists union, and David

B.

(D.B.)

Robertson, president of the Brotherhood of Locomotive

Firemen and Enginemen.

Jewell and the RED represented the

various shopworkers, including the Machinists, who built
and maintained the roads' rolling stock.

For its part, the

RED functioned as a caucus within the AFofL for the men
from the numerous shopcrafts. The brotherhoods, which

represented the engineers, enginemen, brakemen, and others
who operated the trains, were both more powerful and more

conservative than most of the shopcraft and yard service
unions
Following Richberg's counsel, union leaders developed

strategies designed to recreate

a

more sympathetic state.

For Richberg, the necessary remedies had to be electoral
and legislative; court action offered little hope.

"The

courts," Richberg advised B.M. Jewell,

For information outlining the various railway unions,
see, Colin J. Davis, "Bitter Storm: The 1922 National Railroad
Shopmen's Strike," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, State
University of New York at Binghamton, 1988, esp. pp. 16-76.
The papers of the Railway Employes' (sic) Department of the
American Federation of Labor at the Martin P. Catherwcpod Library,
Cornell University, are a valuable source of information
regarding the shopcrafts' strategies during this period. See
Field, "Designing the Capital-Labor Accord: Railway Labor, the
State, and the Beyer Plan for Union-Management Cooperation,"
Unpublished paper presented at the 1992 meeting of the
Organization of American Historians.
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are the branch of Government most partisan in
opposition to the claims of organized labor. The
precedents upon which they rely have been
developed largely for the protection of private
property rights
Through political action in
getting new laws made by the legislatures and
obtaining executive support of such laws, there
is a possibility of change.
''^

The plans were direct; change the laws and the people who

made those laws, and the courts will follow.
While drafting broader electoral and economic

strategies in the months following the strike, labor took
immediate and direct aim at Title III of the Transportation
Act and the Railroad Labor Board.

The union executives

gave Richberg responsibility for drafting legislation that

would replace the RLE.

Throughout 1923 Richberg conferred

with the labor leaders, as well as defending several
officials against charges of violating Judge Wilkerson's
injunction.

Richberg assigned his new assistant the task

of crafting a more detailed proposal that they could then

bring back to the unions. The purpose of the proposed

legislation was two-fold.

First,

it would strengthen

federal support for labor's rights to organize and bargain

Richberg to Jewell, December 9, 1923; enclosure to Jewell
to D.B. Robertson, December 11, 192 3, DRR-CHS, Box 2.
Richberg and Lilienthal's commitment to electoral and
legislative efforts challenges a view of late Progressivism that
depicts a retreat from politics. See, for example, Barry Karl,
The United States from 1915 to 1945
The Uneasy State.
(University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 60-61. Karl claims that
during the 1920s groups of young lawyers who called themselves
Progressives, and were followers of Louis Brandeis and Woodrow
Wilson, "turned to the courts and litigation as their answer to
Politics was not
the problem of combatting their old enemies
the perceived route to take."
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collectively.

Then,

it would substitute more equitable

mediation machinery for Hooper's anti-union Labor Board.
Lilienthal began his work by searching for legislative and
legal precedents upon which to model the bill.^^

The first and most obvious set of precedents was past

legislation such as the Erdman and Newlands Acts,

superseded by Esch-Cummins

,

and the regulatory bodies and

principles established during the war under the Railroad

Administration and the National War Labor Board.

Despite

the inadequacies of the earlier laws, the unions preferred

machinery designed only to mediate between capital and
labor, rather than agencies with the power to arbitrate

disputes and deliver decisions by administrative fiat.
Lilienthal also recognized that labor needed explicit

recognition of collective bargaining.
Lilienthal then wrote to E.E. Witte at the Wisconsin

Legislative Reference Library, a clearinghouse designed to

provide legislators and others the technical advice and
information for which Wisconsin progressivism was widely
recognized.

Witte offered little hope that

a law

protecting individual workers from discrimination for union
activities would stand up in court.

Citing both the Adair

and Coppage decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and "an

unbroken line of state supreme court decisions," Witte
^^Richberg Memorandum, December 11, 1922, DRR-CHS, Box 2;
Lilienthal, Unbound Manuscript Journal, Entry of January 1, 1924,
DEL Papers, Box 193, p. 157.
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advised Lilienthal that

a bill

containing any provisions

outlawing anti-union strategies such as blacklisting and

yellow-dog contracts most probably would be struck down-observing, "there seems to be no hope whatsoever that the

courts will reverse themselves."
R.

Witte did add that John

Commons, the noted labor economist from the University

of Wisconsin, suggested that the courts might uphold anti-

discrimination provisions "if the public purpose of trade
unions were set forth in the statute itself," if in other
words, the unions were construed as some form of public

utility.

However, the cost would likely be high, as both

the federal and state governments would then attempt to

exercise considerable control over union rules and bylaws.

Witte was more hopeful about legal protection for

collective bargaining, observing that "there is

a

distinct

tendency toward the recognition of trade agreements [i.e.
collective labor contracts] as legal enforceable
contracts."

He also provided Lilienthal with a specific

model for mediation machinery, citing an article on

"Industrial Councils in the Electrical Construction
Industry" from the Monthlv Labor Review

.

These industrial

councils were composed of an equal number of

representatives from labor and management.

E.E. Witte to Lilienthal, September 25,

Box

2

.

The article

1923,

DRR-CHS,
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observed that such equipartisan boards seemed to function
more effectively than did tripartite boards, in which labor
and management's negotiators were matched by an equal

number of "neutral" members representing the public
interest
Lilienthal also sought the advice of the Canadian
Prime Minister, MacKenzie King.

King was the author of

that nation's Industrial Disputes Investigation Act of 1907
(IDI)

,

which had received

United States.

great deal of attention in the

a

Samuel Gompers and the AFofL had vehemently

opposed the act because of

a

clause that banned strikes

while an IDI review board investigated labor disputes.

The

law did, however, institutionalize labor's right to

collective bargaining.

Amidst the open shop drive of the

1920s, Lilienthal and the railway labor leaders knew that

they would have to incorporate some degree of public

involvement into labor relations if they were to gain

greater federal support for their unions, although they had
no intention of compromising labor's right to strike.

Former Deputy Minister of Labour F.A. Acland,

answering Lilienthal

's

inquiry on behalf of King, noted the

Witte to Lilienthal, September 25, 1923; "Industrial
Council in the Electrical Construction Industry," Monthly Labor
Review (August, 1923): 26-43.
F.A. Acland for MacKenzie King to Donald Richberg and
David Lilienthal, September 19, 192 3, DRR-CHS, Box 2; for an
analysis of the IDI, see, Bruno Ramirez, When Wor kers Fight. The
Politics of Industrial Relations in the Progressive Era, 189 81916 (Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 163-169.
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success of the IDI and other Canadian labor laws.

Acland

made specific reference to the 1922 shopcrafts' strike,

observing that while "disputes on the two sides of the

border were practically identical...,"
the work of the different Conciliation Boards and
the close attention given by the Minister of
Labour, and other members and officers of the
Government, resulted in an avoidance of any
cessation of work [in Canada].
""^

However, while Acland was most concerned with avoiding any

"cessation of work," Lilienthal and Richberg had to shape

legislation that balanced the state's interest in

uninterrupted rail service with labor's interest in durable
negotiating machinery that could yield fair wages, steady
work, and decent working conditions.

Through the fall of 1923 the labor counsels continued

their work.

Richberg succeeded in mending the split

between the operating brotherhoods and the shopcrafts that
had developed during the 1922 strike.

Despite their

reluctance to strike, the brotherhoods recognized the Labor
Board's deficiencies and feared that Chairman Hooper's

anti-union bias would endanger them all.

Railway labor was

thus united in its determination to abolish the RLB; and

unity was essential, for any open divisions in labor's
ranks would have guaranteed a debacle similar to that of
1922.

Lilienthal and Richberg completed the draft bill by

Acland to Richberg and Lilienthal, September

19,

192 3.

.
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December and brought it to the union officials for their
approval
The proposal had three central components. It replaced
the RLB with a five-member National Board of Mediation.

As

with the RLB, the Mediation Board's members would be
Presidential appointees, but as its title indicates, the

board would only mediate labor disputes when bilateral

contract negotiations between management and labor had
reached an impasse.

The board would have no decision-

making authority, thereby limiting the power of hostile
political appointees.

The proposal created four

equipartisan National Boards of Adjustment, one each for
the operating brotherhoods, the machinists and other

shopcrafts, the clerks and freight handlers, and the inland

waterway workers.

These boards would have the power to

decide disputes regarding work rules and grievances arising

within the context of an existing contract.

Labor believed

that national boards would establish nation-wide labor

standards and would strengthen the unions in regions of the

country where they were weak.

Finally, the bill made the

sixteen standard railroad labor organizations the workers'
legitimate representatives regarding the composition of the
Boards of Adjustment.

Naming the standard organizations

gave explicit state recognition to the unions, dealt

a

blow

to the legitimacy of company unions, and elevated the

status of the weakened shopcrafts by making them the equals

34

Of the operating brotherhoods.

The unions endorsed the

proposal in late December and began mapping out

legislative strategy.

a

""^

Before moving ahead with their plans, the union

leaders held several conferences with Secretary of Commerce

Herbert Hoover.

Having expressed disbelief and disgust at

the hard-line positions of Daugherty and Hooper, Hoover had

been trying to reduce conflict on the rail system.
efforts to forge

a

His

consensus failed repeatedly, however.

Throughout 1923 various union officials offered to meet
with management to draft co-sponsored legislation, but
their offers were rebuffed by the Association of Railway

Executives (ARE)
Cummins.

,

which saw no reason to amend Esch-

With their own proposal completed, on December 28

D.B. Robertson and several other labor leaders met again

with Hoover.

The meeting was amicable, but the Commerce

Secretary expressed reservations with labor's plan.

Outlining what became several of management's strongest
objections. Hoover recommended the formation of either

regional or system-level Boards of Adjustment, and

provision giving the President the power to declare

a
a

national emergency, initiate an investigation, and prohibit

strikes during a "cool ing-of f " period, similar to Canada's

Vadney, Wayward Liberal p. 54; David Lilienthal, "A
Practical Plan for Railroad Peace," unpublished manuscript, no
date, circa March 1924, DRR-CHS, Box 3; D.B. Robertson to Donald
Richberg, December 29, 1923, DRR-CHS, Box 2.
^'^

,
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IDI.

The union leaders left the meeting with Hoover's

commitment to further talks, but without an endorsement of
their billJ^
As they prepared their legislation for Congress, the

railway unions moved ahead with the Beyer Plan, the

cooperative productivity venture initiated on the B&O

Railroad after the shopcraft strike.

Named for Otto Beyer,

a member of the Taylor Society and advocate of scientific

management who developed and oversaw the program, the Beyer
Plan was an integral part of the union's efforts to

institutionalize collective bargaining.

The plan would

bring local and district union representatives into the
planning, introduction, and implementation of shopfloor

efficiency measures.

In exchange for labor's support,

management would abandon open shop and company union
policies, recognize the standard craft unions as the

legitimate representatives of labor, and promise to limit
seasonal layoffs and contracting out.

The plan also

explicitly linked wage hikes to increased productivity.
Labor leaders hoped that the plan would serve as

a

model

Robertson to Richberg, December 29, 192 3; The Memoirs of
Herbert Hoover. The Cabinet and the Presidency. 1920-1933 (New
York, MacMillan Company, 1952), pp. 105-108.
In his Memoirs Hoover claims credit for devising the
Mediation Board as established in the final version of the bill,
which became law in 1926. This account completely ignores the
provisions of the original 1924 version drafted by Lilienthal and
Richberg. Indeed, Hoover's involvement in 1925-1926 seems to be
centered around bringing labor and management together around a
compromise bill rather than drafting any part of the legislation.
^®

.
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for

responsible unionism as they pressed for greater

public support for collective bargaining.

"•^

David Montgomery calls the Beyer Plan the "most famous

offspring" of the "paradoxical marriage of progressive

unionism and scientific management."

Beyer was one of a

cadre within the Taylor Society whose experiences during

World War

I

transformed his understanding of labor

relations and consequently his strategies for improving

^

productivity.

Beyer had worked with the Ordnance

Department during the war, initiating a prototype of the

|

plan at the government's Rock Island arsenal.

I

At the

arsenal, he saw that the goal of increased efficiency could

not be imposed upon an unwilling workforce, but could only
be achieved through an arrangement agreed upon by

management and labor as equal and organized agents.

^

^

With

union-management cooperation, Beyer believed that industry
could achieve what he viewed as the socially desirable goal
of orderly economic growth through increased productivity.

I

The Beyer Plan is also known as the B&O Plan, and the
Glenwood Plan, for the Glenwood shop on the B&O line in which the
plan was first implemented.
For useful
The literature on the Beyer Plan is voluminous.
analyses, see, Montgomery, Fall of the House of Labor pp. 422424; Milton J. Nadworny, Scientific Management and the Unions.
1900-1932. A Historical Analysis (Cambridge, Harvard University
Ronald Radosh, "Labor and the
Press, 1955)
pp. 116-131
American Economy: The 1922 Railroad Shop Crafts Strike and the
^B&O Plan,'" in Jerry Israel, ed. Building the Organizational
Society (New York, Free Press, 1972), pp. 73-87; Sumner H.
Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial Management (New York,
Greenwood Press, 1968, orig. ed. Brookings Institution, 1941),
pp. 437-503.
,

,

;

:
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Along with Morris Cooke and other members of what

constituted a laborist caucus within the scientific

management movement, Beyer's ties to organized labor grew
after the war. After the collapse of the Plumb Plan, Beyer

began working with Machinists President William Johnston to
implement the Rock Island formula in the rail shops during
1921-1922

.2°

The Baltimore

&

Ohio was the logical choice for the

trial of an experimental union-management endeavor.

B&O

President Daniel Willard had spent the 1910s trying to
rebuild the troubled road, and important strategic

considerations influenced his support for the Beyer Plan.
Prior to Willard

's

arrival, the road had endured a period

of willful neglect under the administrative control of its

major competitor, the vaunted Pennsylvania Railroad.

Willard had to improve the B&O's competitive efficiency in
order to gain an edge on the rival that had run the road
into fiscal ruin.

But there was a personal dimension

behind Willard 's embrace of the plan as well.
Yankee farmer, he began working as

a

The son of a

laborer on a section

gang with the Vermont Central Railroad at the age of 18 in

Montgomery Fall of the House of Labor pp. 422, 399;
Nadworny, Scientific Management pp. 116-117; For studies of the
laborist wing of the Taylor Society, see the excellent work of
Carlos Pabon. See "Mapping A New Political Economy: The Taylor
Society, Keynesianism, and Mass Consumption Capitalism,"
presented at the 1992 Annual Meeting of the Organization of
American Historians; and his unpublished dissertation (University
I gratefully acknowledge my
of Massachusetts at Amherst, 1992)
debt to Pabon 's work on this subject.
^°

,

,

.
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1879.

He had been a member of the Brotherhood of

Locomotive Engineers, and after moving into management, he
retained some sense of respect for the railway unions.

in

a New York Times report in 1925, Willard observed that he

was not receptive to Beyer's initial overtures; the plan

sounded too much like an industrial soviet.

He was won

over when the unions assured him that they "did not want to

infringe on the limits of control of management."

In

addition, he was impressed by the plan's trial run at the

Glenwood shops, where, he recalled, "in the old days they
[the workers] didn't care how long it took to turn out the

necessary work."

Although Willard 's acceptance of the

Beyer Plan and his disdain for the "Pennsy's" harsh labor

policies reflect the lingering memories of his wage working
past, his ultimate loyalties rested with the security of

the B&O's profit margin and the protection of managerial
prerogative.^^

Although union support for the Beyer Plan came at

a

time of great labor weakness, its support was not simply a

defensive response to organizational debility, as David

Montgomery has argued.

Beyerism involved a reformulation

of the wage relation, as the unions began to break with

restrictions of production, or "soldiering," and with the

Daniel Willard and Progressive
Management on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad (Columbus, Ohio
State University Press, 1992); New York Times January 4, 1925,
VIII, 4:1.
^^David M. Vrooman,

,

—

.

concept of a "living wage" which pegged wage levels to
notions of family subsistence and comfort.

claimed that soldiering had been

a

Bert Jewell

response to contracting

out or irrational planning by management that resulted in

intermittent layoffs.

"So-called restrictions of output by

workers," Jewell noted,
have been in practice only in industries which
afford its employes irregular or seasonal
employment.
There are today on the railroads no
policies or rules restricting or limiting
production, but if the railroads are going to
restrict, limit and reduce below the actual
requirements of the industry itself the working
time of its employes, then ... the employes [sic]
will have to take some action to safeguard their
interests
In an address to rail executives delivered in the pages of

their journal, Railway Age

.

Beyer declared that because

there was no consensual definition of a fair wage,

negotiations had to be "shifted from the dubious cost-ofliving basis to the basis of service and productivity," but
this could not be accomplished without "an equal balance of

bargaining powers."

Forging an alliance with the Taylor

Society's laborists, the railway unions were offering

management what they viewed as

a fair

exchange

productivity guarantees and labor peace for union
recognition, regular work, and wage hikes.

Montgomery, Fall of the House of labor p. 4 09; Bert
Jewell to Leonard Singer, December 4, 1922, enclosure in Jewell
to Richberg, December 8, 1922, Box 2, DRR-CHS Otto S. Beyer Jr.
"The Employee Morale of Our Railroads," Railway Acre 75(1923), pp
656-657.
,

;
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Labor recognized the limits of the Beyer Plan.
open shop roads showed absolutely no interest.

The

Elisha Lee,

a Vice President of the Pennsylvania Railroad and a
member

of the more conservative faction of the scientific

management movement, charged that the independent trade
unions were replacing collective bargaining with

"collective coercion" and thus deliberately maintaining

artificially high labor costs.

Management's only proper

response, Lee claimed, was support for employee

representation plans, commonly known as company unions.
The unions charged that even in the B&O's shops, the road's

management acted in bad faith by failing to deliver wage
hikes as both productivity and the company's profit level
improved, by hiring temporary workers not covered by the

union agreement, and by continuing to lay off permanent
employees.

Had the plan been the unions' only strategy,

it could not possibly have succeeded.

However, viewed

within the context of other political and legislative
efforts, the Beyer Plan was part of a broader offensive

strategy designed to reinvigorate the labor movement and
secure for labor a more permanent role in America's

political economy.

Elisha Lee, "Labor Problems from an Engineer's Point of
View," Railway Age 73(1922), p. 1193; Slichter, Union Policies,
Labor, p.
pp. 480-493, 496-497; Montgomery, Fall of the Hou se of
423

.

41

Throughout the winter of 1923-1924 the labor leaders
and their lawyers continued to prepare their bill for
Congress.

Facing a legislative leadership dominated by

standpat Republican regulars, and

a

presidential

administration that was perhaps less corrupt but no less
conservative than its predecessor, Lilienthal and Richberg

anticipated

a

difficult struggle.

Organized labor did have

allies in Congress, however, and it was these loosely

organized blocs of progressive insurgents to whom the
bill's authors turned for support.

Hoping to forge a

bipartisan coalition that would draw together enough
Democrats and progressive Republicans, the labor counsels
asked Democratic Representative Alben Barkley and

Republican Senator R.B. Howell to jointly sponsor the bill.
A Kentucky Democrat who would later become Senate Majority
leader and then Harry Truman's Vice President, Alben

Barkley was familiar with the legislative maneuvering it

would take to bring this bill to
leadership opposed it.

a

vote if the House

Preparing for an upcoming

senatorial campaign, Barkley was eager to stand against the

regular Republicans who controlled the House.

In the

Senate, Howell was a first term Republican from Nebraska

and a close associate of his senior colleague, George W.
Norris, but he had arrived in Washington in 1923 with well-

established progressive credentials of his own.

A Naval

Academy graduate and civil engineer, he had served for ten
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years as General Manager of Omaha's municipally-owned
water, gas, and ice utility.

Howell also had relied

heavily on organized labor's support in his successful
Senate campaign.

The rail unions distributed free copies

of their weekly, Labor

Howell's candidacy. 2^

,

containing a strong endorsement of

On February 28,

1924, Howell and

Barkley introduced their bill into both houses of Congress.
Barkley spent much of the spring trying to wrench the
bill out of the grasp of the Chairman of the House

Committee on Interstate Commerce, Massachusetts Republican
Samuel Winslow, but the bill quickly went to hearings in
the Senate.

For several days during March and April,

numerous representatives for labor and the carriers stated
their views to the Senators, issuing charges and

countercharges regarding the motives for each side's

position on Howell-Barkley

.

While they expected opposition

from the Congressional leaders and from the business

community, the labor leaders still had reason for cautious
optimism.

Hoping to consolidate the labor bloc that lay

cautiously within the embrace of the Democratic party, many
regular Democrats were joining with the Republican
insurgents in backing Howell-Barkley.

In his detailed

On Howell's Senate campaign, see, Gutzom Borglum to
Robert Smith, Howell Campaign Manager, July 12, 1922, Borglum
Best known as the
Papers, Library of Congress, Container 83.
architect of the Mount Rushmore monument, Borglum was a supporter
of various progressive causes.

"
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Study of the bill, Robert Zieger observes that "chances
of

passage seemed excellent.

,
.

.

with the brotherhoods' political militance
increasing, the measure had the support of a
majority in the House and perhaps in the Senate
as well."
As the hearings opened, railway labor hoped to translate

those excellent chances into a victory that would reverse
four years of bitter defeat.

Richberg and Robertson delivered most of labor's
testimony, with the lawyer explaining the bill's features
and the union president presenting the organizations'

official position.

As the leader of an operating

brotherhood, Robertson's statements could have more impact

than the AFofL's Jewell or the Machinists' Johnston, still

reeling from membership losses and the negative attention

attendant upon the 1922 strike.

Robertson spoke first,

telling the Senators that the law, Title III of EschCummins, and the administration of that law by the RLB were

gravely flawed.

The 1920 Act failed to provide suitable

protection for labor, he stated.

The law provided for the

establishment of Boards of Adjustment, but left the
specific arrangements up to management and labor; the roads
resisted and the boards were not created, Robertson
charged.

While the law was tentative in the formation of

adjustment boards, it was expansive and ambitious in
Robert H. Zieger, Republicans and Labor. 1919-1929
(Lexington, University of Kentucky Press, 1969), p. 198.
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granting to the Labor Board "judicial" decision-making
powers over contractual matters that should have been left
to the negotiating parties.

Robertson asserted that the

RLB, dominated by an anti-union majority, was able to move

against labor when it never should have been empowered to
do so. 2^

Robertson went on to explain that the judicial power
of the Labor Board was distinctly one-sided.

While

management swiftly enacted the wage cuts authorized by
Board rulings, on the occasions when a decision went

against the roads, corporate lawyers hamstrung the RLB with
court actions challenging the constitutionality of its
powers.

"Robby," as the labor leader was known to his

associates, claimed that these views were not his alone,

nor were they held exclusively by disgruntled laborists.
He quoted a statement from George W. Anderson, a former

member of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the

Massachusetts Public Service Commission.

The effect of the

law, Anderson believed,

was to leave the labor forces at the mercy of the
exploiting forces that dominate the railroads....
The general result is that the mass of railroad
employees were, in my opinion, never so
embittered and so distrustful of railroad
The labor provisions of the
management as now.
transportation act are effectually discredited.
So is the Labor Board.
.

.

.

Hearings on

S.

2646, pp.

Hearings on

S.

2646, p.

2-15.
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Irreparably flawed, Esch-Cummins and the RLB effectively

undermined peaceful labor relations on the nation's
railroads, Robertson claimed.

Richberg spoke next.

Anticipating that the carriers

planned to smear Howell-Barkley as "class legislation,"
tainting it with the deep red hue of Bolshevism, Richberg
deftly tried to portray the bill as

a

moderate measure,

resting largely on successful precedents drawn from

previous legislative and administrative experience.

"Its

provisions and language are largely transcriptions or
revisions in minor details of present or past acts," he

assured his audience.
piece of legislation."

"It is not a radical or even a novel

Richberg went on to dress the bill

in the language of voluntarist associationalism that was so

actively promoted by Hoover from the Commerce Secretariat,
insisting that the state must serve as a generally silent
"Any compulsion exerted by Government in a

referee.

democracy must be based on contract," he noted.

To make

and maintain those contracts, there must be "conference

between representatives designated and authorized so to
confer, respectively by the carriers and by the

employees

"^^
.

But there were important distinctions between the

provisions and intent of Howell-Barkley and Hooverian

Hearings on

S.

2646, pp.

17-18.

.
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ideology.

Section

3

of labor's bill stated that the

representatives should be designated by both parties,
in such manner as may be provided in their
corporate organization or unincorporated
association, or otherwise, without interference,
influence or coercion exercised bv either party
over the self-organization or designation of
representatives by the other (emphasis added)

The bill went on to list the standard railway unions as the

legitimate organizations from which labor could choose its
representatives. 29

The inclusion of this language within

the bill struck direct blows against both the open shop and

voluntarism.

The Pennsylvania and other carriers played

very active roles in the formation and continued operation
of company unions, and such activities would be invalidated
if Howell-Barkley became law.

Further, Section

3

expanded

the role of the state beyond that of a silent referee,

providing legal recognition for the independent AFofL
unions and the operating brotherhoods as collective

bargaining agents.

While the replacement of the RLB by

a

National Board of Mediation with no decision-making

authority would reduce the powers of one state agency,
Section

3

made Howell-Barkley novel and precedent-setting,

not moderate or voluntarist

—

despite Richberg's carefully-

crafted assurances.

After Richberg finished his testimony, the roads'
executives took the floor to defend Esch-Cummins and the

Hearings on S.2646, p. 18
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RLB and to attack Howell-Barkley

.

Hale Holden, Chairman of

the Executive Committee of the ARE, challenged the bill's

legitimacy and raised the specter of uncontrolled wage
hikes if it became law.

Holden 's first steps were exactly

what Richberg had anticipated.

Howell-Barkley was written

by and for labor, without recourse to industrial

conferences or any public discussion, the ARE chairman
charged.

"It is, therefore, obviously a partisan measure,"

he observed.

Holden then went on to point out that Esch-

Cummins and the RLB had begun to restore order to labor

relations on the roads by imposing some much-needed wage
restraint.

The Adamson Act and McAdoo's Railroad

Administration during the war had awarded pay increases to
workers that weighed heavily on the roads, necessitating
rate hikes that in turn harmed industrial shippers,
farmers, and ultimately, the consuming public.

Holden

argued that labor would never voluntarily negotiate wage
cuts, and since the proposed Mediation Board could not

compel reductions as the RLB could and did, "it is a fair

inquiry to know how and in what manner [such reductions]

may be accomplished when the time arrives for an inquiry
into that subject.

"^°

Holden also questioned the wisdom of national Boards
National Boards, Holden claimed, would lack

of Adjustment.

contact with local conditions, and "would undertake to

Hearings on

S.

2646, pp.

31,

45.
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promote unnecessary standardization of conditions without
due regard to local differences."

Such federal

intervention may have been necessary during the wartime
emergency, "but they are an unwise institution in time of

peace."

It was not simply the formation of national boards

that troubled Holden, however, but also the bill's

provisions for appointments to the boards.
these boards are provided by this law in

a

"Nominations to

manner which

will effectively establish the closed shop on the American

railroads," the ARE spokesman stated.

would be closed out.

Company unions

Holden opposed Howell-Barkley in

order to protect company unionism and deflationary wage

policies
Daniel Willard followed Holden, registering his

general support for Holden 's claims.

The co-architect of

the Beyer Plan on the B&O, Willard was no open shop
ideologue.

It was the RLB's ability to dictate wage

restraint that was the paramount issue for Willard.

Not

only did Willard reaffirm the necessity for administrative

wage controls, but he lauded Hooper's Labor Board for the
reductions it had previously mandated.

Downplaying the

sporadic violence accompanying the 1922 strike by 400,000
men, Willard claimed that the board had achieved the cuts

"without violent protests, and it seems to me that this one

accomplishment of itself fully justifies the existing labor
Hearings on

S.

2646, p.

39.
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provisions of the Transportation Act.""

Even for Willard,

the bonds of union-management cooperation stretched thin

when corporate profitability was endangered.

Through the late spring, the bill's chances for

passage still seemed good.
Committee by

a

It cleared the Senate Commerce

13-3 vote, and Alben Barkley was making some

gains in his ongoing battle with the House leadership.

Winslow placed several minor pieces of legislation ahead of

Howell-Barkley on the committee's schedule.

Frustrated by

the introduction of what he described as "chicken feed

legislation" ahead of his bill, Barkley secured the

necessary number of signatures on

a

petition requiring a

floor vote on whether or not to release the bill

committee.

from

Amidst debate that the New York Times described

as "exceedingly bitter," and "marked by scenes of disorder

and confusion that recalled the revolt against Speaker

Cannon in 1910," Barkley swung forty Republicans and lost
only 28 Democrats, winning the bill's release 194-181.^^
If he could get the bill on the schedule before the summer

recess, and hold those votes, Barkley had his victory.
As Congress debated, the roads mobilized

business coalition against Howell-Barkley.

a

broad

A Public

Relations Committee of Eastern Railroads provided

32

Hearings on

S.

2646, p.
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" Zieger, Republicans and Labor
Times

.

May

6,

1924,
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literature to other business groups and the media.

The

United States Chamber of Commerce and the National

Association of Manufacturers both issued resolutions
against any changes in the present law, with statements
that closely followed the reasoning and wording of the

Holden and Walber testimony at the Senate hearings.'^

The

New York Times devoted considerable editorial space to

denunciations of the bill.

From March through July, the

Times delivered four editorials, one per month with the

exception of June, all of them unalterably opposed to

Howell-Barkley .^^
The unions attempted to respond in kind, but their

resources were limited.

Richberg went on the stump, with

Lilienthal often serving as his speechwriter

Always the

.

crusader, Lilienthal was prone to florid prose, as when he

attacked the "autocratic and high-handed methods of the
Newton "Fred" Arvin,

Pennsylvania management."
Lilienthal

's

closest childhood friend (later

Smith College and

a

a

professor at

respected Nathaniel Hawthorne scholar)

critiqued the speeches.

Offering praise and youthful

barbs, Arvin wrote,

get an enormous kick out of watching your
vigorous, masculine pamphleteering style develop:
already almost completely purged of those
I

New York Times
1205-1206.
76 (1924)

22:3

Railway Age

,

April

.

March 31, 16:4; April 23, 20:3; May

5,

1924,

;

:

New York Times
20:3; July 21, 10:2.
^5

7,

•

51

tendencies toward Crolyese which
reproach you for.

I

used to

The railway unions had their own newspaper, Labor

steady drumbeat for the bill.

,

strike

a

Politically progressive

papers supported Howell-Barkley

,

including the Cleveland

Press, which had roundly denounced Ben Hooper in 1923 as

"the traveling propagandist of conservatism."^^
Easley,

Ralph

long-time Chairman of the National Civic Federation

and a well-known advocate of union-management cooperation

,

wrote on labor's behalf, informing Richberg that he did so
"on account of so much unfair paid propaganda that is being

put out at this time by those opposing the bill,"^^

In

spite of these voices of support labor would have been

hard-pressed to match capital

'

s

publ ic relations prowess

Neither side of this mobilization got to see how

effective its legislative efforts were, as the leadership
of both houses in Congress successfully shelved Howell-

Barkley before it came to

a

Robert La Follette,

roll call.

aging leader of the Congressional insurgents, attempted to
force the Senate back from its summer recess in early June
to vote on Howell-Barkley and a farm relief bill, but his

efforts fell short.
however,

The propaganda campaign continued,

for while the bill was legislatively comatose,

Newton Arvin to Lilienthal, May
May 24, 1923.
47; Cleveland Press

2,

1924,

DEL Papers, Box

.

Ralph M. Easley to Richberg, August
3.

8,

1924,

DRR-CHS, Box
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railway labor legislation was not a dead issue.

After all,

1924 was an election year.

Labor's campaign on behalf of the new legislation was

part of what at the time appeared to be a growing

progressive sentiment throughout the country.

Since the

swift legislative enactment of Esch-Cummins and the death
of the Plumb Plan in 1920, the railway unions had realized

that they could not restrict themselves to economic and

legislative strategies; they had to broaden their electoral
presence.

In 1922 the railroad unions led the call for a

conference that would unite various progressive political
forces

,

while also targeting specific races in the off-year

elections

.

Both efforts proved fruitful

of the Plumb Plan went down in defeat,

allies such as Atlee Pomerene (R-Ohio)

.

Maj or opponents

including former
,

a product of Tom

Johnson's municipal reform movement in Cleveland and a
supporter of the Wilson administration's "New Freedom"
legislation, who broke with other progressives after the

war over the nineteenth amendment and the Plumb Plan.
Follette led

a

La

smashing sweep of the Wisconsin

Congressional delegation and R.B. Howell won his first term
in the Senate.

The conference called by the unions drew

broad support and led to the formation of the Conference

.
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for Progressive Political Action (CPPA) the following

year .^^
While the union leaders refused to consider creation
of the third party urged by the Socialist bloc in the CPPA,

they were clearly buoyed by their success, as well as by

international events such as the Labour party's victory in
Britain.

The CPPA gained momentum through 1923, and as the

presidential election year opened, further political gains
seemed likely.

Howell-Barkley

By June, as Congressional leaders submerged
,

the CPPA was gearing up to support a

presidential challenge by the venerable political warhorse,
Robert M. La Follette Sr.

With a convention set for the

Fourth of July in Cleveland, large blocs of Progressives

prepared to rally behind the Senator from Wisconsin.
Follette 's request, Richberg prepared

a

At La

draft platform.

Progressive hopes ran high, as LaFollette stated in

a late

June letter to Richberg, "historic work may be done in the
next ten days."^'

On Pomerene, see Otis Graham, An Encore for Reform. The
Old Progressives and the New Deal (New York, Oxford University
Press, 1967), pp. 60-61.
Although its analysis is clearly shaped by the emerging Cold
War liberalism of its period, the best narrative account of the
CPPA and the 1924 campaign remains, Kenneth Campbell MacKay, The
Progressive Movement of 1924 (New York, Columbia University
Press, 1949)
^®

MacKay, The Progressive Movement pp. 55-74; Robert M.
LaFollette to Richberg, June 20, 1924, Richberg Papers, Library
of Congress, Container 1.
,
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The CPPA was a loosely-knit coalition, however, and
its internal divisions surfaced as the convention date drew

near.

Many of the railway labor leaders supported William

McAdoo's campaign for the Democratic nomination, and feared
that support for LaFollette's nomination, coming before the

Democratic convention, would harm his chances.

After

a

protracted struggle McAdoo lost his bid; the railway
unions, and eventually the AF of

L,

endorsed LaFollette as

an independent candidate, but continued to oppose any

attempt to translate his campaign into

lukewarm support from

a

third party.

a

Such

crucial segment of his electoral

base hindered La Follette's efforts and foreshadowed a

perilous journey to November. ^°
La Follette made railroad regulation and Howell-

Barkley

a

The platform

major theme in his campaign.

endorsed eventual public ownership of the railroads, and
the Progressive Campaign Handbook declared that Esch-

Cummins was "a legislative crime," and "the railroads'

postwar charter of privilege."''^
take note of these charges.

The roads did not fail to

Railway Age wasted no time

attacking his candidacy and pointing out labor's ties to
the CPPA.

"For more than 25 years Senator La Follette has

been the most inveterate, reckless, and unfair assailant of

New York Times June 24, 1924, 1:7, and June 29, 9:3;
American Federationist 31(1924), pp. 563-565, 705.
^°

,

,

New York Times

.

September 23

,

1924

,
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private management of the railways in the United States,"
the journal charged, also observing that "his candidacy is

intended primarily to promote the Howell-Barkley bill."
The New York Times called Howell-Barkley "one of La

Follette's pet measures."

Atterbury's Pennsylvania

Railroad campaigned vigorously for the Republican Coolidge,
printing an antiLa Follette editorial by conservative

publisher Cyrus Curtis on the backs of dining car menus
that reached an estimated 30,000 patrons daily.
The Republicans attempted to undercut La Follette's
farm and consumer support by reiterating the charges made

during the Senate hearings that Howell-Barkley meant higher
shipping rates and higher food prices.

countered with
valuation.

a

The Progressives

complex argument regarding railroad

Richberg had served as the General Counsel for

the National Conference on Valuation of American Railroads
in 1923,

and worked closely with La Follette on this issue

throughout the election campaign.
the roads'

Progressives argued that

fixed costs were enormously overvalued, because

that value was based upon the reproduction costs

—

the

amount of money that would be reguired to purchase all of
If the ICC endorsed

the equipment at contemporary prices.

an "original cost" methodology, as the Progressives

suggested, then the roads' valuation would drop sharply,

Railway Age 77 (1924), pp. 45, 92; New York Times, June
1924, 1:5; MacKay, The Progressive Movement p. 165.
,

1,
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and rates could be reduced even if accompanied by any wage

hikes that the carriers claimed would follow the passage of
Howell-Barkley.

The difficulties inherent in making an

issue as complex as valuation a central campaign theme

illustrate the obstacles faced by the Progressives/^
The roads did have reason to be concerned about the La

Follette campaign's arguments linking Howell-Barkley and
original cost valuation.

The Cleveland convention's

endorsement of eventual public ownership of the railroads
once again raised the specter of the Plumb Plan, which the

carriers thought they had conveniently buried in 1920.

The

Plan had called for the sale of government bonds to raise
the funds for the purchase of the roads.

If the state

based the purchase price upon original cost valuation, the
bond issue would be significantly smaller and thus more

palatable to the public, and the roads' stock and
bondholders would receive correspondingly less compensation
in the event of a forced buyout.

Electoral success for the

CPPA and the subsequent passage of Howell-Barkley could set
in motion other legislation and regulatory decisions

favorable to labor. The carriers understood this threat

when one of their spokesmen charged at the Senate hearings
just months earlier that "this proposed bill is the heart
of the Plumb Plan in disguise."

nearly empty.

With the CPPA's treasury

La Follette had to curtail his whistle stop

Vadney, Wavward Liberal

,

pp.

67-71.
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tour, and most of the mainstream press either ignored or

condemned his campaign.

What most people heard about

Howell-Barkley was the vitriol heaped on it by its

opposition/^

Hobbled by its funding shortfall and worn

down by internal faction fights, the La Follette movement

stumbled badly.

Lilienthal's own lack of enthusiasm

reflected a malaise that pervaded much of the campaign.

"I

can't write you at length about the campaign," he confided
to Fred Arvin,

"because there isn't much length about

it.... I've lost the fine enthusiasm that we had."

The

labor leaders were having second thoughts as well.

Throughout the fall of 1924, the rail union officials began
backing away from the fiery oppositional politics that they
had helped set in motion.

With Ralph Easley and Herbert

Hoover serving as intermediaries, the Coolidge

administration informally initiated talks between the roads
and unions to ease tensions and encourage compromise

legislation even before the November election.
Given the impoverished state of his campaign, La

Follette fared relatively well on election day, finishing
second to Coolidge throughout most of the west and carrying
Wisconsin.

While many of his supporters had not expected

victory, they had hoped that his campaign would generate

Statement of C.E. Anderson, Hearings on

S.

2646, p.

276.

Lilienthal to Newton Arvin, August 1, 1924, DEL Papers,
Box 47; Zieger, Republicans and Labor pp. 203-204.
^5

,

.

(

votes for progressive Congressional candidates.

Railway

labor had hopes that gains for the Democrats, Republican
insurgents, and independents who backed Howeli-liarkley

would match the impressive gains of 1922. They would need
no compromise if they could pass the bill intact.

Results

failed to match expectations, however, and the net loss for
this "labor bloc" was three Senators and twenty-two
Representatives.^*^

Labor did not "capture" tho state;

indeed, the November defeats curtailed their inMuencc.

Over the next year, the CPPA collapsed, and the Republican

caucus stripped La Follette of his committee seniority.
The fiery Senator died the following year.

With

progressive forces in disarray, Howell-Barkley

'

s

fate was

sealed

Strengthened by its decisive victory, the Coolidge

administration took

a

more forceful hand in guiding the

roads' management and labor toward compromise.

Recognizing

that they would be bargaining from strength, but also

cognizant of how close to passage Howe! -narkley had been
1

the previous summer, the ARE voted to negotiate.

Labor

came to the bargaining tabic weakened, but stiil committed
to amending Esch-Cummins and abolishing the RLB.

Wary ol

each other, yet equally weary of industrial strife, the two
As late as August, they

sides met repeatedly during 1925.

remained far apart on several key issues,
MacKay, The Progressive Movement

,

p.

including labor's

228.

(

stand against presidential intervention, the formation of

emergency boards of inquiry, and a "cooling-of
f

period.

Given the distance between conferees, Jewell noted that

Robertson "does not feel that there is
of securing an agreement

.

"^^

a

great deal of hope

Negotiations continued

through the fall, however, and by January 1926, the
reluctant partners had hammered out an accord.
The new bill bore only a superficial resemblance to
its predecessor.

The most significant remnant from Howell-

Barkley was that the new bill replaced the RLB with

a

Board

of Mediation; backing away from their position of the

previous August, labor made this their sine qua non for any
compromise.

The similarities stopped there.

The new bill

deleted any reference to the sixteen standard railway
unions.

It abandoned national adjustment boards in favor

of local autonomy, much like Esch-Cummins

.

Howell-Barkley

had specifically mandated the formation of national boards
but the conferee's proposal stated only that boards could
be established with the mutual consent of management and
labor.

The bill authorized the President to create an

Emergency Board and declare a "cooling-of f" period

—

the

provision much like Canada's IDI that Jewell and Robertson
had so firmly opposed just months earlier.

While this

provision did not explicitly prohibit individual employees
from striking, its wording was sufficiently cautious to
^'^

B.M. Jewell, Memorandum, August 19,

1925,

DRR-CHS, Box

4.
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allow for the proscription of organized work stoppages

during a presidential inquiry.

While appearing to be

patterned after Howell-Barkley, the revisions embodied in
the restructured bill completely demolished the attempt by

railway labor to resurrect the more sympathetic federal

apparatus of the wartime government/^
The most visible symbol of the two bill's differences
came with the Congressional sponsors who introduced the

compromise bill in early January.

Unlike the insurgents

who fought for Howell-Barkley, co-sponsors James Watson of

Indiana and James Parker of New York were both conservative

Republicans, and the new chairmen of the two Commerce

committees in Congress.

In an ironic twist of fate, Watson

replaced La Follette as the ranking Republican in the
Senate committee after the party stripped La Follette of
his privileges.

With the backing of the Congressional

leadership, the Watson-Parker bill would not have to clear
the procedural obstacles faced by its predecessor.

Vadney, Wayward Liberal pp. 53-65; A copy of WatsonParker can be found in. Hearings of the Senate Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Hearings on S. 2306, 69th
Regarding the no-strike issue,
Congress, 1st Session, pp. 1-8.
the bill stated,
nor shall anything in this act be construed to make the
quitting of his labor or service by an employee an illegal
act.... Nor shall any court of the United States, or of any
state, issue any process to compel the performance by an
employee of such labor or service without his consent.
This wording prohibits injunctions against individuals, but does
not protect their organizations against court action for
initiating and coordinating a work stoppage.
,

.
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The Senate hearings and Congressional debate on

Watson-Parker reveal a bill characterized by guarded
compromise, and reflect the mutual resignation exhibited by

both management and labor.

Testifying on the bill's

particulars, D.B. Robertson told the Senate committee that
the carriers had agreed in principle to the formation of

adjustment boards, and that this was "one of the most
important results of the protracted negotiations which have

preceded the introduction of this bill."

Recognizing that

the bill did not compel the formation of any adjustment
boards, the labor chieftain observed that "the provision
.

.

.

might have little force were it not for the fact that

the agreement has been made that these boards will be

established."

He also spoke "with some hesitation"

regarding the cooling-off provision, noting that labor

continued to oppose the principle behind such

a

grant of

executive authority, but had reluctantly agreed to its
inclusion at the ARE

*

s

insistence

Declaring that "I have got to know

a fact

when

I

meet

it on the road," A. P. Thorn explained why the carriers

agreed to the 1925 conferences.

The 68th Congress had very

nearly passed Howell-Barkley despite the roads' strenuous
opposition, the ARE counsel observed, leaving management

determined to play

a

role in what they believed would be

the inevitable repeal of Esch-Cummins.

Hearings on

S.

2306, pp.

40-41.

Management

62

supported the proposed legislation because it had

successfully eliminated the most pernicious aspects of

Howell-Barkley during the negotiations.

In particular,

Thom pointed to the new method for creating Boards of
Adjustment, and the deletion of any explicit mention of the

standard railway unions.

Thom also told the Senators that

Watson-Parker's protection of company unions was crucial.
"A very important provision of this bill is found in one of

its paragraphs," he testified,

which provides that nothing in the act shall be
construed to prohibit an individual carrier and
its employees from agreeing upon settlements of
disputes through such machinery ... as they may
mutually establish. That means that
notwithstanding the provisions of this bill, any
carrier and its employees may agree among
themselves as to other machinery not provided in
the bill. 5°
If not wholly satisfactory, Watson-Parker was at least

acceptable, Thom concluded.

Echoing Thom's sentiments,

W.W. Atterbury and Daniel Willard, both formidable

opponents of Howell-Barkley, spoke in support of the new
measure.

They assured the legislators that the bill served

the public interest by promoting industrial peace on the

nation's railroads.
Despite support from this uneasy alliance of the ARE
and the labor leaders, Watson-Parker encountered stiff

resistance.

A dissident faction within the ARE composed of

^°

Hearings on

S.

2306,

10,

20-22.

5^

Hearings on

S.

2306, pp.

38-39,

145-163.

,

.
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open shop roads formerly aligned with the Pennsylvania

constituted

a

core of

"

irreconcilables

the compromise legislation.

,

"

in opposition to

After failing to block the

ARE's endorsement, where voting was apportioned according
to a road's mileage, the officers from several roads

including the Southern Pacific, the Atchison, Topeka

,

and

Santa Fe, and the New York Central Railroads broke with

their organization.

The dissidents found an ally and fell

in behind the National Association of Manufacturers

(NAM)

which led the assault on Watson-Parker.
James Emery, General Counsel for the NAM, spoke for
the opposition and offered two key amendments to the bill.

Noting that the Board of Mediation established to replace
the RLB would not have the power to dictate wage restraint
by administrative edict, Emery proposed a provision

authorizing the ICC to suspend wage agreements that the

Commission bel ieved would necessitate excessive rate hikes
He also suggested that Congress should strengthen the

wording of the "cool ing-of f " clause,

a

clause that was

already barely acceptable to labor, in order to avoid "any
ambiguous, uncertain language which

...

appeared to or was

intended to impair the judicial powers of the courts of the

United States."

The NAM counsel feared that the bill might

possibly be interpreted as limiting the judiciary's right
to enjoin unions as well as individuals.

He wanted no

64

legislative precedents attacking the injunction powers of
the courts.

Both the ARE and labor rushed to denounce Emery's
proposals.

W.W. Atterbury and Richberg joined in urging

the Senators not to tinker with the bill.

The labor lawyer

first questioned the constitutionality of the ICC

provision, arguing that the RLB's power to invalidate wage

agreements had been declared void by recent Supreme Court
rulings.

Merely transferring this power to another

administrative agency would not make it any more legal,

Richberg cautioned, as he went on to condemn the NAM
proposals to proscribe strikes and control wages as "a
return to some of the legislative theories of the Middle
Ages."

Concluding his rebuttal, Richberg reemphasized the

fragility of the Watson-Parker coalition, warning the

Senators that any amendment "will be regarded as a

destruction of the agreement.""
The support of the Congressional leaders proved as

beneficial for Watson-Parker as their opposition had been

deadly to its predecessor.

March 16 without
381 to 13.

a

The bill cleared the House on

misstep and without amendment, passing

Both sides focused their efforts on the Senate,

which prepared to consider the bill late in its spring
session.

Pressing for a vote before the Congressional

Hearings on

S.

2306, pp.

50-51,

" Hearings on

S.

2306, pp.

39,

^2

78,

64-69.
89.

65

recess, the ARE lobbied individual Senators and on April
24

sent a delegation to meet with President Coolidge.

By this

time, the labor unrest in Britain that would erupt into a

general strike on May

began to cast a long shadow over

3

the debate, as the carriers warned that strikes and chaos

were imminent without the bill's passage.
the Senate took up the bill.

On May

6

and

7

Making reference to the

turmoil in Britain, Hiram Johnson of California spoke in
favor, and La Toilette's 1924 running-mate, Burton Wheeler

of Montana, challenged the claim that the legislation would

harm an already weakened farm economy.
the Senate on May 12.

The bill passed

Although Coolidge expressed what for

him were strong reservations, fueled by the ardent

opposition of the NAM, he signed the bill on May 20 and the

Railway Labor Act became law.^^
Two days later, a New York Times editorial described
the charges made by the NAM as "phantom fears," heralding
the Railway Labor Act as
the all-important first step toward accomplishing
precisely that cooperation of labor and

New York Times
7:1, respectively.
5^

" New York Times

.

April 24 and April 25, 1926, 31:1 and

May 7 and 8, 1926, 18:8 and 16:8,
respectively; Curtis unsuccessfully attempted to have the bill
renamed "A bill to increase the farmers' working day from 14 to
16 hours, and to reduce the railroad man's working day from 8 to
p. 209.
7 hours," Zieger, Republicans and Labor
,

,

New York Times
and Labor p. 210.
56

,

.

May 13, 1926, 24:4; Zieger, Republicans
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management which Mussolini intends, but on our
traditional basis of self-government.^''
For several years, public reports of the law's success

continued to highlight the emergence of this new Era of
Good Feelings, and many historians since have portrayed the

Railway Labor Act (RLA) as

a

prime example of the liberal

corporatism that they claim dominated the country's
ideological landscape before the Great Depression.^®

pronouncements are not without merit

—

Such

the late 1920s was

indeed a period of relative calm on the nation's roads, and

examined in its final form, the RLA could be seen as an

embodiment of industrial self-government and labor-

management cooperation.
The surface calm of the late 1920s is misleading,
however.

Once enacted, the RLA's administrative machinery

was largely dysfunctional, and the reports of its success
were,

in Irving Bernstein's words,

substance."

"as much shadow as

As D.B. Robertson had testified during the

1926 hearings, the act did not specifically require the

formation of Adjustment Boards, it merely provided for
their establishment through joint negotiations and by
mutual agreement.

In an effort to strengthen company

unionism, management insisted on system-level boards, while

New York Times

,

May 22, 1926, 16:1.

for example, Larry Gerber's claim that Hoover and
Richberg viewed the RLA as the "perfect embodiment of the
philosophy of voluntarism," in The Limits of Li beralism, p. 200;
also see Radosh, "Labor and the American Economy."
^®

See,
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the independent unions preferred national boards but
were

willing to accept

a

regional framework.

boards simply were never formed.

In most cases,

the

Led by Chairman Samuel

Winslow, Alben Barkley's antagonist during the struggle for

Howell-Barkley in the House of Representatives, the newly
created Board of Mediation refused on procedural grounds to

hear cases that had not first been reviewed by an

Adjustment Board
disputes.

—

an impossible requirement for most

The unions contended that the roads almost

immediately began to subvert the law's intent by forcing

employees into company unions.
example,

The Southern Pacific, for

fired shopmen who refused membership in the road's

Shop Craft Protective League.

Attempts to contest this

coercion under the provisions of the RLA proved futile, for
the Board of Adjustment on the Southern Pacific was a

system-level body with its labor representatives drawn from
the Protective League.

Bert Jewell and Richberg sought to

bring this matter directly to the national Mediation Board,
but it flatly refused to hear the case.

Dismayed at this

rapid collapse of any semblance of equity and cooperation,

John Marrinan, the Secretary for the Board of Mediation and
a former

assistant to Hoover at the Commerce Department,

resigned his position, charging that "the inaction of the
Board has thereupon made it possible for some carriers to

.
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perpetuate

methods

Company union by practicing brutally coercive

a

"^^
.

As the backlog of grievances continued to build, and

the RLA's flaws became increasingly evident, many union

leaders became convinced that remedial legislation was
necessary.

J.G.

Luhrsen, President of the American Train

Dispatchers Association, wrote to Richberg in early 1928,

warning that,
the fear I so repeatedly expressed with
reference to the idle promises made by management
conferees on this Bill, is becoming more
realistic daily and until something compulsory is
enacted, the present R.L.A. is one of the very
best mediums through which carriers can and will
destroy organizations
,

Layoffs totaling approximately 20 percent of the nation's
rail workforce added a sense of urgency to labor's calls
for new legislation.

officials

,

to the RLA.

After conferring with several

Richberg outlined a set of proposed amendments
As described in a letter to Bert Jewell, the

central revision would make it "unlawful for

a

carrier to

decline to deal with the accredited representatives of the
employes," with "a provision for prosecution and punishment
by the government."

determine labor

'

s

In order for the Mediation Board to

legitimate representative

,

Richberg

suggested that

Vadney, Wayward Liberal pp. 77-78; Zieger, Republicans
and Labor p. 211; Richberg to Jewell, March 11, 1927, DRR-CHS,
Box 5; John Marrinan to L.R. Richey, December 22, 1928, copy in
DRR-CHS, Box 7.
,

,
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the Board of Mediation shall be authorized to
take a secret ballot of the employes involved, or
to utilize any other appropriate method of
ascertaining the names of their duly designated
and authorized representatives

Stymied by the ineffectual machinery wrought by the

compromise of 1926, the railway unions still hoped to
recreate

a

more positive model of federal regulation.

Beyond organized labor, few people possessed the sense
of urgency that had been so prevalent during the mid-1920s.

The shadows 1922 walkout and the 1926 British general

strike receded, and even labor did not bear the same

animosity toward the current board as it had toward the

widely discredited RLB and its rancorous chairman, Ben
Hooper.

Labor's political influence had also waned since

the zenith of the CPPA, and even this limited power

dissipated as union officials split in their choice of
candidates in the 1928 presidential election, with both
Hoover and Al Smith burdened with liabilities that limited
labor's support.

Despite the act's obvious inadequacies.

Richberg to Jewell, March 20, 1928, DRR-CHS, Box

6.

Richberg, Robertson, and William Green of the AFofL
worked for Hoover's nomination, in part due to genuine political
but also motivated by the need to block the nomination
sympathy
By late August, Richberg and Robertson were
of Charles G. Dawes.
growing disenchanted by Hoover's overtures to
"ultraconservatives " Urged by Frederic Howe to join
"Progressives for Smith," Richberg declined, however, noting that
Smith's pro-labor rhetoric was offset by his campaign associates.
"Should I be guided by the voice of Smith, or the hand of
Raskob," Richberg asked, questioning the influence of Smith's
campaign manager, the notoriously anti-union John J. Raskob.
Richberg to Frederic Howe, August 30, 1928; Richberg to
Robertson, August 28, 1928; Richberg to Martin F. Ryan, June 4,

—

.
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the unions were wearily stalemated.

Weakened by declining

membership and sagging political might, railway labor
lacked sufficient leverage to press their demands, and

union leaders were unwilling to risk the results of open
confrontation.

The Railway Labor Act remained unaltered.

For a brief period in the mid-1920s it seemed possible

that the unions could stem the reversals suffered since
and regain the ground lost since Wilson's wartime

1920,

administration.

If the legislative and electoral defeats

during 1924 crushed railway labor's boldest plans, the

uneasy compromise that yielded the RLA in 1926 had
sustained some hope for more modest gains.

The swift

collapse of mutualism that followed the act's passage

destroyed even the pretense of progress for organized
labor.

The unions would not recapture strategic momentum

until they had the harsh ally of economic depression, which

smashed the Business Republicans' hegemony and created

a

more favorable political environment.
The Railway Labor Act was not the ideal embodiment of

industrial self-government and liberal corporatist
ideology.

For organized labor, the law was a failure,

functioning only to undermine independent unionism; for
management, the law was a tool, designed to blunt support
for more radical measures and to serve their self-interest.

Still, the law set an important precedent, legitimating the

1928,

all in DRR-CHS, Box

6.

.
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principle, if not the fact, of labor's right to collective

bargaining.

As Richberg stated in an address to union

leaders in October 1926, the RLA "marks one of the great

advances in the labor movement of this country,"

because the right of organizing, the right of
representation by representatives of your own
choice, the right to negotiate and bargain
collectively, each one of these rights is set
forth as a duty and an obligation in law.
If the present statute lacked sanctions, acceptance of

these rights would evolve "by custom and by common

consent," eventually establishing the need for further

legislation if "it is necessary to swing the force of

government against them [the employers]."

Labor's efforts

were statist and not voluntarist, embracing an expansion of
the federal government's regulatory authority

At the end of the decade, in the midst of a deepening
Depression, David Lilienthal moved to the rich political
soil of the state of Wisconsin.

Although leaving labor law

for public utility regulation, the struggles surrounding

the passage of the Railway Labor Act shaped Lilienthal

new career.

's

In Wisconsin, his efforts to cultivate public

" Richberg, Untitled Speech, October

DRR-CHS, Box
5; as David Montgomery stated in his study of the Murray Hill
agreement involving the Machinists, the National Metal Trades
Association, and the National Civic Federation, "it was through
the agency of the country's political machinery, rather than
through voluntary associations of businessmen, that 'corporate
liberalism' most effectively wooed union leaders...."
Montgomery, "Machinists, the Civic Federation, and the Socialist
Party," in, Workers' Control in America (New York, Cambridge
University Press, 1979), p. 83.
5,

1926,

support for economic regulation, and to implement a

productivist program carry the clear imprint of the battles
of the 1920s.

.

^

CHAPTER

3

SHAPING THE POLITICS OF CONSUMPTION:
RATES AND REGULATORY TECHNIQUE DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION
Over the second-half of the 1920s, Lilienthal slowly

drifted away from

a

career in labor law and toward the

field of public utilities. Although he remained associated

with Richberg until 1928-1929, the daily demands of their

practice were not burdensome, and Lilienthal had enough
time to pursue other interests. Although these interests

covered a broad range of issues, and included assisting
Clarence Darrow in the Ossian Sweet murder/civil rights
case, Lilienthal 's commitment to public utility law grew

proportionally stronger as his involvement with Richberg
waned. Of course, the drift into public utility regulation
in the years immediately prior to the Great Depression

ultimately proved to be both fortuitous and enduring, for
it was in this field that Lilienthal made significant

contributions

.

First as a lawyer in the late 1920s, and then as

a

member of the Wisconsin Public Service Commission from
1931-1933, Lilienthal began a comprehensive reformulation
of the purpose and practice of public utility regulation.
^Vadney, Wayward Liberal
pp. 66-67, 76-82. Regarding
Lilienthal 's Chicago years, see also the work of political
scientist Steven M. Neuse, who is writing a formal biography of
Lilienthal, esp. "A Young Professional Makes His Mark," (draft
chapter, in this author's possession).
Lilienthal and Richberg severed their formal relationship i
with Lilienthal renting
1926, but they maintained close ties
office space from Richberg and working for him on an occasional
,

—

basis
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Relying on the experience he gained in crafting railway
labor legislation, and working closely with a number of

similarly reform-minded colleagues, Lilienthal also turned
his utility work toward a much more ambitious political
agenda. By the early 1930s Lilienthal envisioned government

regulation of the utilities as the fulcrum for both

economic and political reconstruction. With the country
facing a depression of ill-defined but obvious severity,
and with prospects for a quick recovery fading, Lilienthal

began calling for

authority as

a

a

sweeping expansion of regulatory

necessary response to the economy's sharp

decline. He linked recovery and continued prosperity to a

strong administrative state that would exercise

a

mix of

both oversight and control over virtually every economic

sector

—

regulation that would extend far beyond the scope

of traditional government intervention in the marketplace.

This work, which became in many ways a grand struggle,

began quite modestly. In early 1926 Irwin

S.

Rosenbaum,

a

Cincinnati lawyer who knew of Lilienthal through mutual
friends from Harvard Law School, suggested that the two

collaborate on a series of articles on the regulation of

motor vehicles and the trucking industry.

Lilienthal

understood the significance of trucking, one of the newest
forms of interstate commerce and an emerging competitor for
the railroads, and he eagerly accepted the offer.

Their

first effort appeared in the July 1926 issue of the Journal

75

of Land and Public Utility Economics
T.

,

the organ of Richard

Ely's Institute for Economic Research at Northwestern

University.

Soon after the publication of their article,

Lilienthal and Rosenbaum co-edited

a

serial publication on

public utilities published by Commerce Clearing House
(CCH)

.2

Lilienthal

's

new venture was similar to a tax service

also published by CCH, and consisted of statutes,

commission rulings and regulations, and court decisions at
the state and federal levels.

He sought a wide audience,

and to enhance sales, Lilienthal defined

jurisdiction for the service.

a

broad

The co-editors covered

regulated industries ranging from gas and electric

utilities to motor carriers.
proved to be more than

a

The publication's breadth

valuable sales asset, however.

Through his editorial tasks Lilienthal gained an overview
of the current status of public utility regulation across

the United States.

His familiarity with the perplexing

array of state and federal regulations and the various
legal precedents, as well as contacts with utility

commissioners, lawyers, and legislators, provided him with

^David E. Lilienthal, Bound Journal, Unpublished Manuscript,
January 1, 1927, pp. 174, 181-183, Lilienthal Papers, Box 193.
Lilienthal 's journals are available in a seven-volume
edition (New York, Harper and Row, 1964 et. seq.), but much of
the material from the years prior to his work at the Tennessee
Valley Authority is not included in the published edition.
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firm foundation for his work well beyond the post
with

Commerce Clearing House.
The editorial position was not an abrupt break with

Lilienthal's legal training, his work with Richberg, or his
political inclinations.

The serial brought the young

lawyer back to his training in regulatory law under the

tutelage of Felix Frankfurter, and the common-carrier
statutes that he compiled were familiar from his efforts on

behalf of the Railway Labor Executives Association.
Similarly, the loose-leaf publication recalled

his work

for the 1924 La Follette campaign, and the struggle to

define shipping rates, fair valuation, and rigorous

commission oversight as political issues.

Yet this career

move was not motivated only, or perhaps even primarily, by

Lilienthal's political leanings or his legal background.
Lilienthal sensed that during the 1920s public utility law
had languished, despite significant transformations in the

economic landscape-- such as the rapidly increasing

consolidation of utility interests within holding
companies.

The move into utility law represented a

promising career opportunity for an ambitious young lawyer.
Lilienthal was, in effect, looking to make his mark.

As he

confided to his long-time friend Newton "Fred" Arvin, "the
^service'

[the CCH serial]

is partly fascinating because it

is scholarly and creative; but

accounts for my zeal.

I

don't know how far that

Uncomplimentary as it may seem, the

.
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desire to ^put over'
important factor."

a

^Big Thing' seems to be the most

Money, too, seems to have entered

Lilienthal's equation.

Despite his admiration for and

loyalty to Donald Richberg, the labor law firm could not

match the handsome salary and royalties offered by Commerce
Clearing House.
Lilienthal,

As Felix Frankfurter gently reminded

"the interests to which you are devoted are not

on the side of the biggest money bags."^

Indeed, Lilienthal's editorial work paid dividends

well beyond a more secure and substantial salary, as he

accrued professional status as well.

He parlayed his

growing expertise into speaking engagements before various
community and civic groups around Chicago, and began

teaching

a

University.

course on public utility law at Northwestern
He also published several articles on

contemporary regulatory trends in two prestigious legal
journals, the law reviews at Columbia and Harvard.
4

In his articles, Lilienthal focused on the challenges

facing regulatory bodies due to the technological and

institutional changes within the utility industries.

He

noted that the emergence of the holding company as the

^Lilienthal to Newton Arvin, October 29, 1927, and.
Frankfurter to Lilienthal, October 28, 1929, Lilienthal Papers,
Boxes 48 and 49 respectively.
For surveys of regulatory issues during the early 1900s,
see, Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation (Cambridge, Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 1984) and Martin J. Sklar, The
Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism. 1890-1916 (New
York, Cambridge University Press, 1988)
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dominant corporate form among utilities had transformed
these enterprises, integrating the local operating

companies into national systems.

American Telephone and

Telegraph and electric power giants such as Commonwealth
and Southern and Electric Bond and Share had facilitated
the diffusion of technological developments including long-

distance telephone communications and regional electrical
grids, Lilienthal observed, but state regulatory

commissions were ill-equipped, intellectually and legally,
to confront these new realities.

Few commissions had kept

pace with these changes. Lilienthal argued that these state

bodies could provide competent oversight of the utilities,
but only if they had larger, better-trained staffs; utility

commissions could not function if they served as the

warehouses for the detritus of political sinecures.^
Lilienthal

's

attempts to formulate a methodology for

regulating holding companies were quite timely.

By the

late 1920s many economist were observing that these firms

were largely immune to both federal and state oversight.
Indeed, Columbia economist James

C.

Bonbright, who co-

authored the landmark study The Holding Company. Its Public

Significance and Its Regulation

,

argued that while there

were many imperatives behind the formation of these firms,

"freedom from regulation is likely to be the determining

^David E. Lilienthal, "The Regulation of Public Utility
Holding Companies," Columbia Law Review 29 (1929), pp. 404-406.

^
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factor."

Lilienthal urged that the holding companies ought

to be more stringently controlled by the individual
states,

not simply because they were the "real proprietors" of

their operating subsidiaries, but because, "more
important ly]
[

,

they are managers as well, making decisions,

sharing responsibility, and in constant touch with the

properties which serve the public."

The states could

achieve this control by indirect means, regulating
financial transactions between the holding company and its

operating subsidiaries that were already clearly subject to
the jurisdiction of the state commissions.

Implementing

such indirect regulation would be a difficult task, for

commissions would not only have to establish the legitimacy
of state, and not federal, authority, but many state

commissions lacked both the willingness and the capacity to
assume this aggressive posture.

Inadeguate staffing

rendered many commissions unable to pursue the complex

accounting and technical reviews of the burgeoning utility
industries

.

The relative weakness of most commissions also

grew out of confusion regarding the purpose of the state
bodies.

"

[CJommissions are confused as to their proper

function," Lilienthal wrote to Frankfurter in October 1929,

^James C. Bonbright and Gardiner C. Means, The Holding
Its Public Significance and Its Regulation (New York,
Company.
McGraw Hill, 1932), pp. 51-52. Lilienthal, "Regulation of Public
Utility Holding Companies," p. 408.

.
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are they courts, to listen to the evidence, weight
it
render carefully drawn findings... or are they
administrative tribunals, conducting investigations
and reaching conclusions upon the kind of evidence
[as] skilled investigators.

Lilienthal favored the latter agenda, as his subsequent

work in Wisconsin would clearly demonstrate, for he

believed that the consuming public lacked the resources
necessary for adequate representation before the
commissions.

If the regulators acted as neutral arbiters,

they were not serving in the public interest.
Still, aggressive regulation could not be effective,
as long as agency appointments remained substandard.

Lilienthal told Frankfurter that the quality of commission

personnel was "on the decline."

Elaborating on this theme

in the draft of a later speech,

Lilienthal excoriated "the

appointment of pygmy politicians, usually feeble lawyers as
the result of 'deals,'" that has "done more to discredit

regulation" in his opinion than any other factor.
states must show

bodies

a

The

renewed commitment to their regulatory

^

With this work, Lilienthal established a reputation as
one of the leading authorities in utility law, gaining a

national audience and attracting in particular the

attention of James Bonbright and his colleague at Columbia,
Adolf A. Berle Jr.

In summer 1929 both Eerie and Bonbright

^Lilienthal to Frankfurter, October 1929, Lilienthal, "The
Future Development of Public Utility Regulation," 1 September
1930, Lilienthal Papers, Boxes 49 and 4 respectively.

!
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were involved in a New York state investigation of public

utility holding companies touched off by

a

series of

maneuvers by the Morgan financial interests.

That June, in

their first exchange of letters, Berle noted that he and
Bonbright had read with great interest Lilienthal's recent

article in the Columbia Law Review

.

"it is an excellent

and scholarly piece of work," Berle wrote, "and the subject
is peculiarly alive."''

Through the late 1920s, Lilienthal

was building a reputation as an expert in his field, and

forging the personal and professional bonds that left him

well-positioned, when an opportunity arose, to put over his
"Big Thing."

Lilienthal's reputation among other supporters of

regulatory activism was greatly enhanced when he became
involved in a protracted legal struggle over telephone
rates in Chicago.

In 1922, the Illinois Commerce

Commission ordered the Illinois Bell Telephone Company to
reduce its rates within the city of Chicago.

Claiming that

the reductions would lower their rates to unacceptable
levels, Illinois Bell challenged the order in court.

A

number of legal precedents had established that public

utilities were entitled to "fair" minimum rates of return
on their investments, generally gauged at between six and

eight percent; lower rates would be confiscatory upon stock
to Lilienthal, 29 June 1929, Papers of A. A. Berle
Jr., Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Box 9 (hereafter
cited as Berle Papers)
''Berle

and bondholders' property and therefore unconstitutional,
the courts had stated.

In 1923 Illinois Bell gained a

temporary injunction against the rates.

Several lengthy

delays followed, but by 1929, both sides were prepared to
go before the Federal District Court in Chicago.^

The city's lawyers, George

I.

Haight and Benjamin

F.

Goldstein, asked Lilienthal to help them reconstruct the

case they would lay before the judicial tribunal.

Preparing their case over the spring and summer of 1929,
Haight, Goldstein, and Lilienthal turned away from what

constituted a fair rate of return for Illinois Bell; they
centered their case on the relationship of the Bell

subsidiary to its holding company, American Telephone and

Telegraph (AT&T).

At their broadest, the counsels' claims

questioned the standing of the Bell company in the suit,
asserting that AT&T's ownership of 99 percent of the
operating company's stock reduced it to "a mere agency and
instrumentality" of the parent corporation.

As examples,

the city's advocates cited AT&T's use of local Chicago

exchange equipment

f ree-of-charge

for its long-distance

^The history of the Illinois Bell case can be found in the
record of its hearing before the Supreme Court of the United
States, as well as in newspaper accounts of the hearings in the
Supreme Court and Federal District Court. See, "Proceedings,"
Smith et. al. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 282 U.S. 133,
microfiche record of court proceedings, Rutgers University Law
No. 90),
Library; "Smith et. al. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.
Supreme Court Recorder 51 (October term, 1930): 65-73; New York
Times, December 2, 1930, 11:1, and, February 1, 1930, 2:4;
Chicago Tribune February 1, 1930, 1:1.
.
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operations, and questioned the fairness of prices charged

by Western Electric, the sole supplier of the local

company's equipment and the manufacturing subsidiary of
AT&T.

The counsels asked if AT&T was filling its coffers

by mandating imprudent investment in new plant, supplied at

monopolistic prices by Western Electric. The only way their
charges could be answered satisfactorily was to make the

holding company the legitimate target of the investigation
and set rates based upon a fair return on investment for
AT&T, they argued.

Lilienthal worked closely with Haight

and Goldstein in the drafting of their brief, which

stretched to

a

long-winded 600 pages.'

On 31 January 1930, the District Court in Chicago

ruled in favor of Illinois Bell, on the ground that the
local company retained a separate corporate identity.

The

court made permanent the seven year-old temporary

injunction against the Commerce Commission's rate order.
The regulators appealed, and the Supreme Court heard the
case during its October term.

In what Haight and Goldstein

declared a "partial victory," the court remanded the case
back to the District Court in Chicago.

With a statement

'Lilienthal correspondence with Haight and Goldstein, AprilJune, 1929, Box 49, Lilienthal Papers; "Brief for the Appellant,"
Smith et. al., 282 U.S. 133.
^°One of the three Federal judges in the case was James H.

Wilkerson, who had issued the sweeping injunction against the
For an account
strikers in the 1922 Railway Shopcrafts strike.
of the decision, see, Chicago Tribune 1 February 1930, 1:1.
,
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issued by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, the court

upheld the legal standing and corporate identity of
Illinois Bell, but then proceeded to significantly

strengthen indirect state regulation of public utility

holding companies.

Because the ultimate issue was whether

or not the rates are confiscatory upon the company's

property, Hughes declared, the legitimacy of its operating

costs must be more closely scrutinized.

All transactions

between AT&T and Illinois Bell must be subject to

examination by the Commission, including the use of local
exchange equipment for long-distance operations and the
prices charged by Western Electric for materials supplied
to the Bell company.

Hughes concluded by addressing the broader issue of
fair return on a utility's property.

a

Affirming parameters

set by the court in previous decisions, Hughes wrote that

utility is entitled to

a

a

return "equal to that generally

being made at the same time and in the same general part of
the country on investments in other business undertakings

which are attended by corresponding risks and
uncertainties; but it has no constitutional right," the
chief justice continued, "to profits such as are realized
or anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or

speculative ventures.

"^^

Though Illinois Bell emerged as

New York Times 2 December 1930, 11:1; "Smith et. al. v.
Illinois Bell," Supreme Court Recorder p. 72.
^^

,

,

.
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the ultimate victor in this rate case, the Supreme
Court's

demand for more rigorous regulatory inquiries and its

reaffirmation of ratemaking guidelines transcended the
particulars of Smith et. al., influencing public regulation
well beyond the boundaries of the city of Chicago.

Lilienthal immediately recognized the potential impact
of the Smith case.

In a follow-up to his 1929 article in

the Columbia Law Review

,

he outlined the opportunities for

greater regulatory activism implied by the Hughes decision.
Smith et. al. provided a sound legal justification for

oversight of the relationship between holding companies and
their operating subsidiaries, Lilienthal noted.

Transactions ranging from stock transfers and dividend
payments to the purchase of new equipment should be
reviewed by regulators.

Determining costs to holding

companies of services provided to its subsidiaries was, he
wrote,

"puzzling in the extreme," raising numerous complex

accounting and technical obstacles.

Surmounting these

obstacles would require larger budgets for commissions and
a commitment to technical expertise in place of the

political cronyi'sm that helped cripple such agencies.

The main precedent cited by Hughes was Bluefield Company v.
Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 679, 692, 693, 43 Sup. Ct.
675,

679

(1923)

.

"Recent Developments in the Law of Public
Utility Holding Companies," Columbia Law Review 31 (1931), pp.
195-198
^^Lilienthal

,

s
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The case also upheld the primacy of state rather than

federal regulation of utilities, and provided the

theoretical rationale for a pragmatic wariness exhibited by

f

Lilienthal and other reformers toward Washington.
|l

r^ot
I

\

;

I

surprising that many reformers were wary of Washington,

After two conservative Republican administrations, and

j

growing disillusionment with the progressive credentials of
I

the Hoover presidency,

Lilienthal observed that the

Court's decision in favor of Illinois Bell allowed each
state to "regulate the transactions within its own domain

according to its own conception of public policy."

The

decision, Lilienthal continued, "shows a clear inclination
on the part of the Court... to sustain state power over

what are in point of law and fact and tradition essentially
local problems

,

(emp.

his)

"^^

As the Smith case lay before the nine justices of the

Supreme Court, Philip Fox La Follette was surging to

a

landslide victory in the November 1930 gubernatorial

election in Wisconsin.

||

[

It is

The second son of Progressivism

'

late standard bearer, Philip La Follette campaigned in the

aggressive and contentious style of his father.

Hair awry,

jacket off. La Follette had crossed the state that summer.
The large-scale holding companies that grew to dominate the
"Recent Developments," pp. 206-207. That
Lilienthal 's positive appraisal of this aspect of the decision
was shaped by his consideration of the political terrain becomes
increasingly clear during his tenure in Wisconsin. See below,
^^Lilienthal,

PP-

.
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power industry in the 192 0s were the frequent target of La
Follette's attacks.

Charging these corporate giants with

"sinister and subversive practices," he asserted that "this
Power Monopoly [,] bent on gaining absolute mastery of the

energy of the present and future, has stopped at nothing,"
The young La Follette pledged to sweep the corporations out
of the halls of government, replacing them with "the

Progressive philosophy... that the public interest should
be placed above special privilege

"^'^
.

well-received throughout the state.

This message was
La Follette captured

the Republican primary by over 18 percentage points and, in
a state that was at that time

dominated by the Republican

party, the electoral bulge widened in November when the

thirty-three year-old candidate gained over 69 percent of
the vote.^^

Following his inauguration in January 1931, La

Follette began to assemble his administration.

He quickly

turned his attention to the Railroad Commission, which,

although an early model of aggressive state regulation, had
fallen prey to the budgetary neglect common to many state

regulatory agencies.

The end of one commissioner's

appointment and the resignation of

a

second meant that the

^^"Power," La Follette campaign position paper, n.d. (ca.
July 1930); Campaign Textbook P.F. La Follette Papers, Series
Box 1, Archives and Manuscripts Division, State Historical
Society of Wisconsin (hereafter, SHSW)
;

^^Miller,

La Follette

(1982), pp.

11-12.

I,
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new governor could name two-thirds of the Commission.

The

new governor hoped to find a chairman for the Commission

with the necessary expertise and

a

well-established

national reputation. La Follette first sought Basil Manly,
a veteran of his father's ill-fated 1924 presidential

campaign (and later influential in garnering Progressive

Republican support for Franklin Roosevelt's 1932 campaign),
then discussed the position with James

M.

Landis, a rising

star on the faculty at Harvard Law School; both declined
the position, primarily because the $5,000 annual salary

was too low.

Without a strong enough candidate from

outside the state to take the chairmanship, La Follette

turned to one of his family's long-time supporters,

Theodore Kronshage,

a

member of the Board of Regents of the

University of Wisconsin and counsel for the state's League
of Municipalities.

With Kronshage and the previously-

appointed Andrew

McDonald giving the governor

R.

a two-

thirds Wisconsin majority on the Commission, he had enough

political leeway to offer the remaining seat to an out-ofstater with impressive credentials but perhaps somewhat
less status than either Manly or Landis.

Based on the very

strong recommendation of Donald Richberg, La Follette

turned to Lilienthal to fill the third

seat.''^

^^"History of the Railroad Commission," n.d. (post 1931),
Records of the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, Central
Files, Progress File, Series 1825, Box 3, State Historical
Society of Wisconsin (hereafter cited as PSC Records) Wisconsin
is regularly cited as a leader in regulatory innovation; see, for
.
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Lilienthal recognized the opportunity that lay before
him.

The governor had outlined an ambitious regulatory

agenda, and further, the central actors in that political

drama were certain to receive the national exposure that

seemed to be habitually accorded Wisconsin Progressivism.

Eager to return to the public arena, in early February
Lilienthal accepted La Follette's offer.

Kronshage's nor Lilienthal

's

As neither

name had been running through

the state capitol's rumor mill, the nominations came as

something of a surprise, but on Wednesday 11 February 1931,
the state Senate unanimously confirmed both appointments.'"''

Wrapping up much of his Chicago practice in just over six
weeks, Lilienthal prepared for the move to Madison.

On 20

March, the new commissioner's friends and associates

honored him with

a

farewell banquet.

Among those unable to

attend was La Follette, whose telegram reflected the tone
for much of his new appointee's work in Wisconsin.

"We are

hoping," La Follette wrote, "that your David is equipped

with the necessary Biblical weapons.

Goliath is waiting."

The Public Utility

Brandishing accounting and

example, McCraw, Prophets of Regulation p. 24 3.
Basil Manly to P.F. La Follette, 12 January 1931; Felix
Frankfurter to P.F. La Follette, and Robert M. La Follette Jr. to
P.F. La Follette, 14 January 1931, P.F. La Follette Papers,
Series I, Box 41; Donald R. Richberg to P.F. La Follette, 23
,

January 1931.
February 1931, P.F. La
Follette Papers, Series I, Box 4; Milwaukee Journal, 6 February
1931, 1:3 and 6:1, and 11 February 1931, 5:1.
^''Lilienthal to La Follette,

5
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engineering reports, and invoking legislative statutes,
La
Follette's David chose weapons considerably more modern
Still some three months short of his thirty-second

birthday, in late March 1931 Lilienthal arrived in Madison
as the youngest member of the Wisconsin Railroad

Commission.

He came with an emerging national reputation

as an expert in the field of public utility law.

As one of

the architects of a rejuvenated regulatory activism that

was then gaining momentum across the country, he would

cultivate the shift in popular sentiment against the

utility holding companies and other large-scale firms that
had reaped the windfall of the 1920s but whose pockets had

shortened in the depths of the Depression.

Wisconsin would be a brief two years.

His tenure in

However, by the time

Lilienthal left in June 1933 he had broadened the

Commission's scope of action, refined its regulatory
technique, and left in place a model that was the center of

much debate among interested observers. By 1933, Lilienthal
had forged his new politics of consumption.

Among his first tasks upon arriving in Madison was the

administrative reorganization of the Commission.

cornerstone of this restructuring was

a

The

statute enacted

during the spring session of the state legislature.

The

Duncan Act invested the Railroad Commission with broad new

^^P.F.

La Follette to Lilienthal,

Papers, Box 52.

20 March 1931,

Lilienthal
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powers and renamed it the Public Service Commission
(PSC)
to signal the extent of the changes.

The law strengthened

the PSC's ability to indirectly regulate holding companies,

with more control over the issue of utility securities.

authorizing the agency to order

a

By

halt to dividend payments

if the commissioners believed that such payments would

endanger the utility's viability, the statute prevented
holding companies weakened by the Depression from forcing

otherwise stable operating subsidiaries into insolvency
simply to ease

a

capital crisis within the parent firm.

Finally, the law had an "assessment of costs" clause, that

required utilities to pay the cost of the Commission's

investigations and rate hearings.

Along with

a

number of

statutes and resolutions designed to promote public
ownership, the law reorganizing the PSC was described in
the New York Times as one of the "far-reaching and radical

measures," that made Wisconsin "a leader in matters of

public utility regulation and control."^''
The next step for the commissioners was assembling

staff that could implement the new agenda.

a

Several

previous administrations, progressive as well as
conservative, had neglected the agency's personnel and

budgetary needs.

With

a

severely circumscribed state

Governor Philip F. La Follette pp. 17-21;
Lilienthal, "The Work of the Public Service Commission During
Governor La Follette's Administration," n.d. (ca. spring 1932);
New York Times 5 July 1931, II, 2:6.
^'Miller,

,

.
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administrative capacity, the commissioners needed to build
a

bureaucratic infrastructure from the ground up.

year-end report to the governor noted, "on April

As the
l

[1931]

we found that the Commission was wholly without an

accounting department; in fact," the report continued,
"there was not a single individual on the staff who could
be properly described as an accountant."

Recognizing that

regulation "must lean heavily upon accounting control," the
PSC moved quickly to hire nineteen accountants, and

established an Accounting Department "of very high
caliber."

The new regime also created a Rates and Research

Department to coordinate rate and valuation investigations,
and to study "the economic problems involved in public

ownership enterprises," hiring the managing editor of the
Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics
Morehouse, as its chief.

.

Edward W.

The Commission also bolstered the

Engineering Department in order to bring it "in line with
the needs of the State and of the Commission," recruiting
from the California utility board a highly respected

engineer, A.V. Guillou.

Department heads filled out their

staffs with university-trained economists, engineers, and
statisticians.

Rather than limiting the commission's

administrative reach, the relative neglect of previous

93

administrations afforded La Follette's appointees

a

relatively free hand in molding the revitalized agency. 2°
With the organization restructured, the agency sought
to redefine its mission by adopting a more active, and at

times perhaps belligerent, regulatory posture.

At this

point, Lilienthal emerged as dominant member of the

Commission.

In language closely paralleling Lilienthal 's

October 1929 memo to Frankfurter, the PSC's 1931 report to
La Follette informed the governor that the bureau's

reorganization had "practically revolutionized our work,"
changing the Commission
from a body conducting hearings in proceedings where
the preparation and presentation of the facts was
[sic] left to the parties directly interested to a
body initiating and conducting investigations in the
interest of the public and instituting proceedings on
its own motion in which the facts pertinent to the
public interest are assembled and presented by the
Commission's staff.

Despite being the youngest member of the commission, with
no political connections within the state, Lilienthal was

recasting the PSC according to his own vision.
Given La Follette's legislative program and
Lilienthal

's

blueprint for regulatory activism, it was

virtually inevitable that the PSC's relationship with the
privately-held utilities would be tense.

Lilienthal

's

I

M

^°Theodore Kronshage to Philip F. La Follette, 17 December
1931, Lilienthal Papers, Box 52; Lilienthal, "Work of the PSC."

^^Lilienthal to Frankfurter, October 1929, Lilienthal
Papers, Box 49; Lilienthal, "The Work of the PSC," p. 2;
Kronshage to La Follette, 17 December 1931.

"
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tendentious personality made this

certainty.

a

Always

looking for the good fight, Lilienthal set his sights on an
industry that was reeling from both public ridicule and
financial instability.

An opportunity to deliver a quick

blow came soon after his arrival in Madison.
referred to his new commissioner
investments.

a

The governor

letter regarding utility

The editor of Public Utility Fortnightly

,

a

journal owned by electrical manufacturing and power

magnates including Martin

J.

Insull and Owen

D.

Young,

wrote La Follette to inquire about the soundness of
investments in utilities operating in Wisconsin, given the
state's ambitious plans for public ownership and aggressive
regulation.

The editor, Francis

X.

noting his affiliation in the query.

Welch, had avoided

Responding to the

governor's referral, Lilienthal pointed out Welch's ties,
and suggested he was fishing for a statement to be used
"for publicity purposes."

The new commissioner did not

want to disappoint Welch.

He urged the governor to make

full use of the opportunity, and answer by asserting that

"any investor who is looking for speculative and fanciful

profits

I

should advise to keep his money out of Wisconsin

utilities."

Lilienthal went on, asking La Follette to

proclaim that, "until the electrical industry cleans
house

,

and recognizes the truth of the humble laws of
arithmetic (i.e. avoids unsound financial activities),
no investment in a privately owned electric public
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Utility enterprise is safe, whether in Wisconsin or in
any other state."

With Lilienthal charting its course, there would be little

confusion concerning the Wisconsin commission's direction.
Putting the new staff to work, Lilienthal began the
PSC's first major rate investigation initiated on its own
motion.

The target was not a power company; it was the

Wisconsin Telephone Company and its parent firm, American
Telephone and Telegraph.

In August 1930 Wisconsin

Telephone went before the Railroad Commission to request
rate hikes ranging from 20 to 33.3 percent for its Madison

exchange.

No decision had been rendered before the 1931

reorganization, when the new Commissioners took over and

widened the scope of the case.

Citing a range of concerns,

on 29 July the PSC issued an order for a full-scale review
of the Wisconsin company,

the broader investigation.

subsuming the Madison case within
The preliminary hearings in the

Madison case had revealed "disturbing growth" in the
company's maintenance costs and investment in physical
plant during a period of declining revenue brought on by
the Depression.

The PSC also noted the "unsoundness" of

determining rates applicable to

a

state-wide system on a

local area basis, especially as Milwaukee and other cities

were petitioning the board to review their rates as well.

^^Francis X. Welch to La Follette, 30 March 1931, with
undated attachment, Lilienthal to La Follette, Lilienthal Papers,
Box 52.
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The Commission claimed that a comprehensive review should

also result in an economy of effort and money.

The order made clear that the PSC intended to use the

precedents established by the Smith case to draw AT&T into
the regulatory fray.

Noting the decision written by Chief

Justice Hughes, the order stated that "the Western Electric
relationship is

a

vital issue."

The commissioners agreed

that the "large scale production and the special business
and legal relationship" between Western Electric and Bell

subsidiaries such as the Wisconsin company resulted in
"economies of production and distribution" for the AT&T
system.

Listing several hundred-thousand dollars in plant

investment and maintenance, the commissioners claimed that
"most,

if not all,

of the equipment in these accounts

represents purchases from the Western Electric Company....
the total amount involved will, undoubtedly, represent a

substantial fraction of the total rate base."

At issue for

the PSC was how to disentangle the various costs and

benefits entwined in this "special relationship."
^^Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, "In the Matter of
the State-Wide Investigation on the Commission's Own Motion of
the Rates, Rules, Services, Practices, and Activities of the
Wisconsin Telephone Company," 29 July 1931, Docket No. 2-U-35,
State Historical Society of Wisconsin, p. 45.
The reports, orders, and hearing testimony for 2-U-35
comprise over ten large boxes of unprocessed records. No box or
folder numbers are available. All related memoranda and
correspondence that were filed within the PSC's central files are
part of the Historical Society's processed collection, and box
numbers will be provided for citations of that material. Unless
otherwise noted, all PSC documents cited are from the State

Historical Society's Madison archive.
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Answering such questions presented

a

formidable task;

in his 1931 Columbia Law Review article Lilienthal had

characterized the problem as "puzzling in the extreme."
Facing such complexities, the commissioners placed their
faith in the abilities of their new staff of experts.

"We

cannot believe," they claimed,
that the resources of regulatory technique will be
found inadequate to meet even so involved and
intricate a problem as this Western Electric
relationship presents.

Postponing its decision on the Madison request, and

planning to test the strength of its new activist agenda,
the PSC had raised the ante.^^
On top of an already heavy workload, the PSC staff

began the laborious process of preparing the telephone
case.

Under the direction of Rates and Research chief E.W.

Morehouse, the staff requested a voluminous array of

engineering and accounting reports from the Bell system.
No doubt burdened by the requests, but also disinclined to

extend their fullest cooperation, AT&T and Western Electric

balked at the PSC's long list.

Claiming that it could not

isolate out data for items such as the cost of sales and
net profit figures on sales to Wisconsin Telephone, Western

Electric wrote that there was "no practical method" of

procuring the material, "and we therefore had to state in
answer to such requests 'Information not available.'"
2-U-35, "In the Matter of the Wisconsin Telephone
Company," pp. 21-2 2.
2^PSC,
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Stymied in his repeated attempts to clarify why such data
were unavailable, Morehouse suggested in

a

late October

memo to Lilienthal that the PSC should send its chief

accountant to the corporate offices in New York; there,
they could determine what was and was not actually

available in the company's ledgers.
Lilienthal

's

efforts to indirectly regulate AT&T

through its Wisconsin subsidiary reflected his belief that
state commissions could control the utility industry more

effectively than any federal agency.

This was a pragmatic

judgement on his part, based upon political considerations
and his appraisal of legal doctrine in the aftermath of the

Smith et. al

.

decision.

Lilienthal was not blindly hostile

to federal intervention, but after ten years of

intermittent skirmishes with federal regulators, he simply
had little faith in national initiatives.

Lilienthal had

outlined this position in an August 1931 letter to
Richberg.

Writing on behalf of the subcommittee on holding

companies of the Progressive Conference held the previous
spring, Lilienthal explained that they were encouraged by

recent advances made by the most active state commissions,

notably Wisconsin, New York, and California.

Noting that

although "we are none of us theoretical state's right
people," his subcommittee opposed swift Congressional

Morehouse to Lilienthal, 26 October 1931, PSC, Series
1825, Progress File, Box 11.
2^E.W.
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action on holding company legislation because "there is
more hope for regulatory success" at the state level.

Relying on Washington "puts all of one's eggs in one
basket ... [and] much or all might then depend upon three men

appointed by the President."

Having directly encountered

the shortcomings of presidential appointees hostile to

railway labor, Lilienthal was understandably wary of
federal control.

Lilienthal

's

attitudes regarding public ownership of

utilities embodied a caution quite similar to his position
on federal regulation.

He did not share the La Follette

administration's unqualified support for

a

vigorous

expansion of municipal plants; he much preferred

a

more

modest policy of establishing fewer publicly-owned plants
to serve as "yardsticks" against which the operating costs

and efficiencies of the private sector could be compared.
It was simply not politically feasible to expect widespread

socialization of utilities in the near future, Lilienthal
believed, therefore increasing the value and necessity of

more competent regulatory oversight.

In these matters,

Lilienthal identified closely with Morris
^^Lilienthal to Richberg,

7

L.

Cooke, the

August 1931, Lilienthal Papers,

Box 53.
In his examination of the origins of the Public Utilities
Holding Company Act of 1935, Philip Funigiello portrays
Lilienthal as an ardent supporter of state control, but the study
does not explore the rationale behind Lilienthal 's position.
The
See, Philip F. Funigiello, Toward a National Power Policy.
New Deal and the Electric Utility Indust ry. 1933-1941
(Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh University Press, 1973), p. 22.

.
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Philadelphia social engineer and leader of the reformist

wing of the Taylor Society.

yardstick concept since the 1920s, when he had pointed to
the success of Canada's Ontario Hydro power program.

\>
\

t

I

I

The

engineer and the lawyer were introduced through Felix

Frankfurter in 1929, and by the time of Lilienthal's move
to Wisconsin, Cooke was becoming a close ally and

confidante.

The depth of their mutual commitment to regulation was

revealed in early 1932.

Cooke and Lilienthal organized

a

conference on regulatory technique to be held in New York
City in April.

Attendance was by invitation only, and the

two worked quietly to exclude anyone who was too strongly

|

identified as a proponent of public ownership.

In private

correspondence Cooke and Lilienthal agreed to exclude many
of their closest associates,

including Nebraska senator

to Cooke, 11 January 1932, Papers of Morris L.
Cooke, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Box 53
(hereafter cited as Cooke Papers)
In 1928, Cooke expressed his support for the yardstick
concept in a series of letters to Arthur E. Morgan, then
"I am not a 'public ownership'
president of Antioch College.
"But I am firmly convinced that we are well
man," Cooke stated.
advised to have a few publicly owned and operated electric plants
to act as yard-sticks and to exert the same type of influence on
the private companies as is doubtless being exerted by the
Ontario [Hydro] System." Cooke to Arthur E. Morgan, 21 March
1928, Cooke Papers, Box 37.
Foreshadowing the future rift on the TVA board, Cooke and
Morgan's exchange became rather heated. Morgan argued that there
were not enough well-trained and virtuous experts to adequately
staff any expanded public bureaucracies; Cooke differed. Cooke
remained implacably hostile toward Arthur Morgan during the
1930s. See chapters 3 and 6 below.

I^'^Lilienthal
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George W. Norris, Judson King of the National Popular

Government League, and Amos Pinchot.

In a public letter to

Kendall Banning of the trade journal Public Utility
Fortnightly, Lilienthal explained the conference as
a gathering of those who believe regulation has a very
important place in our national utility program and
will have such a place for some time to come. We will
counsel with each other as to regulation in contrast
with but by no means in opposition to public

ownership.

Lilienthal was not fundamentally hostile to either federal

regulation or public ownership, but prior to the 1932

presidential election he remained convinced that aggressive
investigations by state commissions represented the best
means available for serving the public interest.^®
The Wisconsin telephone case was much more than an

attempt by Lilienthal to strengthen the indirect regulation
of holding companies by state commissions.

intended to use the hearings as the first in

Lilienthal
a

series of

blows that would eventually smash the entire rate structure
and drive down all utility prices.

He had previously

received Cooke's assurance that "the quickest way of

^^Cooke to Lilienthal, 13 January 1932, and Lilienthal to
Cooke 19 January 1932, Cooke Papers, Box 53; Lilienthal to
..Kendall Banning, 14 April 1932, Lilienthal Papers, Box 55.

ij
tl

I

I

While public ownership advocates were noticeably absent from
the April conference, the tone of the presentations bore a marked
animus toward the private sector. James Bonbright described the
current holding companies "a great social menace." Combination
in the utility industry had been carried, he continued, "to a
point far beyond that of maximum economy. Normal growth has
[the large systems] must be regarded as
given way to giantism
an economic disease." New York Times 9 April 1932, 19:1.
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exposing the inherent fallacies of the present day rate
schedules is through proper reporting

if fundamental

data for a state was properly collated company by company
the logic of marked reductions would be irresistable
[sic].

Once the PSC sharpened its technique with the

telephone investigation, it could then move inexorably
through the roll of utilities.
Lilienthal was not going to let proper reporting stand
as the lone means towards the end of lower rates.

fashioned a far more ambitious strategy.

He

Lilienthal noted

that the Supreme Court in Smith et. al. had upheld the

"Bluefields doctrine" which held that

a fair rate of

return

was "equal to that generally being made at the same time
and in the same general part of the country on investments
in other business undertakings."

In a report made that

spring to the governor, Lilienthal insisted that with the

country mired deeply in a depression, the PSC must "take
into consideration that fact that other businesses are not

earning returns at all comparable with those which are
claimed by or made by the telephone company."

After

hearings that would illuminate the depths to which the

economy had plummeted, Lilienthal advised La Follette, it

would prove to be both fair and legal to reduce telephone
rates.

The commission had already implemented this

2'Morris L. Cooke to Lilienthal,
Papers, FDRPL, Box 53.

3

October 1931, Cooke
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approach in a minor decision on 21 March, when it noted
that the current "widespread distress" should force

utilities "to reduce rates as general prices and the
incomes of customers go down."
If there were any lingering doubts that the PSC would

use the telephone case as a precedent for other utilities,

Lilienthal removed them four days before the hearings
began.

On

7

May 1932, he sent a letter to every major

public utility in Wisconsin informing them that the PSC

would hear testimony from various state and national
experts concerning economic conditions within the state and
across the country.
rates,

The specific issue was telephone

"but inasmuch as the subject-matter may relate to

other utilities..., the Commission takes this method of
calling the attention of all utilities in the state to
these proceedings."

When he received a copy of this edict,

an elated Morris Cooke urged on his friend: "I extend to

you my hearty congratulations.

More power to your arm!"

After nearly a year of preparation, the PSC was ready.
The hearings began with testimony on economic

conditions in Wisconsin.

Several witnesses sketched bleak

pictures of the state's agricultural and industrial
landscape.

G.T. Gustafson, an economist with the

^°"Smith et. al.. Supreme Court Recorder
"The Work of the PSC," p. 14; PSC decision as
Journal, 1 May 1932, 2:1; Cooke to Lilienthal
enclosure of 7 May 1932, Cooke Papers, FDRPL,
,

Lilienthal,
quoted in Milwaukee
17 May 1932, with
Box 53.
p.

72;
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Department of Marketing and Agriculture, stated that
during
1929-1931, gross farm income had declined from $454 to
$253

million.

The well-known labor economist John

R.

Commons

noted that employment in Wisconsin's major industrial

centers was declining precipitously, and cities that had

endured more modest drops still suffered from wage and

workweek cuts.

Beloit,

percent of its jobs

—

for example, had lost about

20

a marginal hit compared to

Milwaukee's 30 percent and Racine's 48 percent declines.
The Commission's E.W. Morehouse then juxtaposed these

figures against the healthy dividends declared by several

Wisconsin utilities whose majority shareholders were
national holding companies.

As yet unstated, the

implication of Morehouse's observations was that while the
average citizens and businesses faced hard times, the

holding companies callously manipulated their subsidiaries,

mandating the dividend declarations that ignored the plight
of others and imperiled the solvency of the operating

utilities

—

only to meet the overextended debt obligations

of the parent firms.

The Commission's examination of these witnesses

introduced another aspect of its strategy.

Under

Lilienthal's guidance, the PSC planned to compel lower

utility rates on the basis of judicial precedent, but it
2-U-35, "In the Matter of the Wisconsin Telephone
Company," pp. 880-882, 971; Milwaukee Journal, 11 May, 1:1, and
12 May 1932, 3:1.
^^PSC,
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also sought to establish that such cuts were vital to

economic recovery.

To build this case, the PSC had to show

that the Depression was much more than a temporary cyclical
downturn, that the economy was not responding to the

current government prescriptions, and finally that utility
prices were

a

primary obstacle to recovery.

With

Lilienthal asking Commons if he foresaw economic
improvement, the Wisconsin economist answered negatively,

"Rather a falling off," Commons responded.

The labor

economist ridiculed the Hoover administration's attempts to
inflate bank credit, then added,
So far the government efforts to ease up the money
market have had no effect on business. They have
loaded up the banks with money but business is not
borrowing and the banks are not lending.

The PSC turned to Gustafson for his opinion on the impact
of high fixed utility rates.

The agricultural economist

observed that lower crop prices resulted in

greater

a

percentage of farm income going to fixed charges, sharply
reducing farmers' investment in new equipment and personal
purchases.

With Gustafson 's and Commons's testimony, the

PSC began constructing a scenario for utility regulation

during depression that would shape Lilienthal

's

regulatory

strategy for many years after he left Madison.
The Commission next planned to hear testimony on the

national situation, and build the theoretical basis for its
2-U-35, In the Matter of the Wisconsin Telephone
Company, pp. 1011-1012; 882.
^^PSC,
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Claims regarding the rigidities in the price system.

Mathew Sammond, the Telephone Company's counsel, objected
to all the previous testimony on economic conditions.

"The

utilities are dependent upon a level of prices and rates
with relation to their investment... regardless of economic
conditions," Sammond charged.

The company counsel argued

that utilities had never been allowed to enjoy the full
fruits of the most prosperous years, and should not be made
to endure the worst of times.

Sammond requested that the

prior testimony be struck from the record, and that the
roll of witnesses scheduled to address these issues be

suspended."
Because the commissioners sat as the judges in

a

hearing initiated and prosecuted by their own staff, there
was little mystery surrounding the ruling on Sammond 's
motion.

Lilienthal gave the motion extensive, but

certainly not objective, consideration.

In fact, the young

commissioner had anticipated the argument several months
earlier, and had worked closely with James Bonbright on the

Commission's response.

Meeting with Bonbright in late

January, Lilienthal discussed the PSC's plans and secured
the Columbia economist as a witness for the hearings.

Shortly before the hearings began, Bonbright sent
Lilienthal a lengthy draft of potential testimony and

!

"PSC, 2-U-35, In the Matter of the Wisconsin Telephone
Company, p. 1014.

.
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Objections, which included the observation
that claims of
constricted profits for utilities during the
1920s were
fallacious.

The rates of return acted more as a floor than

as a ceiling, and Bonbright rattled off numerous
examples

of utilities that earned fifty to one-hundred
percent more

than the regulated base.

It should not be the PSC's intent

to require utilities "to submit to the drastic drop in

earnings" suffered by so many businesses, he wrote.
However, "the contention that the Bell System should be

protected against sharing the burden of the depression, so
far as that is possible by maintenance of rates," Bonbright

countered,

would amount to a contention that one of the most
prosperous corporate systems in the history of this
country should be relieved of its share of sustaining
the burdens necessary to overcome this world-wide
crisis

Writing for the Commission, Lilienthal denied Sammond's
motion on all counts.

Several factors made this testimony

relevant, he told the company counsel, including the

"spectacular fall" in the general commodity price level,
the decline in labor and supply costs paid by the company,
and the consequent rise in the purchasing power of each

dollar paid out by consumers in rates and by the Wisconsin
company as dividends to AT&T.

"We would both stupid and

blind," Lilienthal stated, "if we failed to inform

ourselves of the extent to which the depression has changed
the whole economic fabric of the community affected by this

108

proceeding.

disturbance.

This depression is no minor business
"^^

Anxious to expedite the hearings, Lilienthal
had in
fact let the testimony continue while he
considered the

objection.

Frederick

C.

Mills testified first.

A Columbia

economist affiliated with the National Bureau of Economic
Research, Mills was completing a long-term study of price
trends, published later in 1932 as Economic Tendencies in

the United States.
in the price system.

Mills outlined the current imbalances
From September 1929 to March 1932,

factory payrolls had declined by more than 50 percent, but
the cost-of-living had dropped by just 21 percent; the

story was similar for agriculture, only the numbers

differed slightly.

The wide gap between wages and living

costs cut deeply into aggregate purchasing power. Mills

pointed out.

Lilienthal asked Mills if prices would

balance out "automatically."

Such a natural equilibrium

could only have been reached had the adjustments occurred
over decades, the economist testified.

The rapid and

intense nature of the current price breaks created what

Mills characterized as a "log jam."

Mills continued by

arguing that the road to recovery would be opened by

Bonbright, "First Draft Synopsis of Testimony on
Wisconsin Telephone Rates," n.d. (ca. April-May 1932), pp. 8-9,
Lilienthal Papers, Box 55; PSC, 2-U-35, In the Matter of the
Wisconsin Telephone Company, "Ruling Upon Motion to Strike
Testimony Relating to Economic Conditions," 1 June 1932, A. A.
Berle Papers, FDRPL, Box 14.
•'^James C.
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breaking down the "differential advantages"
held by certain
economic sectors, such as the utility industry.
still

leading his witness closely, Lilienthal asked
if sectors
clinging to these advantages by defensive
methods, such as

resisting rate cuts, might imperil themselves,
resulting in
"their own ultimate disadvantage [and] ...carrying
with
it

also the implication that that defensive attitude
may

seriously injure the entire economic system."

Mills

responded briefly to the commissioner's lengthy

query.

"I am sure of it," he replied.

Jacob Viner followed Mills.

At that time one of the

country's foremost neo-classical economists, Viner affirmed
his colleague's claim that while maladjusted prices were
not the catalyst for the depression, they were directly

responsible for prolonging the slump.

Asked what would

happen if utility rates and other "undeflated prices" did
not come down, the University of Chicago economist

responded that "there would result widespread insolvency,"
increased unemployment..., and quite conceivably,
extensive collapse of our present economy. The
failure of utility prices to fall has been an
important factor in reducing the buying power of the
country's shrunken national income.

2-U-35, "In the Matter of the Wisconsin Telephone
Company," pp. 1103-1106; for background information on Mills's
work with the NBER, see, Guy Alchon, The Invisible Hand of
Planning.
Capitalism, Social Science, and the State in the 1920s
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 163, 165.
^^PSC,

2-U-35, "In the Matter of the Wisconsin Telephone
Company," p. 1210; Milwaukee Journal, 16 May, 1932, 5:1.
^^PSC,
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Viner's unequivocal declarations provided
an imprimatur
from mainstream economic thought for
Lilienthal's drive to
topple what he viewed as a grossly top-heavy
rate
structure
Bonbright, the last economist to march through
the

Madison hearing room, delivered the longest and most
compelling testimony.

A trenchant critic of the previous

decade's speculative excesses, Bonbright directed his first
salvos at the federal government, not at the priv.ite
sector.

After noting that the president had ultimately

recognized the severity of the slump by declaring an

economic emergency, Bonbright asserted that Hoover's
efforts fell far short.

Referring specifically to the

Reconstruction Finance Corporation and Federal Reserve
policies, he echoed Commons's view that an inflation of

bank credit would not revive commerce.

"It seems now

clear," Bonbright asserted, "that further and more drastic

emergency measures are necessary, because those now adopted
are inadequate."

Without further action, relative

imbalances in the price system would remain and the crisis

would deepen.^''

On Viner, see Joseph Dorfman, The Economi c Mi nd in Auk mi can
Civilization, v. 5. 1918-1933 (Now York, Augustus M. K(>ll(>y,
1969; orig. ed. 1959), pp. 480-4B0; also r.oe J. Ronnie Davis, The
New Economics and the Old Economists (Ames, Iowa St.ilc university
Press, 1971)
.

2-U-35, "In the M.itter of Wisconsin Telephone
Company," pp. 1446-1450.
^^PSC,
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At several points in the examination,
Lilienthal
turned his witness to the theme that the
country faced a
profound economic emergency.
"Ordinary standards of social

legislation," Bonbright answered, "[and] regulation
of what
constitutes fairness between different classes of
producers
and consumers... simply cannot be applied at this
time."

Whereas the regulation of utility rates normally dragged
on
for years, Bonbright urged the PSC to take "immediate

although moderate action to reduce those important prices

within your jurisdiction which are so clearly out of line
with the newer levels of other prices."

He conceded that

moderating the cuts to avoid sending companies into
bankruptcy was

a

complex but necessary task.

Still,

the

Commission had to cut rates. ^®
Bonbright concluded his testimony by discussing the

reproduction cost, or present value, method of utility
valuation.

He had never supported this methodology,

because it required frequent and cumbersome revaluations
and rested on faulty assumptions.

After being repeatedly

upheld in the courts, reproduction cost was the rule of the
land,

however, and the recent severe deflation gave present

value a very different twist than during the 1920s.

Bonbright predicted, "really comes the test."

"Now,"

Will rates

come down during a period of low and falling prices, ho

2-U-35,
Company," p. 1451.
^''PSC,

"In the Matter of the Wisconsin Telephone
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asked.

Ultimately, "strict application" of the
method was
impossible, as the deflationary spiral was
so sharp that
actually corresponding rate cuts would imperil
even the
most well-managed public utilities. Again,

Bonbrighfs

called for "immediate although moderate action."

By

balancing the public's interest in lower rates against
the
need for a financially stable utility sector, competent
regulators could produce

a

ratemaking calculus that would

yield a just result.^'

Upon completion of the first round of hearings, the
PSC on 30 June issued a temporary finding in the telephone
case, ordering local telephone rates cut by 12.5 percent

across the state.

Citing the need to respond in a timely

manner to the current economic emergency, the Commission
based its order on preliminary findings of the ongoing
investigation.

Part of the cut came from the Commission's

careful review of the company's accounts.

Claiming that

AT&T's toll system must pay for itself, the order shifted
over $300,000 in long-distance operating costs off of the
local exchanges.

The greatest proportion of the cut was

due to the economic decline, however.

Citing the decrease

in the dollar value of the telephone service, the finding

stated that

while the tendency of the courts in recent years
has been to give primary consideration to the
2-U-35, "In the Matter of the Wisconsin Telephone
Company," p. 1494; Bonbright, "First Draft Synopsis," p. 5.
^'PSC,
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return upon value, it must
not be forgotten that it is still the
law that
rates, regardless of their effect upon
the
financial condition of the company, cannot
exceed
What the services are reasonably worth.

Skeptically described in

a

New York

T^m^<:.

editorial of

8

July as a "novel principle of rate-making," that
may not
withstand closer scrutiny, the order quickly drew
fire.

As

expected, the company filed suit in the U.S. District
Court
for the Western District of Wisconsin.

The federal judges

issued a temporary restraining order against the reduction,
and both sides prepared for a late September court date.^°

Building an investigation around the purchasing power
and rigid price theories of the Depression, Lilienthal

sought to ground the PSC firmly within the American
mainstream.

Both analyses were at that time commonly held

economic doctrines.

Both could serve widely divergent

political purposes, however.

A flag bearer for the gold

standard, H. Parker Willis opposed inflation and advocated

the selective reductions in certain prices in defense of
"sound currency."

a

At the same time, many advocates of the

purchasing power dictum hoped to prop up rather than slash
prices through production controls and cartelization.

Seeking also to sustain wages through complementary labor
codes, these underconsumptionists would initially support

^°

New York Times 6 July 1932, 34:1, and, 8 July 1932, 16:2;
"Public Service Commission of Wisconsin v. Wisconsin Telephone
Company," Supreme Court Recorder 53 (October Term, 1932), pp.
514-515.
.
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early New Deal measures such as the
National Recovery
Administration and the first Agricultural
Adjustment Act/^
What made the PSC's work different, however,
was
Lilienthal's linkage of the two theories, and

his use of

this rate case as a step toward

political economy.

a

dramatically restructured

Lilienthal believed that breaking down

rigid utility rates through more efficient regulation
and

expanded state intervention would increase the public's

disposable income and stimulate consumption.

As he stated

in a speech to the National Association of Power Engineers,

"unless we solve the problems of distribution of mass

purchasing power, then your efforts in improving
engineering technique and devising means of increasing

production will be doomed."

Solving those problems within

the utility sector meant greater government regulation,
as Lilienthal pointed out in a newspaper interview,

for

"there

are only two kinds of prices: those that react to

competition and those that are controlled by the state and
for which the state is responsible."

Within the highly

monopolistic utility industry, the "price competition which
has been so potent in reducing prices in other enterprises,

has failed to operate in this case," Bonbright noted in his

testimony.

The state had to adjust utility rates in cases

^^Dorfman, The Economic Mind pp. 698-702; an excellent
survey of the various analyses is, Theodore Rosenof, Dogma,
Depression, and the New Deal.
The Debate of Political Leaders
over Economic Recovery (Port Washington, NY, Kennikat Press,
1975)
,
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Where prices proved unresponsive to market
forces, in this
situation, regulators would chart the course
toward the new
politics of consumption/^
In its focus on price rigidities as a
brake on

purchasing power, Lilienthal's work reflects the
roots of
later New Deal policies.
By 1937-1938, a core element
within the Roosevelt administration began turning toward
the nature of monopoly capitalism and the problems of

"administered," or rigid, prices.

Influenced by the 1935

publication of Industrial Prices and Their Relative
Inflexibility by Gardiner

C.

Means, a close associate of

both Bonbright and A. A. Berle, New Dealers including Leon

Henderson and Assistant Attorney General Robert

T.

Jackson

advocated wide-ranging efforts to sustain mass consumption,
in part through an ambitious trust-busting program designed

to restore price competition.

Bringing their case to the

public through the hearings of the Temporary National
Economic Committee and initiating anti-trust litigation,
the New Deal's anti-monopolists shared Lilienthal's concern

with logjams in the price system.

Cutting prices, rather

than production and employment, would revive demand and

restore prosperity, they argued.

'^^

Speech to the National Association of Power
Engineers, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 6 September 1932, Lilienthal
Papers, Box 17; Milwaukee Journal 1 May 1932, 2:1; PSC, 2-U-35,
"In the Matter of the Wisconsin Telephone Company, p. 1489.
'^^Lilienthal

,

Leuchtenberg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New
Deal. 1932-1940 (New York, Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 245-248,

^%illiam

E.
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With his experience centered in utility
regulation,
Lilienthal did not embrace the anti-trust
agenda of

Henderson and Jackson.

Lilienthal accepted the continued

development of larger and more complex forms of
corporate
organization, and envisioned a much broader arena
of

regulatory activity, for the techniques refined in
the
laboratory of the utility commission could then be
applied
to other sectors.

"Whether we individually approve of the

tendency or not, it must be apparent to everyone that we
are in a period of increased community control of business,

rather than less," the young commissioner declared in
speech to business groups in Sheboygan, Wisconsin.

a

He

added that "The lessons we learn in the public utility
field we can adapt to the other fields as they call for

control,"

and urged his listeners to display "the

capacity, the resourcefulness, and the courage for the

undertaking.

I

am hopeful," he continued,

that we can somehow fashion an instrument of
government which will protect us against the control
of these business giants which we ourselves have
created, and which uncontrolled have often inflicted
such grave injuries upon our community and national
life.

The public sector must answer corporate capitalism's

increasing complexity with more sophisticated regulation,

Lilienthal maintained.

Despite relying heavily upon claims

of an economic emergency during the hearings as the basis

257-259; Rosenof, Dogma. Depression, and the New Deal
105.

.
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for the 12.5 percent rate cut, Lilienthal
sought a more

permanent and expansive regulatory framework
that would
necessarily persist long after the emergency had
passed/^
With the hearings temporarily adjourned and the
rate
issue in the courts, by late summer 1932 the
Commission's

activities reverted to the back pages of the press.

Most

people had turned their attention to the primary elections,

which featured a rematch of the 1930 race between plumbing

magnate Walter Kohler and La Follette for the top spot on
the Republican slate.

La Follette had to defend his record

against the vituperative attacks of Kohler and his fellow
conservatives, but the governor's most formidable opponent

turned out to be the Depression.

Popular discontent over

the economy pushed La Follette out of office just as

abruptly as it had helped sweep him in only two years

earlier .^^
Despite anticipating some backlash against the
incumbent, most La Follette loyalists were stunned by the
defeat.

Lilienthal was no exception.

Moving to Madison

less than two years ago, Lilienthal had mapped out

term strategy for restructuring the Commission.

a

long-

Now,

^^Lilienthal Speech to a joint meeting of the Lions,
Kiwanis, and Rotary Clubs of Sheboygan, Wisconsin, 23 March 1933,
PSC, Progress File, Box 7.

Buried in the
^^Miller, Philip F. La Follette pp. 30-34.
avalanche of stories about the stunning reversal between Kohler
and La Follette was the first sign of a major party realignment
in Wisconsin, as turnout for the Democratic primary increased by
almost 800 percent over the 1930 election.
.
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expecting to share a fate common to all
political

appointee's whose patrons stood defeated, he
anticipated
unemployment.
Lilienthal quickly began to explore
alternatives.

One day after the primary, wrote Robert M.

Hutchins, the president of the University of Chicago,
to

inquire if the school was going ahead with a plan
to

develop a program in public utility economics.

If so,

Lilienthal wished to discuss "the possibility of my

organizing and carrying on the work of such

a

department."

He also conferred with Berle about a federal position.

By

this time, Berle had joined Franklin Roosevelt's "Brains

Trust," and was feeling fairly sanguine about his

candidate's chances in November.

Writing Lilienthal in

late September, Berle indicated that he was "prepared to

make a bold attempt to get you some kind of

a

berth," in

either the Interstate Commerce Commission or a new

department that would undertake the regulation of public
utility holding companies.

Berle counseled Lilienthal that

the Roosevelt candidacy represented the only real

possibility of staying in public service, for, "so far as
political backyards go, the Roosevelt backyard is the only
one we can play in, now that Wisconsin has gone back on its

favorite grandson."

Lilienthal gave this option a great

deal of thought and drafted a confidential proposal to

Berle regarding the formation of
Commission.

a

Federal Utilities

Convinced that the new governor would not
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reappoint him,

Lilienthal gave serious thought to making

Washington his new backyard/^
In fact,

Lilienthal

had anticipated.

's

position was more secure than he

His bellicose rhetoric and the

commission's well-publicized hearings had drawn
the
public's attention; the high profile set by the
youngest

commissioner paid dividends. Lilienthal and the PSC became
issues during the fall campaign, and the Democratic
candidate, former Madison mayor Albert Schmedeman, pledged

his support for La Follette's regulatory appointees and

their policies. When Schmedeman emerged as one the many

Democratic victors in the 1932 electoral avalanche,
Lilienthal was assured of

a job

after the inauguration of

the new governor. Although rumors persisted that he was one
of several La Follette Progressives who would follow their

outgoing executive to Washington, Lilienthal remained in
the state for the moment, and used his job security to

renew the rate fight and expand the regulatory range of the
PSC.^''

^^Lilienthal to Hutchins, 21 September 1932, Lilienthal
papers. Box 56; Berle to Lilienthal, 22 September 1932, and
Lilienthal to Berle, 8 November 1932, Berle Papers, Boxes 9 and
14 respectively.

The Federal Utilities Commission proposal contained several
controversial points, including stripping the ICC of regulatory
control over telephone and telegraph systems. However, the memo
essentially reflected Lilienthal 's continued commitment to
strengthening state commissions, with the FUC serving primarily
to gather information for and consult with the state agencies.
later a strident critic of Roosevelt's, in 19321933 La Follette was rumored for several spots in the new
'^''Although
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While the rate investigation and litigation
continued,
Lilienthal also pursued other means for strengthening
the

state's regulatory powers.

As with the preparation of the

rate case, he again relied heavily upon outside
expertise.

This time Lilienthal turned to A. A. Berle to aid
in

revisions of the state's "Blue Sky" laws, which already
gave the PSC limited regulatory control over the sale
of

securities within Wisconsin.

In February 1932,

the young

commissioner had first suggested in one of his freguent
letters to Berle that they work together to update

Wisconsin's antiquated securities statutes, for "it may
be," Lilienthal wrote, "that in the Wisconsin laboratory

something can be worked out along the trail which you have
been blazing as a pioneer."

Berle consented, and they

began their collaboration.^^
One month later, Berle sent off a memorandum outlining
a legislative proposal that also provided Lilienthal with a

political strategy for securing its passage.

"My view,"

Berle counseled, "is that the corporate [securities]

administration, including the Secretary of Interior (which was
slated for, and in Harold Ickes went to, a Progressive Republican
supporter of the President)
and the first ambassador to the
Soviet Union. Miller, Philip F. La Follette pp. 33-38.
,

.

^^Lilienthal to A. A. Berle Jr., 13 February 1932, Lilienthal
Papers, Box 55.
The phrase "Blue Sky" laws was derived from
early efforts to curb unscrupulous securities dealers, who
allegedly would sell everything but the blue sky. The standard
history on this subject is Michael E. Parrish, Securities
Regulation and the New Deal (New Haven, Yale University Press,
1970)
.

problem should be handled from the standpoint
of the
protection of public savings." Observing that
roughly 55
percent of savings were tied up in securities,

Berle state

that the corporations that benefit from such
investment

have virtually no obligation to individual investors.
Because of the loose incorporation laws of states such
as
Delaware and the expense of legal action in any state, "th

handicap of the man whose small savings have been
squandered or lost or unfairly dealt with, makes it
impossible for the individual to help himself."

This

savings strategy appealed to Lilienthal's penchant for

turning otherwise arcane technical matters into easily

understood matters for popular concern, locating securitie
regulation within the same politics of consumption that

characterized his efforts to popularize other venues for
regulation.^'

That summer, Berle delivered a report detailing the

specific statutory revisions that he suggested, but with
the rate case and the primary election occupying much of

his time over the summer of 1932, Lilienthal devoted littl

effort to the Blue Sky work until after the La Follette
defeat.

In late September

He then began moving forward.

Lilienthal seemed optimistic that despite the governor's

lopsided defeat the revisions could be pushed through the
^'Berle to Lilienthal, 14 March 1932, Berle Papers, Box 9.
For the development of Berle 's views on the stock markets as
savings institutions, see, Schwarz, Liberal p. 57.
.
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spring legislative session.

The spectacular collapse of

the financial pyramid constructed by Samuel
and Martin
Insull, which had destroyed the holdings of
a great number
of both institutional and individual investors,
would "make
it much easier to put such a proposal through
the

legislature

I

doubt it will be made the subject of

partisan politics," Lilienthal assured Berle.^^
By the new year Lilienthal was less sure of the bill's

success in the legislature, and he planned

campaign to bolster its chances.

a

publicity

Lilienthal told Berle

that "the lobbies are so strong this year that it is only
by a good deal of direct hammering that we can hope to put

this over."

Following Berle 's suggestion, he centered his

campaign around the issue of protecting people's hardearned savings.

"I can think of no more appropriate

function of government than it should encourage reasonable
saving by protecting the fruits of that saving," the

commissioner declared in his campaign's inaugural speech.
Because the financial sector insisted that incorporation
laws alone provided adequate protection for investors,

Lilienthal launched
reasoning.

a

fiery attack against that specious

He contended that Wisconsin was victimized by

the lax incorporation procedures of other states, notably

Delaware's "abject surrender of the sovereign power of

^"Lilienthal to Berle, 23 September 1932, Lilienthal Papers,

Box 55.
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legislative discretion."

He compared

Delaware's laws to

Nevada's divorce and gambling statutes, in an
invective
charging that "if a state wants to prostitute its

sovereignty to such ends no other state can complain,"
but
the others must move to protect their own interests.
In a somewhat more subdued public report outlining
the

need for the new legislation, Lilienthal continued his
appeal to popular sentiment.

Of the over $450 million

worth of securities sold in Wisconsin from 1926-1930, most
were bought "not by millionaires, but by average Wisconsin

citizens [as]... the nest egg for a rainy day."

He charged

that Wisconsin financial houses were "in pawn" to big city
bankers, and got the "dregs" of issues not sold in New
York, Chicago, or Boston.

Lilienthal pointed to the PSC's

successful oversight of real estate bonds as offering the

regulatory alternative to financial anarchy.

Less than 20

percent of those bonds were currently in default in
Wisconsin, he stated, compared to a national average of

over 80 percent.

Although he also worked the state house

corridors in behalf of the bill, Lilienthal counted on his

outreach strategy to forge a popular base among Wisconsin's
citizenry in support of regulatory expansion.

In a letter

to Felix Frankfurter, he returned to the pugnacious theme

^^Lilienthal to Berle, 14 January 1933, Berle Papers, Box
14; "Protecting the Investor in Corporate Securities," Speech to
the Optimists' Club, Madison, Wisconsin, 30 January 1933, PSC,
Series 1937, Articles and Addresses.
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he had expressed earlier to Berle.

"My attack on the Blue

Sky problem," he wrote to his Harvard
mentor, "has been...
to hammer away at the kind of ^protectionto investors
that the existing set provides....
one form or another I
hope to keep hammering away at this theme."
this match
with corporate capital, the utility commissioner
retained

m

m

some of the spirit of the college boxer."

Lilienthal would not oversee the implementation of the
Blue Sky law (enacted in May)

,

nor would he witness first-

hand the decade-long legal fracas over the telephone rate
case. He was growing frustrated by the seemingly endless

courtroom maneuvers of the utilities, which stymied his
intentions to effect quick and significant rate cuts. By
April 1933 it seemed certain that he would be joining the

Roosevelt administration.

Relying upon the alliances he

formed through his regulatory work, Lilienthal explored

several possible alternatives.

Berle offered to try and

secure Lilienthal an appointment as Solicitor General, or
as an Interstate Commerce Commissioner.

wrote with another offer.

Then Bonbright

The Columbia economist stated

that he had suggested to the president that Lilienthal be

selected to fill an opening on the Federal Power
Commission. The alternatives narrowed quickly after 18 May
1933, when Roosevelt signed the legislation creating the

"Report on the Securities Law in Wisconsin,"
n.d. (ca. February 1933), Berle Papers, Box 14; Lilienthal to
Frankfurter, 9 February 1933, Lilienthal Papers, Box 59.
^^Lilienthal

,
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Tennessee Valley Authority.

Lilienthal immediately became

one of the top candidates for a position on
the threeperson directorate. In late May, Lilienthal
met with Arthur
E. Morgan, the president of Antioch
College well-known for
his work in flood control and social planning,
whom

Roosevelt had already chosen to chair the board of
the new
Authority."
At their meeting in Chicago, Morgan offered Lilienthal
a

place on the directorate.

They specifically discussed

the potential role for the young Wisconsin utility

commissioner, a matter that would become increasingly

important

—

at times overshadowing all other issues at the

Berle to Lilienthal, 15 April 1933, Bonbright to
Lilienthal, 19 April 1933, Lilienthal Papers, Box 59.
Lilienthal 's response to Bonbright 's offer regarding the
Federal Power Commission further illustrates that his earlier
support of state over federal regulation was largely contingent
and not grounded in any ideological position.
Having previously
suggested to Berle the formation of a Federal Utilities
Commission that was primarily structured to support the work of
state commissions, Lilienthal now responded to the FPC position
by stating that he would only be interested if the FPC was given
"powers commensurate with the pressing need for federal
regulation.
As the matter now stands the commission has almost
nothing to do." Lilienthal to Bonbright, 24 April 1933,
Lilienthal Papers, Box 59.
On the growing dissatisfaction among Lilienthal and his
colleagues regarding the efficacy of state commission regulation,
see the 1938 Congressional testimony of Leland Olds of the New
York Power Authority. Given the Supreme Court's validation of
reproduction cost methodology, commissions found it nearly
impossible to cut rates, because most courts found such cuts to
be confiscatory of the company's property. This procedure. Olds
noted, "practically removed rate determination from the
commissions to the courts." The TVA would afford Lilienthal an
opportunity to develop new means for forcing down the rates in
the private sector. Olds testimony, 15 December 1938, Joint
Committee on the Investigation of the Tennessee Valley Authority
75th Congress, 3rd Session, p. 5809-5811.
,
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Authority.

Lilienthal wrote Frankfurter that he "had
an
understanding with Chairman Morgan that I am
to be counsel
for the corporation and generally to
concentrate on the
power side of the project." Given an opportunity
that,

in

his own words, "just seemed too attractive not
to accept,"
he took the position.

Matters moved rapidly in the early

days of Roosevelt's presidency; on 10 June 1933 the
Senate

approved without objection Lilienthal

's

Director and General Counsel of the TVA.

appointment as
By the end of the

month Lilienthal left Wisconsin.
While Lilienthal had only two years to begin the task
of building an effective regulatory apparatus in Wisconsin,

he would enjoy a much longer stay at the TVA. He brought

with him much that would be of value in his new post.
Several key PSC staffers would join him, or serve the new

agency as consultants. He had learned new skills in the art
of public relations. Finally, he had begun to shape the

politics of consumption that would inform all of his work
at the Authority.

As in Wisconsin, Lilienthal quickly set

^^Lilienthal to Frankfurter,

5

June 1933, Lilienthal Papers,

Box 59.
In his study of Berle, Jordan Schwarz accurately points out
the crucial role played by Berle in securing Lilienthal an
appointment.
However, in accenting the well-known personal and
political animosity between Berle and Felix Frankfurter, Schwarz
ignores the continuing close relationship between Lilienthal and
Frankfurter.
For example, see, "The RFC appointment entitled
Berle to a place in the New Deal's inner councils, which he used
to seek positions for allies such as David E. Lilienthal and
others, just as Frankfurter pushed his friends and former
students for administration jobs." Schwarz, Liberal p. 88.
,
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himself to the task of molding an agency
that could
implement his strategy of promoting cheap
power and

government intervention as remedies for an
ailing economy.
Frankfurter accurately counseled his former
student that "a
truly alluring job lies ahead of you... but don't
expect to
ride any other horse than that for a long time."
Despite

experiencing some rather sharp jolts during the ride,
Lilienthal did indeed remain there for quite some time,

serving for twelve eventful years and leaving only in the

waning days of the Second World War.^^

^^Frankfurter to Lilienthal,

Box 59.

6

June 1933, Lilienthal Papers,

s

CHAPTER

4

THE AUTHORITY AS INSTRUMENT: STATE-BUILDING
TECHNOLOGICAL ENTERPRISE AT THE TVA IN THE AS A
1930S

Just over one month after his inauguration,
on 10
April 1933 Franklin Roosevelt sent a message
to Congress

requesting legislation creating
Authority.

a

Tennessee Valley

Little more than a page in length, the brevity

of the message belied the breadth of its implications.

Decrying the "continued idleness of

a

great national

investment" at Muscle Shoals in northern Alabama, the note

signalled the president's intent to fulfill

a

campaign

promise and break the decade-long legislative stalemate
that had left Muscle Shoals in limbo throughout the 1920s.

While marking the end of one series of controversies

concerning the Wilson Dam, its hydroelectric power
capacity, and its adjacent nitrate plants at the Shoals,
the message set in motion a new round of struggles that

made the Tennessee Valley one of the flashpoints of

Roosevelt's New Deal.
The new president laid out the by now familiar themes
of flood control,

soil erosion, agricultural reform, and

industrial development that were to complement the TVA

hydroelectric power program.

'

Roosevelt also declared his

support for the agency's formation as

a

quasi-autonomous

public authority, "a corporation," he wrote, "clothed with
the power of government but possessed of the flexibility

and initiative of a private enterprise."

Roosevelt

s

.
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provided few substantive details in his
message, and turned
the matter over to Congress.
Drawing upon bills vetoed by
Roosevelt's two Republican predecessors and
taking only six
weeks to push the proposal through both
houses and a joint
conference, Congress delivered the bill to the
White house.
On 18 May 1933, Roosevelt signed the Tennessee
Valley

Authority

Act.''

This chapter will focus on the forging of the TVA

'

bureaucracy, and how the agency's organizational structure

informed its policies.

Broadly construed, the process of

state-building and the creation of an administrative
infrastructure at the TVA was an exercise in the design and

construction of

a

new technology. In this case, the

technology was the agency; the Tennessee Valley Authority
was a tool, or a set of tools, and the forging of the

Authority becomes, then, a technological enterprise. While
political historiography has commonly cast the state in
this manner, Lilienthal too fit his agency precisely within
this framework. In

a

chapter of TVA; Democracy on the March

Tranklin D. Roosevelt, "A Request for Legislation to
Create a Tennessee Valley Authority," 10 April 1933, House
Document No. 15, 73d Congress 1st Session.
There has been a great deal written about the Muscle
Shoals controversy, but a useful place to start is the
first chapter of Thomas K. McCraw s succinct history of the
TVA's early years, TVA and the Power Fight. 1933-1939
A more
(Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott, 1971), pp. 1-25.
detailed appraisal is available in Preston Hubbard, Origins
of the TVA: The Muscle Shoals Controversy. 1920-1932
(Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 1961)
'
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entitled "Modern Tools for

a

Modern Job," Lilienthal notes

that
A new and modern task requires new and modern
tools; a
spirit of enterprise and a creative modern outlook
are
quite as necessary in devising the mechanics of
getting things done as in establishing goals and
policies
For such an undertaking Congress and the
President invented an entirely new kind of government
implement.

The TVA

,

Lilienthal goes on to claim, is "a significant

departure as an instrument of twentieth-century
democracy.

"^

If we take seriously the notion that state capacity is

indeed a tool, that administrative forms are a technology,
we can look to recent developments in the history of

technology for insight into this process of state-building.
In his article "Do Artifacts Have Politics," Langdon Winner

has suggested that technologies are ideological constructs.
It follows from this that the choices that lay behind the

design of an instrument, in this case an instrument of
state, reflect the patterns of power that exist when that

the tools are forged.

The designers inscribe their

politics within their machinery, but the technology is not
simply socially determined, for the new structures then
influence the course of future developments.

Once

constructed, the machinery will tend to reinforce specific
social and political arrangements, as Winner argues,
^Lilienthal, TVA: Democracy on the March p. 167.
For a review of the historical literature, see the
introduction to this study, above.
,

131

"because choices tend to become strongly
fixed in material
equipment, economic investment, and social
habit,

[and]...

flexibility vanishes for all practical purposes
once the
initial commitments are made."
the summer

m

of 1933, the

TVA's designers were fixing in place those
initial
commitments.

Despite a lengthy prehistory played out during the

Muscle Shoals debates of the 1920s, in the summer of 1933
the TVA lacked a clear and precise form.

The authority had

a three-member board of directors: Arthur E. Morgan,

Roosevelt's first choice for the board and its chair;
Harcourt A. Morgan, an agricultural scientist and president
of the University of Tennessee— and though Canadian-born,

the board's southerner; and, Lilienthal.

Beyond the

board, however, the TVA initially had no personnel or

organizational apparatus.

The authority had the fairly

specific directives of selling the power from Wilson Dam,

experimental fertilizer production, and flood control, but
it also had such ambiguous and ill-defined mandates as

planning and regional development.

Over that first summer,

the board had to establish the authority's priorities,

develop procedures for both policy-making and
administration, and forge an effective bureaucracy.

^Langdon Winner, "Do Artifacts Have Politics?" in, The
Whale and the Reactor. A Search for Limits in an Age of
Hicfh Technology (Chicago, University of Chicago Press,
1986)

,

p.

29.

.
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The full extent of each director's
responsibilities

was not clearly articulated during the
TVA's first months.
Still, there was little doubt that Lilienthal
was brought
in as both director and general counsel
to help shape the

agency's electric power program rather than attending
only
to the more mundane legal affairs of the Authority.
Arthur
Morgan had confirmed this role in their first interview,
and the initial board meetings reinforced this informal

delegation of powers.

Since there was no general manager,

it was also apparent that the directors would be doing
much

more than making policy, and would directly involve

themselves in policy implementation and administration.
This murky mix of responsibilities and the imprecise

delineation of power among board members helped precipitate
a struggle that took years to resolve.

However, the

earliest impact of the agency's odd structure its provision
of wide discretionary powers to each director. While the

Morgans began assembling their own staffs (Arthur focusing
on forestry, water control, and regional planning; Harcourt

tending to the fertilizer program and agricultural
revitalization)

,

Lilienthal moved ahead in the power

arena.

Just shy of his thirty-fourth birthday when he came to
the TVA that June, David Lilienthal was clearly the most

Herman Pritchett, The Tennessee Valley Authority.
A Study in Public Administration (Chapel Hill, University
of North Carolina Press, 1943)
^C.

13

junior member of the board of directors,

with A.E. and

H.A. Morgan at fifty-five and sixty-five
years-old,

respectively, age was only the most obvious but
probably
the least important marker.

At the president's discretion,

Arthur Morgan had held a tacit veto power over the
subsequent selections for the board, and with the others'
assent, had assumed the chairmanship at the initial board

meetings.

Each man had one vote on the board, but it

appeared that the chair would be first among equals.

H.A.

Morgan was considered crucial for introducing the new
agency into Southern social and political pathways.

The

three directors received staggered terms of appointment.
A.E. Morgan held a nine-year term; H.A. Morgan got six

years; Lilienthal was appointed for three years.

By the

end of the summer, however, Lilienthal had secured

increasing power for the TVA divisions controlled by him.

Through calculated maneuvering and an almost fevered
commitment to protect what he perceived as the public
interest, and despite a bitter struggle among the

directors, the trajectory Lilienthal established in that
first crucial summer eventually established his place as
the board's dominant force.

Amorphous at its inception,

the TVA that emerged bore the indelible marks of the

personality and politics of David

E.

Lilienthal.^

^For information on Arthur Morgan's role in the
selection of Lilienthal and H.A. Morgan, see, Roy Talbert
Arthur Morgan of the TVA (Jackson,
Jr., FDR's Utopian.
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Construction at the TVA, then, involved much
more than
simply building dams and high-tension wires,
and began
before any directors were named to the board.
"The choice
of tools," Lilienthal insisted, "is vital."
The
first

choice for the TVA was its creation as a public
authority—
a

government-owned corporation.

The authority as a form of

public administration has roots at least as far back as

Elizabethan England, but its use did not become widespread
until the twentieth century, when the Port of London

Authority and the Panama Canal Corporation emerged as early
and successful examples of the format.

Governments used

the corporate form primarily during periods of emergency or
wartime, for activities that were more commercial and not

considered to be traditional sectors of state
responsibility.

The federal government incorporated

numerous agencies during the first World War, such as the

War Finance Corporation and the Emergency Fleet
Corporation.

Some authorities emerged after the war at

both the national and local levels, most notably the Port

Authority of New York and New Jersey in 1921.

But it was

not until the 1930s that the number of public corporations

surged in the United States.

Indeed, one contemporary

scholar observed that the Roosevelt administration used the

device "so frequently that it came to be regarded almost as
an invention of the New Deal."

Authorities multiplied

University Press of Mississippi, 1987), pp. 90-96.
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locally as well, as Robert Moses, the
architect of
metropolitan New York's highways, housing, and
park
systems, made the public authority a trademark

of his

work.*

Public authorities had two extremely significant
benefits, proponents claimed.

First, they were reputedly

far more efficient than traditional government

bureaucracies; second, organizational autonomy allowed them
to operate in an apolitical or even anti-political manner--

free from the taint of patronage and backroom dealing that

supposedly permeated other public agencies controlled by
Congress, the White House, or political parties.

These

benefits made authorities particularly well-suited for
action during an emergency such as war or the Depression,

when the country needed its administration to stand above
traditional political differences and act in a quick and

decisive manner.

The dual factors of flexibility and

"There is little historical literature on public
authorities and government-owned corporations. However,
useful information can be found in studies by contemporary
political scientists and public administration specialists.
See, Pritchett, The Tennessee Vallev Authoritv and
"Government Corporations in the United States,"
Southwestern Social Science Quarterly 19(1938): 189-200
(quote cited is on p. 190)
also see Erwin Wilkie Bard, The
Port of New York Authority (New York, Columbia University
Press, 1942)
Regarding Moses's use of the Authority form, see
Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker. Robert Moses and the Fall
of New York (New York, A. A. Knopf, 1974), pp. 15-16, and
615-639.
;

;

.
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autonomy seemed to make the corporate form the
appropriate
technology for the New Deal in the Tennessee Valley/
As the Muscle Shoals project had begun in wartime,
and
the agency's dominant functions would have been
the

production and sale of fertilizer and electricity, earlier
legislative versions of the Muscle Shoals plan had also

proposed incorporation.

The inclusion in the 1933 version

of broader regional economic and social development lent

the new agency the titular distinction of becoming an

"Authority"

—

still a corporation but one involved less

strictly in commerce and charged with the more steward-like

purpose of "controlling [the valley's] development through
the expenditure of public funds or the guidance of public

authority."

But whether a Corporation or Authority, the

agency was cloaked in the rhetoric of flexibility and
autonomy.®
In his letter to Congress, when Roosevelt suggested "a

corporation clothed with the power of government but

possessed of the flexibility and initiative of a private
enterprise," he was echoing a commonly-held sentiment about

unwieldy and inefficient public agencies.

The TVA needed

to be free of the regulations and statutes that normally

have drawn much of this administrative and
In
institutional history from the works of C.H. Pritchett.
addition to the studies cited above, see also, Pritchett,
"The Paradox of the Government Corporation," Public
Administrative Review 1 (1941): 381-389.
8

Pritchett, The TVA

.

p.

30.
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bound government in so-called "red tape."

The political

scientist C.H. Pritchett observed that ordinary
cabinetline bureaus were often forced to "sacrifice
efficiency
scrupulous legality."

m

to

short, under normal

circumstances, the government could not get things
done.
The report of the joint legislative conference on
the TVA
bill reaffirmed this, stating, "we are fully persuaded,"

that the full success of the Tennessee Valley
development project will depend more upon the ability,
vision, and executive capacity of the members of the
board than upon legislative provisions. We have
sought to set up a legislative framework, but not to
encase it in a legislative straitjacket
We intend
that the corporation shall have much of the essential
freedom and elasticity of a private business
corporation.
.

Under the TVA Act, Congress released the new agency from
the restraints of civil service hiring, as well as federal

accounting and procurement practices.

Unfettered, it was

hoped that TVA would indeed get things done.^
To provide maximum flexibility to the new corporation,

Congress left much of the language of its legislative

charter purposely vague.

While committing the Authority to

regional planning and development, the act specified little
as to what these responsibilities would entail.

Notably

absent as well were any guidelines for an administrative
format.

The original House version of the bill, sponsored

by Democrat Lister Hill of Alabama, provided for a general
'united States House of Representatives, Report No.
130, Joint Conference Report on H.R. 5081, TVA Act, 73d
Congress, 1st Session, p. 19.
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manager to implement the policies set by the
board of
directors.
George Norris's Senate bill contained

no such

provision, however, and the final version followed
his
proposal.

In a marked break with precedent, the act did

not forge any formal ties between the TVA and any
Cabinet

department.

Prior to the New Deal, most government

corporations had to have

a

Cabinet member from a closely

related department on their board of directors.

In what

became a model for the corporations formed during the

Roosevelt administration, however, the TVA had no such
requirement, leaving the agency, in C.H. Pritchett's words,

"typically independent of the regular system of

departmental responsibility."

This design gave the its

board enormous discretionary control.

As both primary

policy-makers and administrators, with little direct

accountability to either the executive or legislative
branches of government, Lilienthal accurately observed in

a

July 1933 speech that the directors held "powers almost

unheard of in ordinary governmental departments
^°Pritchett, The TVA

.

"^°

136-137, and, "The Paradox of
the Government Corporation," p. 385; Lilienthal, "A New
National Conservation Policy," Address to the International
Congress of Women, Chicago, Illinois, 18 July 1933,
Lilienthal Papers, Box 18.
This model of relative autonomy extended even to
previously established corporations. Legislation amending
the charter of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
removed the Treasury Secretary from its board. However, by
the late 1930s, the model was under attack from both
By 1941, only the TVA and the
Congress and the cabinet.
FDIC remained free of more direct control within a CabinetThe struggle over political control and
line hierarchy.
.

pp.
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Freed from traditional accountability,
the TVA seemed
to stand above politics.
The Authority cultivated this
image carefully, and quite successfully.
Contemporary
observers, and historians since, frequently noted
the

agency's immunity to corrupting political influence.
a

After

visit to the valley, one journalist noted that "there

seems to be next to no politics in the TVA.

The

directors... do not answer to any government department.

They are not subordinate to Mr. Ickes, or to Jesse Jones,
or least of all to Mr. Farley."

for decades.

This mythology held sway

In his multi-volume history of the New Deal,

Arthur Schlesinger Jr. wrote,
protected by statute from political interference, TVA
guarded its chastity jealously.... The righteousness
was doubtless excessive.
But TVA did maintain an
extraordinary enthusiasm and dedication.
TVA administrators guarded this apparent purity so closely

because it protected them from critics who could then be
painted as the agents of corrupting political influence.
What Lilienthal and his associates were building at
the TVA certainly was not free from politics, however.

accountability figured prominently in the attempts to
extend the TVA format to other regional agencies and in the
executive reorganization plans of the late 1930s. See
Pritchett, "The Paradox," and, Barry Karl, The Uneasy
State.
The United States from 1915 to 1945 (Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1983).
Hutchinson, "Revolution by Electricity,"
Scribner's Magazine 96 (1934), p. 196; Arthur M.
Schlesinger Jr., The Politics of Upheaval. 1935-1936
(Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1960), p. 375.
''''Paul
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Instead, what they were constructing
was an emerging

politics of expertise, where

a

cadre of technically-

trained, objective experts would both make
and implement
policy.
Lilienthal was forging what one historian has
recently termed the "proministrative state,"
a politically

secure place where these experts could shape
public policy.
Merging within the federal bureaucracy two movements
that

previously had been following similar, but parallel,
trajectories, this institutional union of professional

expertise and public administration came to characterize
system that seemed aloof from traditional politics.

a

Its

dedicated public servants and professionals could determine
the "best" and most efficient solutions to the country's

social and economic problems,

in an environment unhindered

by red tape and old-style patronage.

As Lilienthal

explained in his 1944 paean, TVA: Democracy on the March

.

an employee who owes his appointment to his political
standing is a man whose allegiance may not be solely
to the merits and the public purposes of the
undertaking.
The whole enterprise would be infected
by half-technical, half-political judgments....
Once
politics enters, the entire edifice of an enterprise
built upon expert skills becomes unsafe.

This politics of expertise was not wholly new, but

a

wider

range for government intervention and the development of

institutional arrangements such as autonomous authorities
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and corporations, assured for it a more
permanent and
significant roleJ^

Most of Lilienthal's political terrain was
national
rather than regional.
By 1933 he was firmly situated

within the matrix of regulatory advocates and
economic
reformers he had first encountered as a junior
associate of
Donald Richberg. For Lilienthal, this reform network
served two purposes.

He drew heavily from among his

closest colleagues within this network for constant
political support and advice.
and,

Morris Cooke, George Norris,

still, Felix Frankfurter helped Lilienthal chart the

course at the TVA.

He rarely made a move without relying

on their counsel, particularly with regard to personnel

appointments at the Valley Authority.

Drawing from

academia, state and federal regulatory bodies, and

sympathetic political circles, Lilienthal could staff the

Authority's departments with individuals who were not only
highly-qualified experts but who also shared his
ideological perspective.

Thus, the lawyers, economists,

and engineers who Lilienthal brought to the valley would

turn their expertise to proving the social and technical
^^Lilienthal TVA.
Democracy on the March (New York,
Harper and Row, 1953; orig. ed. 1944), p. 180.
On the "proministrative state," see the excellent work
of Brian Balogh.
For example, "Reorganizing the
Organizational Synthesis: Federal-Professional Relations in
Modern America," Studies in American Political Development
5 (1991): 119-172; and. Chain Reaction. Expert Debate and
Public Participation in American Commercial Nuclear Power,
1945-1975 (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1991).
,
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efficacy of

a

lower rate structure, a wider distribution
of

power, and a more expansive regulatory presence.

Even before the TVA had secured sufficient
office
space in the valley that first summer, Lilienthal
began

assembling his legal and technical staffs.
legal department into two sections.

He divided the

The first would handle

what he termed the "routine business" of the Authority:
condemnations, personal injury suits, and similar affairs.

These lawyers would have to come from among members of the
state bars within the region.

Lilienthal hoped to devote

as little time as possible to securing competent personnel

for that first section,
far more important.

for he viewed the second group as

The "Power Research" section of his

legal department would work closely with Lilienthal

's

technical staff, studying markets, drafting legislation and

power contracts, and cooperating with state, county, and
municipal governments. Primarily concerned with securing

aggressive and committed people, Lilienthal also took
control of hiring the utility economists and power

engineers who would informally comprise the power
department; he maintained direct charge until

a

Department

of Electricity was formed a full year later.

^^Lilienthal to Frankfurter, 9 June 1933, Lilienthal
Papers, Box 59; despite the formation of the new department
in 1934, Lilienthal maintain a high level of daily
administrative responsibilities until a 1937
See, Pritchett, The TVA pp. 175-176.
reorganization.
,
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Well aware that his La Follette lineage
and Harvard
Law training branded him as an outsider
to many

Southerners, and sensitive to the TVA's mandate
for

regional administration, Lilienthal nonetheless
had no
intention of limiting his personnel search to the
Tennessee
Valley, or even to the South.
Soliciting advice and
lists

of candidates from his various advisers, he attached
too

much importance to this agency's success to circumscribe
the talent pool for his staff in such an arbitrary manner.

Writing to Frankfurter, he stated that "we can ease
ourselves into the situation,

I

the right kind of southerners."

believe, better if we get

Given Lilienthal

"s

political connections to midwestern and Plains
progressivism, he would not make regionalism

a

primary

criterion, however, noting that "this is a national matter,
not a sectional one."

And unlike H.A. Morgan's

agricultural programs, which were quickly identified with
the conservative forces of the South 's agricultural elite,
the starved condition of regulatory bodies in the region

left the new director without strong southern candidates
for his technical staff.

In the end,

few members of either

the Power Research legal section or the nascent Department
of Electricity came from the South.
^^Lilienthal to Frankfurter, 9 June 1933; Lilienthal
sent similar letters to Cooke and Frank Walsh, the labor
lawyer and then a member of the New York Power Authority
The defining work on the agricultural programs'
conservative bonds is, Philip Selznick, TVA and the

.
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The lists of candidates and the ultimate
appointees
reflect how both implicit ideological
interests and
explicit political machinations were deeply
embedded in the

supposedly value-free environment of administrative
expertise.

Among those considered for Lilienthal's legal

staff were two Harvard Law graduates and Reconstruction

Finance Corporation staffers, Paul Freund and Frank

A.

Watson; Freund, who went on to serve in the Justice
Department, had clerked for Louis Brandeis at the Supreme
Court.

Also considered was John Wheeler, son of Montana

Senator and 1924 La Follette running-mate Burton
Wheeler.

K.

Lilienthal drew many of his closest staffers from

among former associates in both Chicago and Wisconsin.

Joseph

C.

Swidler had begun his law career in 1930 as

Lilienthal's junior associate.

He remained in Chicago when

La Follette summoned his boss, but moved south in 1933 to

become assistant general counsel at TVA.

Julius Krug had

been a utility economist at the Public Service Commission
in Madison,

and followed what quickly became a well-worn

path from Wisconsin's capitol to the new agency.

From

farther afield Lilienthal found that the network of

activist regulators and municipal plant administrators

provided a rich yield of sympathetic experts.

Notably,

Llewellyn Evans, at one point a candidate for the position

Grassroots. A Study of Politics and Organization
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1949)
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on the board that went to Lilienthal, came
to the power

department from Tacoma

,

Washington's municipal utilityj^

Despite a legislative mandate designed to bar the
door
to a spoils system in an agency unfettered by
civil service

procedures, political considerations very clearly

influenced several appointments among non-technical

professional staff.

Lilienthal devoted special attention

to public and Congressional relations. Politics at the rVA

operated at different levels.

Beneath the carefully

cultivated image of the agency's anti-politics, Lilienthal
in particular was a shrewd practitioner of the political

arts.

Sharpening the skills he had acquired in Wisconsin,

Lilienthal reveled in the realm of deal-making and

carefully-measured political seismography

.

In mid-May,

as

he had moved from a possible candidate to an imminent

nominee, Lilienthal began corresponding with Forrest Allen,
an editor at the Memphis Press-Scimitar

,

part of the

Scripps-Howard newspaper chain that backed Roosevelt, the
New Deal, and the TVA.

Lilienthal had Allen perform some

political intelligence, giving the new director "some
indications of where to classify" various people

ol

local

significance and provide Lilienthal with

a

political

Allen later became

a

member of the

"pedigree" for each.

^^Lilienthal to Frankfurter, 9 Juno 1933; The Journals
Volume One
The TVA Yo.i rs. 1939of David E. Lili enthal
1945 (New York, Harper and Row, 196-1), pp. 72-7 1, 92-93
Arthur Morgan of the TVA
Roy Talbert, Jr., FDR's Utopian.
(Jackson, University Press of Mississippi, I9H7), p. 92.
.

.

;
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agency's public relations office.

V.D.L. Robinson, an aide

to Tennessee senator Nathan Bachman,
received a position in
the Authority's information division
and worked as

Lilienthal's personal assistant.

Along with Forrest

Allen's appointment, Robinson helped to secure
the new
director's exposed flank as a northerner unfamiliar
with
the region and its political environment. Another
former
senatorial aide took charge of the TVA's Washington
office.

Marguerite Owen left George Norris's staff to become the
agency's chief Washington lobbyist.

She became a close

Lilienthal ally, working with him in a number of battles

with Congress and in the divisive internal struggle that

would rock the TVA during the mid-1930s.
Despite the highly politicized nature of these
appointments, none ignored the importance of competence.
Krug and Swidler went on to have long and distinguished

careers in public service

—

Krug as the Secretary of the

Interior from 1945-1949 and Swidler succeeding Lilienthal
TVA general counsel and later as chair of the Federal

Communications Commission under John

F.

Kennedy.

Llewellyn

Evans was later described as "a prophet and visionary," who
also "had a firm grasp on the technicalities of power

generation and transmission."

At numerous points in her

career, Owen helped pull the TVA out of hostile political

currents.

The interests of politics, ideology, and

s
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expertise meshed in a seamless weave within
the TVA's
administrative apparatus.
''^

As had been the case in Wisconsin, Lilienthal
was able
to rapidly assemble an agency staff.

These experts then

faced the formidable task of planning a major
expansion in
the generation and marketing of TVA electricity.

To begin

with, they had to answer the intricate issues every

electric utility had confronted, such as load and capacity,

distribution networks, and the relationship between rate
structure and market demand.

The Muscle Shoals experience

provided only the barest of precedent for the new
Authority; previously, all of Wilson Dam's hydro power was
sold directly to the Alabama Power Company, one of several

regional affiliates of the giant holding firm, Commonwealth
and Southern.
valley.

The TVA had no power lines reaching into the

It had no customer base

—

wholesale or retail,

commercial or domestic.
Yet the power staff did have an agenda.

Its mission

was to drastically lower the prevailing rate structure,

particularly for domestic and small commercial users of

^^Allen-Lilienthal correspondence, May-June 1933,
Lilienthal Papers, Box 59; quote from Lilienthal to Allen,
19 June 1933.
On Robinson's appointment, see, Talbert, FDR
Utopian pp. 152-154; Marguerite Owen wrote her own account
of her years with the TVA, The Tennessee Valley Authority
For the laudatory
(New York, Praeger Publishers, 1973)
appraisal of Evans, see, an oral history with Joseph C.
Swidler, as quoted in Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis
'

,

.

,

p.

379.
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electricity.

Doing this, they claimed, would ultimately

raise consumption levels so significantly
that the lower
per unit revenues would be financially justified.

Further,

beyond the immediate concern for the TVA's operating
costs,
Lilienthal and his staff promoted broader hopes
that the
lower rates would leaven the depressed American
economy

while allowing millions of presently excluded citizens
access to the emancipative promise of electric current.

Although the TVA shared many of the technical problems
of forecasting load and demand common to all power

companies, establishing a rate structure initially posed
the most vexing and unigue problem for the Authority.

As

Lilienthal had learned in both his work with the railway
labor unions and the Wisconsin PSC, rate-making was always
a confusing and contentious craft,

requiring a lengthy

fact-finding process that was open to an array of often

contradictory interpretations.

Rates were normally based

on the valuation of the investment necessary to produce the

service, whether railroad freight delivery or electric

current.

Valuation of property and operating cost analyses

were at the heart of many of Lilienthal

's

prior political

discussion of this economic argument, see
Chapter 2, "Rates and Regulation;" a useful study of ratemaking at Ontario Hydro is Keith Miller, Power at Cost.
Ontario Hydro and Rural Electrification. 1911-1958
(Montreal, McGill University Press, 1991); further analysis
of Lilienthal 's claims for electricity as a liberating
technology will follow in Chapter 4, "Selling State Power,"
below.
^^For a
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battles, and he knew that the rates
he announced would
provoke bitter criticism from the TVA's
opponents within
the private sector.
TVA power rates would have to
withstand intense scrutiny while also enticing
enough

interest to create a revenue-producing market
that would
solidify the agency's political support; Lilienthal
knew
that the rates mattered and therefore, so did
the rate-

making process.
Some of the variables in the TVA's rate equation were

particularly complex.

While the courts had resolved

certain debates over valuation methodology, there was no
base principle guiding valuation estimates for power

produced from a multi-purpose dam.

The Wilson dam, and

every other dam planned by the Authority for the Tennessee

River and its tributaries, served three inseparable
functions: flood control, navigation, and hydroelectric
power.

To arrive at an "actual" valuation of the TVA's

power system, Lilienthal

's

power experts would have to

divide out and allocate each dam's costs among the three
functions

—

precedents.
a

an inevitably lengthy process with few

The TVA also found it impossible to arrive at

base "original cost" valuation for the Wilson Dam.

The

staff contended that original cost methodology, the

valuation principle upheld by the Supreme Court, could not
be applied at Wilson, because its construction had begun

during the highly inflationary war period, and then its

.

.

.
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completion had been delayed an additional
several years.
To further complicate matters, many of
the agency's
advocates from the president down touted its
impending rate
structure as a "yardstick" against which the
allegedly
unfair charges of the private power firms could
be

compared.

While the term never appeared in its legislative

charter, and the vast differences between the TVA
and the

private utilities negated the value of any comparisons,
most people agreed with Franklin Roosevelt, who, during
the
1932 campaign pledged that public power projects such as

Muscle Shoals "will be forever

a

national yardstick to

prevent extortion against the public and to encourage the

wider use of that servant of the people

—

electric power."

Together, these issues made an already arduous process even

more cumbersome

For a contemporary analysis of the allocation
question, see, Horace M. Gray, "The Allocation of Joint
Costs In Multi-Purpose Hydro-Electric Projects," American
Economic Review 25 (1935): 224-235; cite FDR's Portland
speech
The standard monograph on the development of the TVA's
power program remains McCraw's, TVA and the Power Fight
esp. pp. 30-34 and 70-74 on the yardstick issue.
A study of federal power policies conducted by the
Twentieth Century Fund in the late 1930s provides very
valuable data and analysis of TVA rates. With full
publication delayed by the war, a summary was published in
1944 as The Power Industry and the Public Interest (New
York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1944)
with the full report
coming out four years later as. Electric Power and
Government Policy. A Survey of Relations Between
Government and the Electric Power Industry (New York,
Twentieth Century Fund, 1948)
,

,

,
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By August, pressure was mounting
from numerous

quarters for the announcement of

a

TVA rate schedule.

The

number of inquiries from various municipalities
seeking
access to the anticipated cheap power grew
each week.
Private utilities also anxiously awaited the
news.

To have

schedule in place so soon, Lilienthal knew that he
would
have to come out with rates that were not as fully
grounded
a

in verifiable operating costs and valuation data as
he

would have wished.

As he wrote that summer to his

Wisconsin associate and friend, E.W.

(Ed)

Morehouse,

"before we go ahead on them [the rates] we want to be as

nearly sure that we are on the right track as possible, and
yet we have to act pretty fast."

The objective was

a

rate

structure radically lower than any offered by the

surrounding power companies: low enough to draw greater

consumption within the cities and towns clamoring for the
new power, but also sound enough to withstand the

inevitable attacks from hostile observers within the

politically weakened but still formidable utility lobby in
Washington.

These pressures forced the TVA staffers to short-

circuit so much of the normal rate-making process that

Thomas McCraw's landmark history of the agency

characterizes their efforts as "basically (and necessarily)

^'Lilienthal to E.W. Morehouse, n.d.
Lilienthal Papers, Box 60.

(ca.

August 1933)
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an exercise in intuition."

But as a contemporary study
of

electric power suggested, the "TVA
rates were not, however,
drawn out of a hat." if the twin
constraints
of time and

politics did limit the scope of the work
that underpinned
the first schedule, Lilienthal and
his staff were
not

operating completely in the dark.

Llewellyn Evans turned

to the agency's hydraulic engineers
for the Wilson Dam's

operating costs from the 1920s.

Construction and operating

cost estimates for future dams were already
available, and
the TVA's experiment with low rates was not
without
precedent.

The power division used data from the Ontario

Hydro system and Evans's Tacoma municipal plant as
models
for their own enterprise.

conducted by Lilienthal

's

A three-year long study

regulatory allies at the New York

Power Authority provided extensive evidence linking low
rates to increased consumption patterns that would thereby

secure satisfactory returns for an operating utility.

Summarizing the Power Authority's study, Julius Krug stated
that it "demonstrate [d] very clearly in that study that

with increase in use, distribution costs decrease very
substantially.... You can pretty much double the amount of

energy sold over distribution systems without materially

increasing the cost of providing service."

Armed with this

variety of data, the TVA experts were engaged in much more

.
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than pure-and-simple guesswork; there
were no rate schedule
dartboards hanging in the power division's
20
off ices.

To have their rates ready by the
summer's end,
Lilienthal and Evans made two significant
decisions.

m

a

short-term resolution to the allocation-valuation
dilemma,
the power staff formulated a base figure
for the Wilson Dam
property by what became known as the "prudent
businessman
principle."

As Lilienthal later explained this highly

controversial method to

Congressional committee in 1938,

a

the TVA determined what "a prudent businessman would
pay"
for a hydroelectric dam with generating capacity
comparable
to that at Wilson.

Attacked by private utilities as

hopelessly subjective, Lilienthal claimed that this
principle was burdened with different, but not greater,
ambiguities than original cost valuation which was

essentially unusable for Wilson Dam.

In any event, the TVA

viewed these estimates as transitional figures that could
be revised once a more permanent allocation system was in

place

2^
.

TVA and the Power Fight p. 60; Twentieth
Century Fund, Electric Power and Government Policy p. 594;
Krug testimony. Joint Committee on the Investigation of the
Tennessee Valley Authority 75th Congress, 3rd Session, 14
Parts (May-December 1938)
pp. 738-740 (hereafter cited as.
Joint Investigation of TVA
''''McCraw,

,

,

.

,

)

^^Pritchett, The TVA pp. 82-83; Lilienthal testimony,
23 July 1938, Joint Investigation of the TVA pp. 53085309.
.

.
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The second decision reflects just
how deeply the
ideological currents common to Lilienthal
and his staff
permeated their techniques at the TVA. Working
with

reasonable, but admittedly rough, cost estimates,
the power
division turned the normal rate-making process
on its head,

and decided to let their projections for
anticipated

residential consumption levels serve as
factor for the TVA's base rates.

a

determining

Had they followed the

standard practices of the private firms, the TVA ratemakers would have established

a

running average consumption

level from several previous years' usage in the region.

They would then have set rates that would guarantee

satisfactory revenue from secure, already-existing demand.
Instead, Evans and the staff relied on consumption patterns
in low-rate systems such as Ontario Hydro,

and projected

annual domestic consumption at 1,200 kilowatt hours (KWH)

per year, a figure that was twice the national average.

Forecasting such

a

tremendous boost in power

consumption, the TVA could then offer the sharply lower

rates that its proponents believed would produce sufficient

revenue while making power an affordable commodity.

As

Lilienthal later explained the issue,
one principle of pricing must be clearly recognized,
or the entire social significance of the yardstick is
lost: the rate charged for electricity, within wide
limits, determines the cost, it is the rate that
determines the cost.... And by a happy coincidence, the
social objective of wide utilization of electricity,
and the business principle I have just stated, work in
harmony.... In a wide field of mass production, as
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i;j^^^^^ed den.and results in less cost
per
Z7lTit
unit.
Limited production means high costs;
wide
consumption produces low costs.

Lilienthal and Evans did not turn rate-making
into a
political act, for it had always been so.
What they did
was transform it into a tool serving an
emergent

consumption-driven political economy. ^2
As Evans constructed a preliminary set of rates,

Lilienthal assembled an outside consulting team to
review
the staff's work.

This team's members were all highly

regarded experts, but they were also closely identified

with the low-rate regulatory agenda, as well as friends or

colleagues of Lilienthal

'

s:

James

C.

Bonbright from

Columbia; Haninah Zinder and Ed Morehouse from the

Wisconsin PSC; Martin Glaeser from the University of
Wisconsin's Economics department; Leland Olds and Mile

Maltbie from New York State's Power Authority and PSC.

The

advisors' highest priority was to help Evans fine-tune the

initial TVA rates for immediate release.

After applying

the finishing touches to that schedule, the group was to

break up into various committees and prepare detailed
studies of the valuation and allocation issues, ultimately

Electric Power and Government Policy pp. 591-598;
Lilienthal testimony, Joint Investigation of the TVA pp.
795-796.
,

,
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establishing

more firmly grounded methodology
for the
Authority's power program.
a

^-^

The first goal proved by far to be the
easier of the
two tasks.
The consultants offered only minor revisions
to Evans's rate structure, and they passed
the completed

schedule on to Lilienthal.
released the new rates.

In mid-September,

the director

At three cents and under per KWH

for normal domestic consumers, the TVA's prices
were indeed

radically lower than those of the surrounding companies,

undercutting the privately-held Alabama, Georgia, and
Tennessee utilities by between 40 and 60 percent.
these rates were

While

bold departure from the regional norm,

a

and attracted considerable national attention, they were
not the high-risk gamble they have sometimes been

considered.

Lilienthal had recruited a team of extremely

competent rate-makers who combined advocacy of the lowprice agenda with
economics.

a

firm grasp of the realities of utility

From the Pacific Northwest to Ontario, there

were enough examples of
electricity.

a

highly elastic demand for

For these people, the TVA would be one more

step, albeit a giant step,

in their implementation of an

already working model.

The TVA pp. 86-87; Lilienthal testimony,
Joint Investigation of the TVA p. 707.
'^^Pritchett

,

.

.

^^McCraw, TVA and the Power Fight pp.
power and Government Policy pp. 596-598.
,

,

59-61; Electric
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Completing the second goal proved far more
difficult
for Lilienthal's consultants and power
staff,
however.

Establishing long-term valuation and allocation
principles
involved technical complexities that challenged
even the

collective expertise gathered at the TVA.
issue,

in particular,

questions.
a

The allocation

raised a number of daunting

Apportioning the value of multi-purpose dams on

cost-benefit basis was nearly impossible.

How,

for

instance, could one measure the public's interest in flood

control?

As Horace Gray, a contemporary economist, noted,

the non-vendible character of certain utilities
renders allocation by reference to a free market
impossible.
The intangible nature of certain
benefits... make[s] it difficult to allocate costs.

Gray concluded by declaring that "no objective formula is
possible; joint costs," he wrote, "must be allocated by

reference to social policy."

The lack of clear precedents

made the task both more complex and more significant.

As

the study dragged on into 1934 and 1935, Lilienthal urged

caution upon his colleagues.

The Authority had its initial

rates in place, and he wanted to be sure that the final

recommendations were theoretically sound and politically
defensible.
so far as

I

"It is the first case of such apportionment,

know, among the Federal power projects," he

advised Bonbright, "and to that extent may become
part of national power policy."

a

settled

Facing such an array of

.
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variables, the power division moved
slowly on these

matters."
Technical complexities were not the only
source of

delay in implementing

more conclusive power policy.

a

As

early as July 1933, an internal struggle
between A.E.
Morgan and Lilienthal was emerging within the
TVA's board.
Ultimately, the fault lines that split the board
reveal

a

deep ideological divide between the two directors
that

engulfed the agency in
controversy.

a

bitter and protracted public

The catalyst that triggered the opening

rounds in this struggle, however, was the power issue.

Differences between Morgan and Lilienthal regarding
specifics such as allocation methodology and concerning the
more general tenor of the power program were the first
signs of the TVA's impending crisis.

The ambiguities in

the Authority's policy-making and administrative structures

during its first months complicated the board's policy
dispute, and the temporary resolution of this struggle

carried significant implications for the future course of
the TVA.^^

Unlike Lilienthal, Arthur Morgan had little direct

experience with either the politics or technigues of the
"The Allocation of Joint Costs," p. 224;
Lilienthal to James C. Bonbright, 12 September 1935,
reprinted in, Joint Investigation of the TVA p. 713.
^^Gray,

.

best narrative account of the Morgan-Lil ienthal
struggle is, Thomas K. McCraw, Morgan vs. Lilienthal: The
Feud within the TVA (Chicago, Loyola Press, 1970)
^•^The
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electric power business.

That inexperience, of course, had

been the primary reason for Lilienthal's
appointment to the
board.
And although Morgan exhibited an often
dogmatic and
unyielding personality, he hoped to steer
his agency toward
close cooperation and compromise with the
private power
sector.
He advocated allocation methods and a base

valuation for Wilson Dam's operating costs that would
have
boosted TVA's power costs, and thus forced rates
higher as
well.

The TVA chair opposed aggressive competition by the

agency for sales territory then controlled by the private
utilities, and he made conciliatory overtures toward

Wendell Willkie, the head of powerful Commonwealth and

Southern utility holding company.

"I

think we should treat

legitimate power development as an honorable and desirable
activity," Morgan stated in a mid-July memo to Lilienthal,
and that we should not unnecessarily stimulate any
competitive activity which will destroy invested
values.
Moreover, I think that we should assume
reasonableness, fair play and good will on the part of
the utilities unless experience in our own relations
with them demonstrates the contrary.
(emp. his)

The staff of social planners that Morgan assembled around

him also reflected this cooperative demeanor.

Earle

Draper, a noted regional planner hired by Morgan who played
a

central role in designing the town of Norris, echoed the

chair's sentiments in

a

press interview when he stated that

s
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"care is to be taken that whatever power
is developed will
not compete with existing power interests "^^
.

All of this rankled Lilienthal, whose
combative

attitude toward the utilities had been well
illustrated in
Wisconsin. Answering Morgan's overtures to the
utility
industry, Lilienthal issued his own lengthy memorandum.

He

strongly urged his fellow directors to make no
territorial

concessions at this early stage.

"I

must repeat my deeply

felt disagreement with such a policy and such a procedure,"
he wrote.

Lilienthal then went on to further warn against

a conciliatory approach.

"Candor compels me to say," he

wrote,

that I am most skeptical that we can hope for genuine
'co-operation' with the private utilities.... To
premise our policies at this time on the willingness
of the privately owned utilities to work with us,
seems to me to be running counter to every reasonable
expectation.

After outlining his recommendations for a more aggressive
posture, Lilienthal signalled his intent to introduce the

issues for formal consideration at a board meeting in late
July. 2^

On the allocation and valuation questions, see,
Pritchett, The TVA pp. 84-91; on Morgan's general approach
to the power issue and his personality, see, Talbert, FDR
Utopian esp. pp. 128-149; A.E. Morgan to Lilienthal, no
date (ca. mid-July 1933), Lilienthal Papers, Box 60; the
Draper interview is quoted in a letter from John P.
Robertson, secretary to George W. Norris, to Morris Cooke,
22 July 1933, Cooke Papers, Box 53.
.

'

,

^®Lilienthal to Arthur E. Morgan, 21 July 193 3,
Lilienthal Papers, Box 60.
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That differences between the two
men would surface was
probably inevitable. What was not
inevitable was the

junior director's early and decisive
break with Morgan on
these matters, and his efforts to almost
completely sever
Morgan's influence over TVA power policy.
Behind his

aggressive public stances, Lilienthal often
assumed

a

deferential posture toward his direct superiors,
seldom

challenging their positions.

As a sympathetic biographer

of A.E. Morgan described this character trait,

"he made

friends in high places with astonishing ease, along
with

certain amount of cultivation.

Lilienthal

's

mentors and confidants verge on sycophancy."

a

letters to his

Although the

portrayal may have been shaded by the author's inclination
toward Morgan, such

a

depiction is close to the mark.

In

taking these dramatic steps, Lilienthal was not acting
alone, but was instead moving under the direct guidance of

his closest advisors.

George Norris, Morris Cooke, and

Felix Frankfurter were all observing the activities at the
TVA,

and were all equally disturbed by Morgan's

conciliatory stance.

Confiding with each other and then

with Lilienthal, the three urged him forward in his

confrontation with Morgan.^'
Morris Cooke began sending out warning signals in
early July.

He wrote to Norris,

Frankfurter, and

Lilienthal, expressing his concern that the TVA chair was
29

Talbert, FDR's Utopian

,

p.

96.

—

.
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setting the new agency on

a

dangerous course.

"i am

convinced that the Administration is, in
this matter,
headed right into serious trouble,"
Cooke stated.
He noted
that he found Morgan's "idealism,
versatility, and

engineering capacity" admirable, but "he has
selfconfidence raised to the nth power and— in the
political
and electrical fields especially— a naivete
that I
have

never seen paralleled."

Citing a specific example of the

potential trouble, Cooke told of

a

meeting he had with

Morgan's "personnel man" regarding the TVA's hiring
practices.

They met at Washington's Cosmos Club in early

that July, and according to Cooke,

this man asked

within hearing of a miscellaneous group "Who should
build the Cove Creek Dam?" Having changed the subject
I returned at a more opportune moment with the
query
"How will you choose the engineer to build Cove Creek
Dam?" Answer
"I ask every man I meet and about one
out of three write me when they get back to their
offices

—

"Allowing the private power interests to know your mind,"
Cooke wrote to Lilienthal, will be "sure to end

disastrously."

For Cooke, committed to the position that

ideological perspective was embedded within engineering
technique, this was indeed a dangerous course.
^°Cooke to Felix Frankfurter, 13 July 1933, Cooke
Papers, Box 57; Cooke to Lilienthal, 26 July 1933,

Lilienthal Papers, Box 59.
In FDR's Utopian Talbert speculates that it may have
been Cooke that originally brought Arthur Morgan to the
attention of President Roosevelt, and helped Morgan secure
the TVA position.
Cooke's correspondence seems to indicate
a deep and early mistrust for the TVA chair.
See the
letter of 13 July to Frankfurter, "When I heard of Dr.
.

Norris and Frankfurter reiterated this
concern.
Senator Norris expressed great confidence
in Lilienthal who
he stated "has been in the fight long
enough to realize
what the commission [the TVA board] is up
against.
I know
as you do," he continued in a letter to
Cooke, "how
important it is to have the key positions filled
with men
who are not tangled up with the power trust
They ought
to take off their gloves before starting— this
is not a

kindergarten entertainment."

Frankfurter warned Lilienthal

to pay close attention to Cooke,

"who knows what he is

talking about when it comes to the engineering
fraternity.

"^^

Lilienthal responded by noting that he "desperately
needs counsel" from his various advisers.

He was doing all

he could to build a staff that was both competent and

ideologically committed, and offered as an example his

hiring of Llewellyn Evans.
21 memo to Norris,

He also sent copies of his July

Cooke, and Frankfurter, among others,

and shared with them his plans to exclude Morgan from any

further influence in the power program.

Frankfurter wrote

Morgan's appointment I felt that the President had struck
as near twelve as we often come in human affairs;" and,
"The President has naturally 100 per cent confidence in his
But
Chairman
otherwise he would not have appointed him.
I miss my guess if he knows his naivete.
I have 100 per
cent confidence in what he would do if he but knew."

—

^^George Norris to Cooke, 8 July 1933, Cooke Papers,
Box 53; Felix Frankfurter to Lilienthal, 10 July 1933,
Lilienthal Papers, Box 59.
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back to his former student, applauding
the proposed
administrative coup.
"Of course you are right in your
position," he exclaimed, "Dead right....
Don't deviate from
your position
Thank God you're on the job." At every
stage in this struggle, Lilienthal secured
the backing
of

his network of influential mentors.

After winning H.A. Morgan's support for the
proposed
reorganization, guaranteeing at least a two-to-one
majority, the August board meeting became an anti-climax.

Arthur Morgan acquiesced, at least temporarily, to

a formal

division of responsibility among the three board members.
Each director assumed primary policy-making and

administrative control over specific TVA functions: A.E.
Morgan to oversee forestry, flood control, and regional
planning, H.A. Morgan to have agricultural programs, and

Lilienthal to run the power section.

In certain respects,

this formal sanctioning of the tripartite division merely

ratified how the agency had been functioning since early
June.

But most importantly, it essentially barred Morgan

from making what Lilienthal regarded as unwarranted

intrusions into his domain.

On September

2,

Morgan wrote

^"^Lilienthal to Frankfurter, 13 July 1933
and,
Frankfurter to Lilienthal, 29 July 1933, Lilienthal Papers,
Box 59; In addition to Norris, Cooke, and Frankfurter,
Lilienthal sent copies of his July 21 memo and
,

reorganization proposal to James Bonbright, Robert La
Follette Jr.
and Basil Manly; see correspondence in
Lilienthal Papers, Box 59.
,
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to Wendell Willkie that all negotiations
regarding power

matters would now have to be directed
through Lilienthal."
Shortly after the August resolution, Cooke
reaffirmed
his belief in Lilienthal, and offered
some warm personal
words for the 34 year-old, who felt physically
and

spiritually drained by the struggle.

"The fact that you

are standing manfully," Cooke wrote,
and I think adroitly for an interest which tens of
thousands have very much at heart must be your
inspiration and support
when you need the Old
Guard ordered out or any other special service all you
have to do is to ask.
You are the right man in the
right place and in the End will win out.

There would follow many more opportunities for Lilienthal
to rely on Cooke's unswerving support.

On the details of this "trisecting of administrative
responsibility," see, Pritchett, The TVA pp. 156-158; on
the ideologically conservative implications of H.A.
Morgan's autonomous control over the agriculture program,
see, Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots copy of the letter
from A.E. Morgan to Wendell Willkie in "TVA: Miscellaneous"
folder, "Lilienthal Papers, Box 61.
Harcourt Morgan's close relationship with conservative
agricultural forces is paralleled in Lilienthal 's work by
the ties he establishes with the AFofL building trade
unions. What Selznick describes as the ideological
cooptation of the agricultural division occurred in the
power division as well, and emerged out of the imperatives
and internal logic of TVA's structure and policies. See
chapter 6 below.
.

;

^^Cooke to Lilienthal,

4 October 1933, Lilienthal
Papers, Box 59.
Cooke remained a close observer of the TVA, as well as
a (privately) strident critic of Arthur Morgan. Writing to
Frankfurter during the law professor's year at Oxford,
Cooke stated, "The TVA administrative situation is by no
means cleared up. They are struggling along with three
bosses, when one is suggested by good management. Antioch
Morgan could never be the general manager of this project,
but I think ultimately they will have to settle down and

.
.
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While the arrangement was at best

a

fragile truce

that would later break down, this
administrative

compartmentalization left the agency- most junior
director
in charge of that part of the TVA that
was to have

the most

significant and longest-lasting impact in American
politics
and society. Lilienthal understood that the
decisions
that

he made during the agency's first years, when both
a

bureaucracy and

a

dam system were being constructed,

carried enduring implications. In 1939, looking back at
that construction phase, he remarked in a letter to Newton
f

Arvin that he was now ready to focus his efforts on the
national economic reconstruction of which the TVA was one
small part. "With the power program on its feet, and

fortified by thousand-year dams and 20-year contracts not

subject to change by Congress,

I

hope to be able to devote

more and more time to this job," Providing cheap electric

power had always been one of the agency's central mandates.
But as the Authority's other functions receded in

importance and the TVA became increasingly focused upon the

power issue, Lilienthal and the infrastructure that he
forged defined the agency's future and its place in the

broader political landscape of the New

Deal.-^^

act as board of directors and have one executive.
Lilienthal 's power ideas have largely won out." Cooke to
Frankfurter, 19 February 1934 Cooke Papers, Box 57
.

,

^^Lilienthal, The Journals

.

I,

p.

82.

.
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For Lilienthal, this future entailed
a new political
economy that consciously linked low-cost
production and
mass consumption; it was a future managed
by policy-makers
who were the stewards of an interventionist
state but were
immune from more traditional modes of
political influence
and, ultimately,

from public accountability as well.

Building an organization designed to produce and
sell

electric power, Lilienthal was also generating state
power.

i

CHAPTER

5

SELLING STATE POWER: LEGITIMATING THE
TVA
AND THE POLITICS OF CONSUMPTION
Question: "What are they going to do with
all
that power when they get it?"
Answer:
"Make two bulbs of glass glow where
only one glew before."
Business WeeV 23 December 1933.

Lilienthal seemed more exhausted than exhilarated
by
the August administrative coup that he and H.A.
Morgan
engineered. In any event, he had little time to reflect
on
its long-term significance or savor the personal
triumph.

He forged an uneasy truce that staked out the working

boundaries for the agency's directors, wresting almost
total control over the power program while relinguishing

influence over the Authority's various other programs.
Still Lilienthal

's

ongoing efforts to consolidate control

and create rationalized administrative structures neither

diminished nor simplified his role.

His list of

responsibilities grew longer, and his profile, atop the

electricity department's flow chart, stood in much bolder
relief.

Lilienthal was in charge of TVA's power.

The temporary resolution of the Authority's

administrative dispute allowed Lilienthal to assess the
TVA's political environment. He could not help but notice
an array of hostile forces ready to undermine the agency

and curtail its influence.

Despite enjoying a

corporation's flexibility and autonomy, the agency was not
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immune to political and constitutional
challenges to its
legitimacy.
Opponents emerged from across the political
range- from the private utilities and their
financiers who
openly fought any expansion of public power,
to elements
within the Roosevelt administration, located
primarily in
the Agriculture and Interior Departments,
who waged an

initially more muted and cautious struggle against
the
TVA's incursions into their "turf." Looking for
supporters, however, Lilienthal saw a more inchoate

political landscape.

Aside from the small cadre of public

power and regulatory advocates and a few Congressional
stalwarts, the Authority did not have the backing of well-

defined forces in the political arena.
Without stronger institutional bases of support,
Lilienthal had to forge a popular constituency to

legitimate the Authority and secure its long-term
viability.

Lilienthal thus used rate reductions to

consolidate

a base;

power.

the TVA's foundation was cheap electric

Lilienthal worked to devise a low rate structure

and secure territory for TVA current while launching

a

massive public relations campaign designed not only to sell

electricity but also to sell the Authority as the sole

provider and guarantor of the cheap rates. He struck
quickly.

"Speed was important," Lilienthal reflected later.

for only in a period of sweeping ^reform' or
^emergency' psychology could the job be started;
.

..

^
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—

carrying it on, if it should show early
results
the Republicans or
j.^^^^-^^^
t?ad?Mona?
traditional Democrats got back.
The politics of consumption that he
had begun shaping in
Wisconsin were taking more evident form. At
the TVA
Lilienthal used affordable electricity as the
axis from
which he spun off an ambitious political
strategy that

linked the TVA and the New Deal to economic recovery,

unequalled material prosperity, and
order

a

democratic social

.

The campaign's rhetoric functioned at several levels.
At its broadest, this rhetoric echoed commonly-held notions

that championed electric power as the deepest wellspring of

progress and modernity.

In this respect,

Lilienthal relied

upon popular expectations of electricity's unlimited
potential, tapping into the deep faith that most Americans

shared in the transformative powers of new technologies
since the westward expansion of the railroad and the
telegraph.

through

a

But Lilienthal added new layers of meaning

new vocabulary specifically designed to highlight

the promise of TVA current.

Although TVA-generated power

was the functional equivalent of that produced by the

private utilities, Lilienthal strived to create
identity for TVA current.

a

unique

In his campaign, the TVA power

director went about securing his agency's legitimacy by
identifying abundant and affordable electricity with the
^Lilienthal, The Journals

.

I,

pp.

79-80.
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TVA's public power; current from the
private companies,
travelling the wires at the same frequency
as TVA
kilowatts, was, he proclaimed, expensive,
and therefore
undemocratic. As importantly, Lilienthal
extended this
identification to the New Deal's wider array of
regulatory
initiatives.
Linking TVA electricity and the New Deal's
expansion of state prerogative, the agency profited
from

the Roosevelt administration's broad base of
support while

also extending the federal government's reach further
into
the private sector.

in effect,

Lilienthal

campaign at

's

once sold TVA electricity, the Authority itself, and state

power in general.
The Authority carefully orchestrated every aspect of
its public relations effort.

In his pathbreaking critique

of the agency, TVA and the Grass Roots

.

Philip Selznick

observed that
"its [the TVA's] leaders have been especially
active... in propagating a systematic formulation of
its own meaning and significance.
This self-analysis
of the role of TVA has been elaborated at length and
presented to the public at every possible
opportunity.... The elaboration of this interpretation
has been, indeed, a well-developed and effective
exercise in administrative self-consciousness.

At the center of this effort was Lilienthal.

Since his

brief stay in Wisconsin, he had grown increasingly adept at

using the media to promote his agenda.

The power chief

relished the added responsibilities that he assumed as the

Authority's pitchman.

He admitted that much of his

salesmanship seemed ignoble, confiding in

a

letter to his

^

It
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friend Newton Arvin that "it was
undignified as hell, like
an Indian root doctor," but Lilienthal
believed that TVA's
strength depended largely on its ability to
control its own

public image.

Added responsibilities exacted a high personal
cost on
Lilienthal.
He was driven by a psyche that mixed ambition
and a sense of high moral purpose, always a volatile
combination, and he devoted long hours and prodigious

amounts of effort to his work.
in later years at the TVA,

characteristics.
wrote,

In a self-appraisal written

Lilienthal noted these very

"You have been carried along so far," he

"by an intense and absorbing desire for achievement;

the contest spirit; make a place for yourself; get
somewhere, etc."

At times he seemed indefatigable,

demanding a similar commitment from his assistants, and
carrying a haughty and zealous demeanor into his political
struggles.

This drive emerged as much out of self-doubt as

it did from arrogance; while alternately combative or

dismissive toward opponents, he still melted into
sycophancy around his mentors.

Continuing the self-study

noted above, Lilienthal went on,
in five years in public life you have leaped from
relative obscurity to a place near the top. What are

^Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots p. 21; on
Lilienthal as the central figure in TVA promotional efforts,
Selznick, p. 22, notes that Lilienthal took, "the leading role in
public exposition of the official TVA doctrine."
The February 1939 letter to Arvin is quoted in, Lilienthal,
The Journals I, p. 80.
,

.

^
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^avP^hi2^
""^V
have
been H°-'^°
driving
for....
any problem on that score
But here you are, and now
you going to do with your

^^^^
have what you
Somehow there never seemed
during the exciting cHmb
what does it mean wha^a^e
accomplishment?

Beyond the occasional stirrings of doubt,
the workload and
anxieties also left him prone to periodic
bouts of physical
and spiritual collapse, requiring days and
sometimes weeks
of convalescence at home or at a retreat on
Florida's Gulf
Coast.

Recurrent maladies, of both the mind and the body, did
not break Lilienthal's stride during his "exciting
climb."

The ambition that fed on his personal insecurities also

served to shield those doubts from his public persona and

marked him as a willful, committed administrator.

Whatever

fueled his personal drive, Lilienthal had to draw deeply on
his reservoir.

During the TVA's early years the young

director faced a series of obstacles that imperiled the new
agency and could have blocked his ascent.
Lilienthal immediately took control of the Authority's

promotional work.

He oversaw the design of the advertising

program at the TVA and its adjunct, the Electric Home and
Farm Authority (EHFA)

.

These strategic components were

ideologically and geographically transmutable

—

identical

to promotional techniques employed by the agency's rivals
in the private utility sector but also by state-owned firms

both in the United States and abroad.
^Lilienthal, The Journals

,

p.

67,

The first floor of

see also pp 79-92

.
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TVA offices housed showrooms and sales
displays that, with
a few alterations, the new agency
could have pulled
directly from the floor plans of any number
of light and
power companies. Similar to Ontario Hydro,
its Canadian
progenitor, Ontario Hydro, which had wide
stretches of
territory to cover, the TVA trucked a mobile
kitchen across
the countryside.
Preaching the gospel of salvation through
an all-electric home, the agency set up the kitchen

encampment in local communities to draw converts to the
miracle of kilowatts and appliances.

Such marketing

gimmicks as brochures, newspaper advertisements, and
envelope stuffers in customers' bills reached across the
ideological spectrum.
If many of the TVA's techniques mimicked the private

sector, Lilienthal anticipated taking steps well beyond the

For a closer study of the EHFA, see chapter 5, below.
Although the two agencies were formally separate entities, they
jointly developed their promotional efforts.
Regarding the specific plans for TVA-EHFA outreach, see,
EHFA, "Notes on Board Meeting," November 17, 1934, and "Budget
for Promotional Division," n.d. (ca. late 1933, early 1934), both
in Record Group 234, Records of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation/EHFA, Box 15, National Archives (hereafter cited as
RG 2 34, RFC/EHFA, Box #).
There are histories of numerous utility companies that
detail their marketing techniques. An excellent early example
and a more recent work are, Nicholas B. Wainwright, History of
the Philadelphia Electric Company. 1881-1961
(Philadelphia,
Philadelphia Electric Company, 1961) and Craig Wollner,
Electrifying Eden. Portland General Electric. 1889-1965
(Portland, Oregon Historical Society Pres, 1990)
For
international comparisons, see Fleming, Power at Cost. Ontario
Hydro and Rural Electrification and William Luckin, Questions of
Power. Energy and the Environment in Interwar Britain
(Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1989)
.

.

;
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range of normal utility propaganda.

m

a

late-1933 memo to

the President, Lilienthal outlined his
plan to mobilize the
resources of all possible government agencies
on behalf of
the TVA.

He argued that,

the Government has open to it avenues for the
moving
of public opinion not properly available to
private
enterprises. Whereas it was improper for the
utilities to use the school system for their
promotional purposes, it is entirely appropriate for a
non-profit governmental agency to use the school
system, the agricultural agencies... to facilitate
the
social objectives of this program.
At a joint TVA-EHFA board meeting, H.A. Morgan strongly

supported his associate's proposal, stating that "what we
must have— and right down to the elementary schools, is

education for recovery."

Under the direction of Eloise

Davison, a staff of home economists designed training

courses for domestic science teachers in the use of

electric appliances, complete with suggestions on

incorporating these advances into their curriculum.

The

twin Authorities also produced a textbook for college home

economics classes.

While Lilienthal insisted that the

book's content should be "strictly educational," this did
not rule out imprinting the book with the TVA-EHFA emblem
as well as a statement of the agencies' advantages and

objectives. "Education for recovery," it seems, was an

expansive pedagogy.^
^Memorandum, Lilienthal to Franklin D. Roosevelt, n.d. (ca.
late 1933), Lilienthal papers. Box 60; Notes on Meeting of Board
of Directors, 17 November 1934, and, Lilienthal to George D.
Munger, Commercial Manager of the EHFA, 30 May 1934, both in RG
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Along with his control of the
promotional efforts,
Lilienthal also launched into public
speaking.
with only
brief interruptions, this tour ran
continuously during his
13-year tenure at the agency. He stumped
up and down the
valley, at village crossroads and in city
banquet halls,
speaking before virtually any audience that
would have him- chambers of commerce, farm groups,
PTAs.
He lectured
nationally, before the League of Women Voters
among other

organizations, and over the airwaves from the studios
of
the major radio networks.
These engagements were the most

immediate st-p in the campaign because Lilienthal could
go
out on the stump before the Authority's infrastructure
was
in place.

However, his long-term commitment to personal

public appearances reflects much more.

On a personal

level, Lilienthal obviously enjoyed the attention that his

speeches garnered and slowly insinuated his own presence
into the public identification of the Authority's power

program.

This identification served not only to magnify

his role and importance within the agency; the speechmaking

also gave him the broadest autonomy for imprinting his

specific vision upon the TVA.

In so doing,

Lilienthal

created the popular perception that his goals and those of
the TVA were identical.

RFC/EHFA, Box 15. As will be noted in Chapter 5, the TVA
directors sat as the board of the EHFA until the latter agency
was restructured during 1935-1936.
234,

.
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As with its methods, the TVA derived
much of its
rhetoric from the most traditional and
widely-held

representations of electricity.

Where the railroads and

the telegraph had once reigned as the
guarantors of the
nation's progress, knitting the countryside
together and

enabling the fulfillment of Manifest Destiny,
electric

power stood as the latest incarnation of a
technological
engine driving social change.

with electricity's myriad of

actual and possible applications, its various promoters

proclaimed a new age at home, on the farm, and in the
factory.

Historians such as Ruth Schwartz Cowan and David

Nye have explored this terrain, detailing both the rhetoric
and the reality of America's romance with electrical

technology.

Employing

a

common vocabulary that spread more

quickly than any district's power lines, electricity's

adherents portrayed it as the perfect servant

—

silent and

unseen, yet ready at the flip of a switch; tireless and

wholly malleable, ready to be turned from one task to
another at the whim of its

user.*^

Electricity was a servant,
a genii.

a slave,

or,

often enough,

A Woman's Home Companion article from 1935 echoed

the formulaic framework of these pronouncements in its

"Ruth Schwartz Cowan, More Work for Mother. The Ironies of
Household Technolocfy from the Open Hearth to the Microwave (New
York, Basic Books, 1984) ; and David E. Nye, Electrifying America.
Social Meanings of A New Technology. 1880-1940 (Cambridge, MIT
Press, 1992)
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description, noting, "all the Aladdin
of the Arabian Nights
had to do,"
was rub his lamp and a formidable
genie arrived
^ ^''^^^h °^ P^^ss a
I?f
electricity will perform miracles which makebutton and
Aladdin's
powerful genie look to his laurels.
•

These characterizations cut across national
boundaries.

Britain's quasi-public Electrical Development
Association
churned out numerous promotional pieces during
the interwar
period, including the 1919 "Letter of a Householder"
that

described "Miss Electricity" as a "Good General Servant
always ready and willing to perform work without bother
or
fuss... who never sulked or failed when important
occasions

arose."

Much of the literature was an awkward mix of

roseate but ill-defined sketches of the impending Electric
Age and detailed instructional vignettes on the latest in

electrical gadgetry.''
Lilienthal invoked this refrain throughout his years
at the Valley Authority.

Speaking to a national radio

audience in May 1934, the power chief promised his
listeners "electricity can bring into even the most modest
home tireless servants.

It can banish much of the drudgery

of the home and the farms."

In TVA; Democracy on the

March, Lilienthal mixed the various metaphors with little

regard for grammatical decorum.

Outlining the agency's

Helen McKee, "All the Comforts of Home," Woman s Home
Companion 62 (February 1935), p. 16; the EDA pamphlet is quoted
in, Luckin, Questions of Power
p. 28.
'

,

"

.
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massive expansion of generating
capacity, he gave his third
chapter the title, "Twelve Billion
Genii," then went on to

describe each of those twelve billion
kilowatt hours of
current as "a modern slave, working
tirelessly for men."
As others had for England and metropolitan
America,

Lilienthal promised bold change for the social
landscape in
the Tennessee Valley.^
In a somewhat ironic twist to the portrayal
of

electric power as the ever-present slave or servant,
Lilienthal 'and other power proponents often described
the
current as an egalitarian technology. Electricity

responded to the demands of individuals, democratically

alleviating burdens across class or region.

Arthur

E.

Kennelly, for many decades a leader in the electrical

engineering profession and a fervent popularizer of the
medium, explained the current's inherently democratic pulse
in a 1929 Scribner's article;

"any electric distribution

system,

supplying a large number of dwellings with the power
they require, exists from moment to moment, day and
nite (sic)
as an organization in obedience to the
wishes of the communities as expressed through their
switches
,

^Lilienthal, Transcript of the Address on NBC Radio Network,
delivered at Washington, D.C., 21 May 1934, Lilienthal Papers,
Box 18; TVA: Democracy on the March p. 17.
Feeding the postwar
boom in domestic and military-industrial consumption, TVA's
investment in increased capacity continued after the war.
In the
revised edition published in 1953 for the book's 10th
anniversary, Lilienthal had to increase the number of genii to 18
billion. Unless otherwise noted all references to Democracy on
the March are made to the original 1944 edition.
,
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Electricity's reputedly democratic response
to any demand
was enhanced by the system's ability to
reach into any
home.

The capacity of alternating current systems
to
transmit power over substantial distances, far
from the

point of production, was integral to its democratic
format.
"Electricity is the most humane and most efficient
form of

energy," Lilienthal wrote, "it is mobility itself:
It can
be brought to the people."'

When Lilienthal hailed electricity as silent servant
and democratic force he was echoing some very well-worn
themes.

But extending this rhetoric to the TVA allowed the

power director to place the agency in

a

common context.

The TVA was new to the area, with a relatively unique

administrative structure and

a

controversial agenda, but

its commitment to liberation through technology located the

Authority in familiar terrain.

Lilienthal understood the

need for familiarity when he hired

a

Madison Avenue

advertising firm. Young and Rubicam, as consultants on the

TVA-EHFA promotional campaign.

The firm suggested some

fairly standard, and thus familiar, sales techniques, and
also designed the agencies' symbol: a blue fist grasping

a

bolt of red lightning, with "TVA and "Electricity For All"

detailed in block red letters.

Design historian John

Mendenhall observes that many corporations used lightning
^Arthur E. Kennelly, "Electricity in the Household,"
Scribner's Magazine 85 (April 1929): p. 452; Lilienthal, TVA:
Democracy on the March p. 55.
,

,
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bolts, noting that in the 1930s, no
trademark "was as

popular as the stylized lightning bolt.... A
fist grasping
a lightning bolt, a physical impossibility,
was the perfect
visualization of man's conquering the elements." The
emblem became ubiquitous across the valley.

On the front

of the building that housed the twin agencies' display
room
in Chattanooga, the emblem pulsed out its message in

flashing neon-lit colors, with the lightning bolt, "TVA"
and an added "EHFA" flashing on and off in sequence.

At the TVA, the design served two purposes.

First,

the familiarity of the lightning bolt located the TVA

within the broad mainstream of American commerce; this
flashing spectacle that beckoned people into sales displays

would have been equally at home along any of the Main
Street commercial districts in the country.

Second,

however, the emblem's slogan intimated that TVA's

technological and commercial policies were geared toward

distinctive goal; "Electricity For All" was not

a

a

message

hurled from the lightning bolt logos of corporations such
as Zenith, RCA, and Emerson Electric.

The message also

differed from the NRA's Blue Eagle, whose talons clutched
lightning bolts along with gears.

The TVA put the power in

the people's hands, rather than leaving it in the grasp of
an eagle

—

the symbol of the American state.

With the TVA

as their tool, the American people could indeed achieve the

impossible; the most humble citizen could control the
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thunderbolts that were once the exclusive
property of
privileged fewJ°

a

Some familiarity was important, for
Lilienthal moved
from the common to the novel when he
described the special
mission at the TVA. He believed that much of
electricity's

revolutionary potential was undercut by the greed
and

short-sighted policies of private utilities.

Inflated rate

structures and underfunded rural electrification programs

constricted the flow of power to the people.

Power could

not be democratic if it was unaffordable or unavailable.

During speeches that first summer and fall at the new
agency, Lilienthal was constantly heralding "the very

beginning of the power age.

In my judgment,"

we have not yet begun to tap the possibilities of the
use of power as a means of increasing the income of
our people and of lightening the burdens which fall so
heavily on them.

Supporters in the press joined in these proto-keynesian
proclamations.

"The air is full of talk about the coming

of an ^economy of abundance,'" one reporter speculated.

"But the TVA offers us our first chance to see,

in American

terms, what this may actually mean."^^
^°John Mendenhall,

Symbols of Power and Progress. American
Trademarks. 1930 to 1950 (New York, Art Direction Book Co.,
1983), no pagination.
I am indebted to David Nye's Electrifying
America for the citation to this work.
^^Lilienthal
"A New National Conservation Policy," Address
before the International Congress of Women, Chicago, Illinois, 18
July 1933, Lilienthal Papers, Box 18; Paul Hutchinson,
"Revolution by Electricity. The Significance of the Tennessee
Valley Experiment," Scribner's Magazine 96 (October 1934), p.
,
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TO usher in this new age, Lilienthal
insisted that his
agency must preside over a sharp break
with the past

practices of the private firms.

For too long, he claimed,

the financial chicanery of prominent
utility magnates such
as Samuel Insull, described by Lilienthal
as "the leading
citizen of Greece" after fleeing the country to
avoid

prosecution for the misdeeds of his holding companies,
had
stymied the realization of electricity's full promise,
"is

it any wonder," Lilienthal then asked,

"that the people are

determined to maintain the most vigilant public control of
this liberating force?"

Many TVA supporters launched

similar attacks on Insull and the private utilities,

berating these "financial exploiters...

[who] gave little

heed to the real function of the industry in which they had

chosen to carry on their schemes of lurid high finance."

200.

As noted in the introduction to this study, I do not use
keynesianism and proto-keynesianism in any strict doctrinal
sense. Instead, I borrow the formulation from the work of Peter
Friedlander, and subsequently from that of Steve Eraser and
Carlos Pabon. As such, the terms describe an ideological
framework centered upon the use of fiscal policy and regulatory
mechanisms to foster consumption-driven economic growth. I will
at times also employ the term "fordism" in very similar
circumstances, but generally use the latter when I am most
concerned with issues of industrial production typified by high
output and low per-unit profit margins, and the linkage of mass
production to consumption.
See Eraser, Labor Will Rule. Sidney Hillman and the Rise of
American Labor (New York, Eree Press, 1991) and "The 'Labor
Question'" in. Eraser and Gary Gerstle, eds.. The Rise and Fall
of the New Deal Order. 1930-1980 (Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 1989), pp. 55-84; Friedlander, "The Origins of the Welfare
State;" and, Pabon, "Regulating Capitalism." For more on these
issues, see chapter 5 below, esp. fn. 11.
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For regions of the country that had no
Tennessee Valley
Authority, the vigilance necessary to protect
the people
from the financiers- primitivism had to be
embodied in more
aggressive regulatory oversight.
In the valley, the TVA

would implement direct public control.

Lilienthal

maintained that the TVA's role was to break down the
various barriers to greater prosperity— making electricity
available, affordable, and thus, democratic

.

''^

As Lilienthal continued to sharpen this vision of

TVA's role, he began to shape a special definition for TVA
electricity.

As David Nye has suggested, "the public

encountered electrification in many guises.
political issue, an element of spectacle,
transportation, a motive force, and

a

a

It was a

means of

source of profit."

Through the 1920s, the private sector was the "most

organized and self-conscious group dealing with
electricity," and its portrayal of electricity rested on
the primacy of kilowatt as commodity.

In his speeches and

writing, Lilienthal wrested the initiative away from the

utilities. The electrical revolution that they prophesied

was interwoven within the broader myth linking material

progress and individual freedom to the organizational

^^Lilienthal Untitled Address delivered to the Rotary and
Exchange Clubs, and the Chamber of Commerce, Nashville,
Tennessee, 7 November 193 3, Lilienthal Papers, Box 18; Marquis
Childs, The Farmer Takes a Hand. The Electric Power Revolution in
Rural America (Garden City, New York, Doubleday and Co., 1952),
,

p.

43

.
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revolution of corporate capitalism.

The Depression had

done much to unravel that tapestry,
and Lilienthal sought
to legitimate the TVA's power program
by redefining
democratic access to those kilowatts as
a public good.
While the marketplace might satisfactorily
allocate private
commodities, the vagaries of the invisible
hand could not

guarantee a just distribution of public goods.

A public

asset required public control; in this case, that
control
was the TVA.''^
By the early 1930s, state regulation of the
electric

power industry was well-established.

Along with gas,

telecommunications, and water companies, electricity was

a

"public utility," and a "natural monopoly," which

necessitated regulatory oversight as

a

self-regulation of the marketplace.

However, Lilienthal

moved beyond this notion.
more than a public utility
or service.

substitute for the

He argued that electricity was

—

it was a socially vital good

The good produced by a privately-owned utility

was still, in essence, a private commodity; its vital

nature made it particularly subject to regulation, but the

product was ultimately private.

Electricity, in his view,

was not a private commodity but a natural resource, owned
by the people as common wealth.

The public, through its

administrative instrument, the state, could contract with
the private sector for the development of the country's
13

Nye, Electrifying America

,

pp.

138,

142.
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natural resources; the resource itself
remained a public
asset.

Lilienthal did not delve deeply into the
philosophical
justifications for his rhetorical turn. As a
policy-maker
and administrator, he rarely looked toward
the metaphysical
for his rationale.
Nor did he rely on his legal training.
Certainly there would be several legal challenges
to the

constitutionality of the agency, but those battles were
yet
to come, and ultimately rested on matters such
as the

courts' interpretation of interstate commerce and the

mundane technicalities of who had the legal standing

necessary to sue TVA.

Lilienthal was trying to build a

popular base of support for the agency's power program,
explaining the TVA's low rates as the means toward

greater end

—

a

democratizing an important public resource.

In "A New National Conservation Policy," an address

delivered in July 1933, Lilienthal first discussed at
length the TVA's plans to control soil erosion, long

a

target of resource protection measures, and then moved on
to electricity.

"In the President's plan for the

development of the Tennessee Valley," he stated, "there is
another principal natural resource

—

electric power.

The

Valley Authority," he continued
is directed to make experimentations and studies to
develop this national resource of electric power as a
means of taking from the backs of men and women in the
Valley some of their ancient and arduous burdens.
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Lilienthal continued to use this analogy with
the soil,
noting the following year that "next to the

soil itself,"

electricity is America's greatest heritage. The
TVA
and other Federal agencies are under a solemn
duty to
see to It that this great natural resource of
electricity shall yield its full measure of benefits
to the people of the country.
The integral bond between conservation and rational

development of natural resources would not have been new to
Lilienthal

's

thinking.

At the core of the Progressive

tradition out of which he had emerged, from his days as an
adolescent Bull Mooser to his years as

a

Frankfurter

protege at Harvard, was the belief in the planned use of
the land and other resources.

The natural resource analogy operated on multiple
levels.

Lilienthal tapped into many Americans' fundamental

attachment to the land as

a

symbol of the country's unique

mission, adding electricity to the sources of innate wealth
that blessed the nation.

But he also touched on the

widespread unease regarding the misuse and possible
exhaustion of the soil.

The fertile topsoil flushed into

the nation's rivers, or blown across the Dust Bowl bespoke
the squandering of that resource, and illustrated the need
for vigorous national stewardship to protect the common

"A New National Conservation Policy," and,
Address on NBC Radio Network, 21 May 1934, both in Lilienthal
Papers, Box 18.
Regarding the idea of conservation and its
relation to development, see, Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and
the Gospel of Efficiencv. The Progressive Conservation Movement.
1890-1920 (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1959)
^'^Lilienthal

,

.

.
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wealth.

During the Depression, this steady erosion
of the
soil also seemed to mirror a broader
degradation of

America's economic initiative.

The TVA would help reverse

this vitiation of both land and economy,
Lilienthal
claimed, by carrying on "a resolute, uncompromising
and

intelligent war upon insecurity— insecurity of livelihood,
insecurity of resources."

For Lilienthal, the Authority's

control of electric power was just one step toward "the
fuller and better balanced development of the resources of
the region," that would lead to the resurgence of a more

vital economic culture.
To democratize its electrical resources, Lilienthal

had to transform the region's power system, but this effort

involved no substantial changes to the power itself.

After

all, TVA current alternated along the regional power lines

at the same number of cycles as did private power.

Lilienthal believed that what distinguished his agency's

power from other utilities, what made it democratic, were
the institutional components of the TVA's electrical

network.

"The methods of democratic development

represented by the TVA are distinctive," he wrote.

"They

are methods that differ from those customarily employed

both by private enterprisers and public agencies."

^^Lilienthal
"A New National Conservation Policy." On the
Dust Bowl phenomenon and the idea of the soil as a cultural
symbol, see, Donald Worster, Dust Bowl; The Southern Plains in
the 1930s (New York, Oxford University Press, 1979)
,

.
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Lilienthal took care to emphasize that
these departures
were profoundly revolutionary but not
in any sense
Bolshevik.
"Their roots lie deep in the soil of
American
tradition.... it [the TVA] required no change
in the

Constitution of the United States.
full control.

Congress has maintained

Property rights and social institutions have

undergone no drastic amendment."

still, the Authority's

production and distribution structures stood in stark
contrast to those of the giant holding companies and
their

operating subsidiaries.

Llewellyn Evans's revolutionary

rate format further altered TVA power.

electricity would cease to be

a

With cheap rates,

luxury item.

It was social

rather than technical artifacts that made this public power
unique
In TVA:

De mocracy on the March

.

Lilienthal outlined

two "essential principles" for the TVA's success.

The

first principle was that the TVA recognized that "resource

development must be governed by the unity of nature
herself."

Explaining how the agency's production

techniques differed from those of its private rivals,
Lilienthal insisted that the TVA produced its hydroelectric

power as part of
development.

a

unified program for regional

Economic, human, and natural resources were

integrated into what Lilienthal termed "a seamless web."
Power generation must not overshadow the need for
16

Lilienthal, TVA: Democracy on the March

,

p.

7.
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reforestation in the Valley's hills.

Cost-cutting measures

in dam design and construction should
not override concerns

for worker safety and the need to train
a technical

workforce for the region.

Power engineers and public

health staff had to reconcile daily demand
for power with
mosquito control that was achieved by a quick
and therefore

electrically-wasteful release of reservoir water.

Unfettered by the profit motive, the TVA did not have
to
answer to a holding company's bond and stockholders,
who

might disregard the social costs of "exhausted land,

butchered forests, polluted streams, and industrial
ugliness."

Unlike other federal projects, the TVA

controlled all aspects of development, and did not have
competing bureaucracies undermining its holistic
approach.

The second principle was that the TVA employed

"democratic methods, by the active daily participation of
the people themselves."

aloft by two pillars

—

These democratic methods were held
first, the TVA's practice of

decentralized administration, Lilienthal and H.A. Morgan's

much-vaunted "Democracy at the Grass Roots;" second, the
TVA's reliance upon the incipient rural electric

cooperatives and municipal power systems for its

distribution network.

^^Lilienthal
7.

,

Heralding

a

new kind of federal

TVA; Democracy on the March

,

p.

6,

and Chapter
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agency, Lilienthal believed that
the TVA was more
responsive to the citizenry because
its administrative and

policy-making machinery resided in the
Valley, not in
Washington.
if the strengths of the federal
regulatory
apparatus could be linked with the intimacy
of local
control, then, Lilienthal claimed, "the
experience in this
valley laboratory in democratic methods takes
on unusual

meaning."

if this notion of grass roots democracy
faded in

later years, during its first years this
idealized approach

permeated almost all of the agency's rhetoric.
The TVA's close relationship with municipally-owned

utilities and rural co-ops was, for Lilienthal, emblematic
of how a democratic power system nurtured a participatory

citizenry.

Lilienthal took great pride in the rural co-

operatives established in conjunction with the TVA, which
set the standard for the national program undertaken by the

Rural Electrification Administration.

Among the first

consumers of TVA power were the municipal system in the
town of Tupelo, Mississippi, and that state's Alcorn County

Electric Co-operative.

The ties to the "muni's" and co-ops

made TVA power special.

Perhaps rehearsing for one of his

many speeches, Lilienthal wrote in his journal,
there is somehow a magic about TVA kilowatts.... To
have the form of organization whereby electricity is
^^Lilienthal TVA; Democracy on the March p. 138, see also,
chpts. 9 and 15; See Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots passim,
for a deeply critical assessment of the dissonance between the
rhetoric and the reality of the grass-roots approach.
,

,

,

192

brought to them through the beginning
activity in which they participate is of cooperative
really an
accomplishment. That I feel is what is
actuary going
Lilienthal was genuinely inspired by the
earnest spirit he
felt whenever he attended co-op business
functions.
"i

have been at such meetings where throughout
a whole day as
many as two thousand farmers and their wives
and children
discussed the financial and operating reports made
to them
by their superintendent and board of trustees,"
he later
recalled.

These meetings were social gatherings as well.

Following a break for

a

barbecue lunch, the co-op sponsored

demonstrations of new appliances and farm equipment, and
cook-offs offering up the tastiest products from electric
kitchens.

As Lilienthal described them, "these membership

'town meetings' are not simply business sessions.

They

have an emotional overtone, a spiritual meaning to people
who were so long denied the benefits of modern energy and

convenience."

In Lilienthal 's estimation,

it was the

institutional components of the system, and the people who
forged them, that gave TVA kilowatts their "magic.
^'Lilienthal, Journals,

I,

pp.

"^°

52-53; TVA; Democracy on the

March, p. 21.
Describing the TVA's work in Tupelo, Lilienthal described
the town as, "the remarkable little city of Tupelo.
Tupelo will
be known to history as the place where the average man and woman
first made full use of electricity." In fact, Tupelo is
internationally acclaimed, not for its use of TVA power, but
rather as the hometown of the rock-n-roll star Elvis Presley.
^^Lilienthal

,

TVA; Democracy on the March

,

p.

22.
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The Authority's rate-making revolution
completed the
creation of democratic kilowatts. The
low rates were the
cornerstone of TVA power policy, and the
centerpiece of

Lilienthal's promotional efforts.

Whenever he discussed

cheap electricity, Lilienthal skillfully
integrated popular
symbols of class and gender into a public power
narrative
that had Franklin Roosevelt, the New Deal, and
the TVA as
the central characters.
in a radio speech during early
Lilienthal pulled together all of these elements.

1934,

"Some years ago," he told his radio audience,

when Franklin Roosevelt was a candidate for Governor
of New York, he urged strenuously the importance of
lower rates and power development.... His opponents
tried to poke fun at this program, by saying that
Roosevelt wanted to put a waffle iron in every
farmhouse.
The women of upstate New York saw nothing
funny about the program at all, and voted
accordingly.... Electric appliances are just as
appropriate in the humble household as in the home of
wealth.
A love of home and a pride in that home is,
by no means, a special possession of any group.
In the space of a few sentences,

neatly arranged,

Lilienthal laid out the TVA vision of electricity's

domestic potential.
a luxury item,

Until rates came down, electricity was

the "special possession"

of the affluent.

This action required the intervention of the state,

personified by Roosevelt, to make power widely available
and bring it into every "humble household" in upstate New

York

—

and the Tennessee Valley.

"The housewives of this

country use an amazingly small quantity of electricity...
[They are] still barred from the almost limitless
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advantages of this great natural resource....
it is part of
the job of the Tennessee Valley
Authority to see that this
condition should not continue." Lilienthal
disarmed the
agency's opponents by giving their critique
a class bias,
and noting that the voters had gone to
the polls
and

overwhelmingly endorsed Roosevelt's agenda, first
as
governor and later as president. ^1
Lilienthal envisioned his democratic kilowatts

relieving women of myriad difficult tasks.

His fervent

belief in electricity's potential is best reflected in
the
fact that his private correspondence brims with the same

pronouncements found in his public addresses.

"Women who

have stood over hot coal or wood ranges during these

blistering summers," he wrote to Felix Frankfurter, "are
now working on cool kitchens with electric ranges; electric

refrigerators and electric hot water heaters have added

greatly to the decencies of life."

However, the TVA power

chief did not intend that electricity would liberate women
from their domestic sphere.

Instead,

it would perhaps

lighten their burdens and allow women to find their true

potential within the home.

With their burdens eased, women

Lilienthal, "The Electrification of the American Home,"
Address on CBS Radio Network from WJSV, Washington, D.C., 20
January 1934, Lilienthal Papers, Box 18.

.
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could transform the home into the idyllic
haven it was
meant to be.^^
Nonetheless, Lilienthal shared this vision
with many
of his contemporaries, of both sexes.
A Women's Hnm^

Companion article promised women that
scientists, manufacturers, engineers and architects
are all conspiring to make the home a more
comfortable
place to live and to help women put all the good old
epigrams about their work never being done down the
latest and most efficient model of an incinerator once
and for all.

Eleanor Roosevelt urged Lilienthal forward, telling him
that "if it is possible to make life easier for women in
the home,

it will mean much not only for their health, but

also in the leisure time they will be able to devote to

their children."

For many women, the material advantages

of electricity did bring welcome relief.

In a press

release announcing the TVA's power contracts with Lee and

Alcorn county co-ops in Mississippi, Lilienthal told the
story of a farm women's expectations for electricity.

When

it was "facetiously suggested that she would now be able to

use an electric iron to curl her hair," she replied "^No.

The first thing

I

intend to do is to install an electric

pump to bring running water into my kitchen.

something

I

have wanted all my life."

That is

The woman of the

^^Lilienthal to Frankfurter, 7 August 1934, Lilienthal
Papers, Box 63.
The best overviews of these issues are. Cowan, More Work for
Mother, and Susan Strasser, Never Done: A History of American
Housework (New York, Pantheon Books, 1982)
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story may be fictive, especially given the
close

resemblance to the above-mentioned narrative of
upstate New
York women. The essential truth of the Mississippi
woman's
message, however, is undeniable.
Electricity lightened

many burdens, and women welcomed power into their
homes,
even if it did not necessarily free them from either
their
labors or the domestic sphere.

While Lilienthal accepted cultural norms regarding

domesticity and gender with little reflection, he also
encouraged specific efforts by women's groups to carve
space within the public sphere.

affirming women's right to
guardians of the home.

a

In part, this meant

voice if only to speak as the

In an April 1934 speech to the

national meeting of the League of Women Voters, he stated,
"as women of America,

individually, you are the most

important of all users of electricity

electricity in the home."

—

the users of

But Lilienthal went beyond that

limited construct, and accorded women a legitimate role in
the broader political world as well.

During the 1920s, the

League supported George Norris's efforts to keep the Muscle

Shoals plant in the public domain, and into the New Deal it

remained a strong backer of the TVA.

Acknowledging this

support, Lilienthal recognized that women's influence
^^Helen McKee, "All the Comforts of Home," Woman's Home
Companion 62 (February 1935), p. 16; Eleanor Roosevelt to
Lilienthal, 14 July 1934; Lilienthal, "Statement for Chattanooga
News," n.d. (ca. December 1933), Lilienthal Papers, Boxes 63 and
,

62,

respectively.
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reached beyond the traditional scope of
home and family.
"As a group of women," Lilienthal
told them, "united to
take part in the political life of the
city,
state, and

nation, you have an immediate and direct
interest in the

community control of public utilities."

As individuals,

they were women, with all of the domestic
implications of
that gender— able to enjoy a better life because
of

government action that would bring down power rates and
revolutionize their the homes; as an aggregate, however,
they were an interest group that could help legitimate
the

TVA's program. 2^
Ultimately, Lilienthal foresaw the TVA's low rates

transforming the entire region.

Farms and factories would

prosper alongside well-kept electric homes.

As in the

home, electricity would ease certain tasks, spur

productivity, and usher in the age of plenty.

George Fort

Milton, editor of the Chattanooga News and a strident

backer of Lilienthal

's TVA,

believed that the agency's

cheap power could help push the entire region out of its

chronic economic dependency.

He wrote,

"the Tennessee

basin has caught the imagination of the nation's engineers
and statesmen. It is, indeed, the American Ruhr."

High-

wage jobs in energy-intensive industries such aluminum and
chemical manufacturing would spur economic growth and pull

Address to the League of Women Voters,
'^^Lilienthal
Massachusetts, 24 April 1934, Lilienthal Papers, Box 18.
,

Boston,
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the region out its long, dark age
of dependency and
underdevelopment. These industries would not
be alien
intrusions into the valley's environment;
rather, they
would be the logical and organic culmination
of the area's
development, as the human, mineral, and
electrical

resources attained rational fulfillment.

This fordist

vision promised a future without limits. Economic
growth
and the egalitarian implications of material
abundance

would usher in a new social order. "Added leisure and
comfort, lighter and briefer tasks," an EHFA-TVA pamphlet

proclaimed,

"a merging of all classes of American people

in a common understanding and a common well-being,

the benefits of electricity."

such are

But Lilienthal constantly

reiterated that none of this could happen unless the TVA
was able to rationally and democratically develop the

region's power resources.

To this end, he had to locate

the Authority as one component in the New Deal's

restructuring of the nation's faltering economic system.
Simply linking the TVA to the president and his New
Deal was a relatively easy task.

During his campaign,

Roosevelt had placed conservation and utility reform high
on his agenda, proclaiming in an oft-cited speech in

Portland, Oregon, that a judicious mix of federal

regulation and public power projects would "prevent
^^George Fort Milton, "Dawn for the Tennessee Valley,"
Review of Reviews 87 (June 1933), p. 33; EHFA-TVA, Untitled
Pamphlet, n.d. (ca. Fall 1934) RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Box 15.
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extortion against the public and... encourage
the wider use
of that servant of the people—electric
power."

m

late

January 1933 the president-elect continued
to give this
policy a high profile when he invited George
Norris to
accompany him on a tour through the Tennessee Valley.
Passage of the TVA Act as part of the early legislative
flurry that would soon bear the moniker "The First
100
Days," made it clear to contemporary observers that
the new

agency was a centerpiece of Roosevelt's New Deal.

Given

this prominence, there seemed to be little required of
Lilienthal.26

Despite the apparent ease of his task, Lilienthal

never missed an opportunity to associate the TVA,

Roosevelt's New Deal, and the Democratic party.

He was

becoming increasingly acute at sighting the public
relations angles, frequently resorting to the hard-sell

maxim of commercial advertisers: link TVA to Roosevelt, and
Cheap Power to Prosperity often enough and their public
images will be fused.

It was this strategy that resulted

in Lilienthal 's canned speeches referring to Roosevelt's

long-standing support for cheap power since his New York
gubernatorial days. As a progressive Republican from the
midwest, Lilienthal also carefully modulated his message
^^Franklin D. Roosevelt, Public Papers and Addresses
complied by S.I. Rosenman (need vol. and pg. cite for Portland
speech) ; on the January 1933 trip, see, Richard Lowitt, George W
Norris. The Persistence of a Progressive, 1913-1933 (Urbana,
University of Illinois Press, 1971), pp. 576-569.
,
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for his Southern audience.

Although the easternmost

reaches of the TVA's potential territory
was hill country
that had a proud tradition of insurgencies
against the
Democracy, Lilienthal's political and power
markets lay in
a region that was overwhelmingly
dominated by the

Democratic party.

Thus, when Lilienthal did broaden his

scope beyond Roosevelt, he chose his icons carefully.

in

one of his frequent attacks on the "propaganda
activities"
of the utilities, Lilienthal charged that, left
unchecked,

the private pov/er magnates "would have destroyed the

American system of democracy which Jefferson and Jackson
established."

Arriving as an outsider, the power director

quickly familiarized himself with the region's rhetoric.
Yet Lilienthal was not merely tying the Authority to

the coattails of the New Deal.

While the TVA drew much of

its initial strength from its close identification with the

popular chief executive, Lilienthal intended to refract the

glow of this reflected glory, using the success of the TVA
as a means to strengthen certain ideological tendencies

within the multifaceted New Deal.

In short,

Lilienthal saw

the TVA as a wedge opening up the gates to a more rigorous
and inclusive federal regulatory apparatus while also

fostering the growth of an aggregate demand-driven economy.
The TVA would not be the staging point for the "creeping

"^'Lilienthal,
Papers, Box 18.

Nashville speech,

7

November 1933

,

Lilienthal
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socialism" about which its critics so
often warned.
Like
his close ally Morris Cooke,
Lilienthal did not advocate
universal state ownership of any industry.
instead, he

believed that more effective regulation
would force the
private sector to be more responsible. The
TVA served not
so much as a yardstick, but rather as
a "birch rod," with
the threat of further state ownership
complementing
enhanced government oversight to compel good
behavior from
business.^®

How Lilienthal justified public utility regulation
reveals how he viewed the TVA as
intervention.

a

wedge for broader

Most people understood and accepted some

form of regulation over the utility industry.

The

supposedly unique public value and inherently monopolistic
structure of industries such as power and the common

carriers made them exceptions to the popular idiom of

laissez-faire capitalism.

But Lilienthal deemphasized the

issue of utilities as natural monopolies; the relative

immunity of these firms from normal market forces played
little role in Lilienthal

28

's

reasoning.

Instead, he chose

One of many examples of Cooke and Lilienthal 's opposition
to universal state ownership was their exclusion of public power
advocates from their regulatory conference of 1932. See, chpt.
Also, see Leonard DeGraaf's article on the Giant Power
2, above.
issue during the 1920s, which quotes Cooke to the effect that he
was less concerned with who owned the utilities, but rather with
"how such properties are managed, no matter who does it." Cooke
to Gifford Pinchot, 11 April 1924, as cited in Degraaf,
"Corporate Liberalism and Electric Power Planning in the 1920s,"
Business History Review 64 (Spring 1990), p. 17.

202

to stress the public value and necessity
of electric power
as the justification for regulation.
"By its very nature,"

Lilienthal argued, "the generation and distribution
of
power, whether by private or public agencies,
is a public
business, for in our present-day community life we

are all

utterly dependent upon that service."

Electricity had

become an indispensable service, and the state was

obligated to guarantee that private interests did not
contravene the public good.^'
Using this social necessity argument, Lilienthal began
to make claims that in an increasingly complex economy,

wide sectors of the economy had to be considered equally
indispensable, and thus akin to

public utility.

a

The

utilities were no longer unique, not an aberration, and
should be viewed as the model for more inclusive federal

oversight of the economy.

Lilienthal had begun to map out

this strategy while still a utility regulator in Wisconsin.
In his March 1933 speech in Sheboygan

(cited in Chapter

above), Lilienthal had argued that the president-elect's

anticipated bank reform measures were but one example of
"the tendency toward greater and greater community

regulation of essential business enterprises."

The

country's lengthy experience with utility regulation
afforded many lessons, positive and negative, for this
imminent extension of state power.
29

Lilienthal, Nashville speech,

7

"And so," Lilienthal

November 1933.

2
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went on, both lecturing and exhorting
this meeting of
Sheboygan's local business elite,
when we are thinking of how to improve
the regulatory
mechanism which we have worked out
tentativel^for
^usmess, the public utility, we should bearoL
in"min^
r^ni^t the public utilities.... We"^^^ely learning to
regulate
are devising a
technique of community control of every
business which
directly and immediately affects the public
wellbeing.
The Depression had exposed broad faults in
laissez-faire
ideology, and Lilienthal was using utility
regulation to

bring those faults into sharper public view.^°
Lilienthal argued that corporate capitalism was

increasingly insinuated within the daily life of all
Americans.

it was not the government's role to hinder that

expansion, but to modulate its social impact through

careful regulation of large-scale firms.

Here, Lilienthal

reflected his intellectual links to A. A. Berle's advocacy
of responsible corporate management, and reaching even

further back to Theodore Roosevelt's New Nationalism.

Lilienthal advocated the creation of

a

powerful national

regulatory apparatus, very similar to what Martin Sklar

describes as the Republican Roosevelt's vision of "public
service capitalism." This regulatory leviathan would

oversee almost all national enterprise in

a

manner akin to

the Interstate Commerce Commission's regulation of the

railroads.

^•'Lilienthal,

"Rather than distinguish industry, and the

Sheboygan speech, 23 March 1933

.

.
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economy in general, from public
service business like
common carriers and public utilities,"
sklar
states,

"he

[Roosevelt] argued their similarity and
the need to subject
them to similar kinds of comprehensive
public

administration."

if not in so many words,

Lilienthal

likewise envisioned the New Deal's creation
of an era of
public service capitalism.
In the Valley, Lilienthal anticipated that
low TVA

rates would sell this sweeping expansion of the
state's

prerogative.

The dramatic surge in consumption of

electricity and the strong support for the agency certainly
indicate that cheap power was

a

popular policy.

It is a

much more difficult proposition, however, to gauge the

31

•

Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American
Capitalism. 1900-1916 (New York, Cambridge University Press
1988)

347-348.
It should be noted that Lilienthal 's acceptance of largescale corporate capital as early as 1931-1933 tends to undermine
the longstanding historiographical depiction of him as a "neoBrandeisian" who came to accept "big business" more reluctantly
and much later.
This portrayal rests largely on the continued
influence of Arthur Schlesinger Jr's. paradigmatic three-volume
work on the New Deal, which (in this matter at least) is deeplyflawed.
As pointed out in Chapters 2 and 3, Lilienthal spanned
that reputedly unbridgeable gap between Felix Frankfurter's cadre
of Harvard Law acolytes and Berle's adherents.
See, for
example, Schlesinger' statement, "Lilienthal, a Brandeisian in
1933, ended as the prophet of bigness," in, The Politics of
Upheaval. 1935-1936 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1966)
Schlesinger seems to have misinterpreted Lilienthal 's
hostility toward holding company abuses of the late 1920s as a
universal condemnation of the corporate form. This is clearly
not the case.
If at some point Frankfurter shed the vestiges of
his support for Theodore Roosevelt's New Nationalism which he had
backed in 1912, Lilienthal never lost this thread, and in fact
strengthened those ideological ties by working with Berle during
the Wisconsin PSC years.
,

pp.

252,
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public response to the rhetorical meaning
Lilienthal
attached to his policy. Although the
impact of
Lilienthal

's

sales pitch can not be definitively

quantified, it can be explored.

From the rolling mountains

of eastern Tennessee to the cotton country
south of

Memphis, many people in the Valley believed
in the

limitless possibilities of the TVA's democratic
kilowatts.
Ultimately, an electric iron or washing machine would
not

transform gender or class relations, but such appliances
could be made widely available.

Valley folk saw family and

neighbors get jobs with or because of the agency.

They

believed that the Authority's electricity brought not only
material progress, but also the promise of

a

prosperity

they had never known.

Support was not universal.

ambivalence in the valley.

Certainly there was

Across various cultures,

technology's "Great March of Progress" had normally
elicited concerns ranging from hostility toward the symbols
of change

—

machines and factories-- to programmatic

resistance against the agents of the transformations.
TVA and the Dispossessed

.

In

Michael McDonald and John

Muldowny aptly describe the hostility engendered among the
people of the Norris basin, driven from their homes by the

Authority as it bought up land for reforestation and
reservoirs.

Wielding its power of eminent domain

imperiously, the TVA did little to even feign respect for

«
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the cultural values

ol

the..-.,

f^oople,

worsening what under

the best ol circumstances would
h.wo boon

transformation.

diff icnt

The TVA compressed an enormou:; amount

economic and social chanqo into

a

very briol period.

was perhaps Inevitable that such upheaval
hostility.

a

war.

ol

it

met with some

But even as the agency uprooted famiiiQS
and

flooded land that held the roots

ol

poor but very

clor-.o-

knit communities, most people in this lar-llun<, km,
ion

looked toward the TVA with as much hope

a:;

appi c-hon:

.

i

(,n

.

There is scattered, somewhat elusive, evidence that

reveals some of this popular support lor the TVA.

David

Nye observes that valley people literally sang the

p.,,!;,.:;

of the TVA.

"The

H.i II

ad of the TVA" spread throughout the

region, with people inserting the name

ol

their own

community into the verses, making it their own
the deeply personal
too,

sontj

impact of this new Authority.

.>bouL

Humor,

is another folkway that reveals how people felt about

the agency.

Using the traditional mission of the

Department of Agriculture as

a

foil,

one common joke asked,

"What are they going to do with all that power when they

get it?"

The answer: "Mcjke two bulbs

only one glee before."

ol

(jla:;r.

(j

I

ow whore

The humor demonstrates not only the

cultural reach of the agency, but it also shows that

McDonald and John Muldowny, TVA and t he
Dispossessed. The Reset tlemen t of Population in t he Nor rls Dam
Area (Knoxville, Univeri;ity of Tennessee Press, '\')nA)
^'^Michael J.

.
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Lilienthal's productivist gospel was
winning many converts.
Cheap power meant greater yields of
domestic consumption."
Some of the evidence is more tangible.
Speaking on
the floor of the House of Representatives
in March 1936,
John Rankin, whose district covered Tupelo
and much of
northern and eastern Mississippi, defended the
TVA agenda.

Taking a page straight from Lilienthal's texts,
he
ridiculed a Republican opponent who had scoffed at
the

value of electric appliances.
bow down over

a

"I should like to see him

washtub," Rankin gibed, "and do the family

washing for a few weeks.

That would convert him; it would

probably make a Democrat out of him."

He read on the House

floor from some of the hundreds of letters that poured into
his office in support of the TVA and cheap power.

Again

and again, these letter writers thanked Rankin for his
work; they spoke of new irons,

fans,

more lights,

freedom

from drudgery; finally, they urged him to continue

supporting a cheap power policy.

Through the late 1930s,

Rankin was a forceful advocate for the TVA and all of the
New Deal's electrification programs.

But he did not cast

his lot with Lilienthal and Morris Cooke out of some deep
and abiding personal loyalty to them, or even due to some

ideological identification with them.

He took his stand

because the TVA agenda in these years was indisputably

"Nye, Electrifying America pp. 313-314; "TVA Sales Plan,"
Business Week 23 December 1933, 12.
,

.
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popular with his voting (i.e. white)
constituents.
The
best illustration of this is Rankin's
bitter break with the
agency during the 1940s. Running a
deeper course through
Rankin and many of his constituents than
the philosophy
of

cheap power was an unshakable racism.

Lilienthal directed

the TVA's modest support for breaking the
color barrier in
some of the agency's hiring decisions, which
led to vicious

denunciations of the Authority's management by Rankin.

As

long as the TVA stood free and clear for low rates,

avoiding even modest challenges to Jim Crow, Rankin was
one
of its most enthusiastic backers.

While there are few reliable means for measuring the

public's support of the TVA, it seems clear that the power

program did enjoy some marked popularity.

Lilienthal

garnered widespread support for his agenda by tapping into

popular faith in technology's transformative powers and

a

identifying TVA current as

a

unique force. He made low-cost

electricity the rhetorical linchpin of his efforts to
strengthen his hand within the Authority while also

enhancing the profile of the proto-Keynesian elements
within the New Deal. His insistence that the TVA

electricity itself bore some inherently democratic value
reflected Lilienthal

's

personal faith in the reformist

^^For one of Rankin's early speeches, see, Congressional
Record 25 March 1936, pp. 4346-4350; on his later break with
Lilienthal 's management of the TVA, see, Lilienthal, The
Journals I, pp. 630, 683.
.

.
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political implications of mass consumption.

Crafting a

rhetoric of democratic kilowatts,
Lilienthal was striving
to forge a vernacular political
culture that fostered the
growth of TVA power.

CHAPTER

6

FORGING "A POTENTIAL MASS MARKET:"
THE ELECTRIC HOME AND FARM AUTHORITY,
1932-1935
Lilienthal realized that rhetoric alone would
not
protect the Authority from its foes nor sell
even a single

kilowatt of electricity. He knew that the agency
had to
foster greater demand for power across the
region so that
the TVA could justify its hydroelectric production
and more
readily acquire territory from the private companies.
The
first step toward greater demand was low-cost power
and the

agency's fordist reformulation of rate-making methodology.

With rates for electricity maintained at what he described
as a "luxury basis," most people simply could not afford to

increase their power consumption. As Lilienthal

explained in a speech before the American Academy of
Political and Social Science,
the average domestic consumer throughout the
United States uses about 50 KWA of energy a
month, which is a niggardly and parsimonious use
of a great resource... [because] rates have been
too high to permit the general use of
electricity. As a result of these rates, the use
of electricity has been restricted and has
never.
reached the proportions justified by our
sources of electricity, or by the universal need
and demand for this service.
.

.

The situation was particularly acute at the TVA, with

industry estimates of the region's excess power capacity

ranging from 30 to 40 percent. Lilienthal accepted these
claims, but pointed to an unacceptably high rate structure
as the chief culprit for the surplus. The burden of proof.
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however, did not rest with the private
firms; it lay with
Lilienthal and his power staff.

Lilienthal quickly realized that the high cost
of
electricity was only part of the problem. Even
if rates
came down to acceptable levels, most people
did not have
the load-building appliances needed to consume
that

affordable electricity. As with electric rates, appliance
prices rested on a luxury basis, he believed, and such
luxury prices were choking off further growth.

With the

sales of high-priced models, Lilienthal claimed,

manufacturers had only "skimmed the cream" off the
appliance market.

Without more appliances in more homes,

the TVA would have no market for its power. The result, for

Lilienthal, placed the TVA's power program in a double
bind.

The utility and appliance industries would not lower

rates and prices until consumer demand grew.

Consumers

could not use more power until both rates and appliance

prices fell.

As Lilienthal declared in his American

Academy speech, "here we have

picture of a complete

a

business stalemate."^
^Lilienthal, Draft Copy of "Philadelphia Speech," December
30, 1933, p. 4, DEL Papers, Box 62; reprinted as "Business and
Government in the Tennessee Valley," in Towards National
Recovery The Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 172(March, 1934): 45-49. For a general survey of
TVA's relations with the power industry, see, McCraw, TVA and the
Power Fight
.

.

^"TVA Appliances," Business Week March 17,
10-11; Lilienthal, "Philadelphia Speech," p. 5.
,

1934, pp.

212

In the fall of 1933,

facing formidable market barriers

to the distribution of TVA power,
Lilienthal developed a
proposal for a federal finance agency
that would provide

low-interest loans directly to consumers
for the purchase
of electric appliances.
The agency he envisioned would
work through private as well as publicly-owned
utilities,

attracting the cooperation of the private sector
with the
promise of greater load offered in exchange for
lower

rates. First outlined in a letter to Presidential
assistant

Marvin Mclntyre, Lilienthal argued that the proposed
agency
would not only provide political relief for the TVA,
it

would also serve as

a

mechanism for national economic

recovery by generating much needed consumer purchasing.

Appliance manufacturers would step up production and put
people back to work. Industrial suppliers would have new
orders to fill.

Local commerce would enjoy a renewed vigor

as sales increased.

For Lilienthal, the beauty of such

a

program was that it could serve the TVA's political goals
while at the same time aiding the New Deal's recovery
effort.^

During the winter of 1933-1934, Lilienthal began

moving forward with his proposal in late 1933. He turned
for advice to two close associates, the social engineer

Morris Llewellyn Cooke and his former boss Donald
^Lilienthal to Marvin Mclntyre, November 21, 1933, DEL
Papers, Box 62; also cited in McCraw, TVA and the Power Fight
62

.

,

p
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Richberg. Already one of Lilienthal's
most steadfast
allies, Cooke expressed immediate
support for the proposal,
noting in a letter that the plan seemed
"generally

workable."

Cooke did add that the agency might have

problems persuading most private utilities
to lower their
rates.

"m

the Tennessee Valley of course you have
them

[the utilities] backed up against the wall.

But take

Minnesota and the Dakotas," he wrote,
you will probably only get a pitying look from
the service company when you begin to talk the
kind of rates you have in mind.^

Cooke continued to wield great influence; as head of the
Rural Electrification Administration (RA)

,

Cooke would

become a director of the new finance agency in 1935-1936.
As the general counsel for the NRA and a close advisor
to the president, Richberg was well-situated and able to

ensure that the proposal of his former junior associate got
a

fair hearing within the administration. Lilienthal wanted

the President to establish the finance agency by executive

order and fund it through the $3.3 billion appropriated

under Title II of the NIRA.

Lilienthal hoped that this

maneuver was possible, in part so that he could capture
some of that $3.3 billion before it was exhausted, but also

because he wished to circumvent Congress, where his program

Morris

Cooke to Lilienthal, December 11, 1933, Cooke
Papers, FDRPL, Box 53, Folder 23.
L.
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"would be sterilized by extensive
legislative hearings.
Having helped draft the NIRA and then
steer it through
Congress, Richberg thought that the
maneuver was possible,
but he knew that Lilienthal would need
to cultivate a base
of political support in order for Roosevelt
to authorize
the agency's creation.

Richberg quickly arranged

a

meeting between Lilienthal

and Gerard Swope, the influential head of General
Electric
and a member of the NRA's Industrial Advisory Board.

In

early December, 1933, Lilienthal met with Swope and

explained his plan.

A well-known advocate of cooperative

ties between business and government, and

a

wily

entrepreneur who recognized the possibility of opening up
previously untapped markets, Swope expressed immediate
interest in the project.

Having supported industrial

rationalization through an expansion of trade association
activities during the 1920s, Swope put Lilienthal in touch

with his industry's trade association, The National
Electrical Manufacturers' Association (NEMA)

,

but Swope

also secured an autonomous link for General Electric by

placing Lilienthal in personal contact with T.K. Quinn,
Vice President of G.E.'s manufacturing division, and

^Lilienthal to Donald Richberg, November 30,
Papers, Box 62.

1933,
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Chairman of the corporation's new
credit arm, the General
Electric Contracts Corporation/
Many other manufacturers were initially
less
cooperative. They harbored doubts about
the profitability
of increased low-end sales, fearing
that customers might
turn away from higher-priced models, and they
were also
reluctant to enter into such an intimate relationship
with
a federal agency the powers of which were
not yet clearly
defined.
But when Westinghouse joined G.E. in support
of
the sales program, the others had to follow,

for they could

not risk being cut out of what Business Week described
as

"potential mass market."^

with T.K. Quinn providing

technical advice and examples of private sector finance
plans, Lilienthal drew up a proposal which he presented to

the President in mid-December.

Lilienthal

's

proposal reflected both the

characteristic strengths and the flaws of its author.
Diligently constructed with

a

careful attention to the

possible political ramifications of the program, and

well-stocked with data, the document was also grand in its
vision and extremely optimistic in its assessment of the
new agency's potential economic impact.

suggested by Quinn, Lilienthal proposed

Along lines
a

cooperative

•^Lilienthal to Richberg, November 30, 1933
and T.K. Quinn
to Lilienthal, December 4, 1933, DEL Papers, Box 62.
;

''"TVA

Demonstrator," Business Week

.

May 19, 1934, p. 11.

a
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arrangement among utilities, manufacturers,
local appliance
dealers, and the new agency.
The manufacturers would
provide dealers and utilities (for most
utilities sold
electric appliances at this time) with
low-priced,

agency-approved refrigerators, ranges, and hot
water
heaters.
Participating dealers and utilities would
encourage moderate-income customers to use the
EHFA plan,
enticing people to buy with both low prices and
the

program's below-market finance rates.

The EHFA would

finance the purchase, with a monthly payment added on
to
the customer's electric bill.

To provide a clear example

of how the agency would work, Lilienthal offered the

President

a

hypothetical case.

"Mrs. John Jones of the

little town of Sparta, Wisconsin, will get the benefit of
this plan," Lilienthal wrote.

After hearing of the plan

through news releases and other publicity, Mrs. Jones will
go to her local dealer, and find models produced by "a

well-known manufacturer

—

[such] as General Electric" and

approved by the new agency.

Instead of $100 for

base-priced models, she will find refrigerators for "may be
as low as $35," and easy credit terms.

After discovering

that the local utility's rates are also coming down, Mrs.

Jones will inform her husband, who will then go down to the
dealer, order the equipment, and sign the note.

Joneses will have

a

The

new refrigerator, and their monthly
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payment will become part of a revolving
fund used to
advance credit to more families.^
The major innovation which the EHFA
offered in the
field of installment finance was a liberalization
of credit
terms.
Automobile financing had fueled a major expansion
of consumer credit during the 1920s, breaking
down

long-standing moral canons which previously had left most
people reluctant to go into debt to purchase household
goods. Institutional barriers began to recede as the

utilities and local finance companies began to offer terms
on everything from radios to refrigerators. Through

the

1920s, however, these finance plans still included a series
of restrictions that stymied broader use of installment

plans. Contracts were limited on average to only twelve

months, with the most generous provisions rarely going

beyond twenty-four months. Lilienthal's proposal would
lower downpayments to between five and ten percent, and

Quinn to Lilienthal, December 4, 1933, DEL Papers, Box
62; Lilienthal correspondence with Quinn, November and December,
1933, in. Records of the Electric Home and Farm Authority,
National Archives, Records Group 234, Reconstruction Finance
Corporation/Electric Home And Farm Authority, Manufacturers
Files, Box 85 (hereafter cited as RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Box No.);
Lilienthal memorandum to Franklin D. Roosevelt, "National Home
and Farm Electrification Program Proposed by Tennessee Valley
Authority," n.d. (circa early December, 1933), DEL Papers, Box
^T.K.

60.

In a technical sense, the EHFA's rates were not "below
market," for the agency's rates actually became part of the
market.
I use the phrase "below market" to denote rates which
were lower than those offered by sales finance companies at that
time.
I thank Martha Olney of the University of Massachusetts,
Amherst, Economics Department, who pointed out the need for this

clarification.

.

.
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extend contracts to

a

range of thirty-six to forty-eight

months.'

Operating on a nation-wide basis, Lilienthal
estimated
that the program would generate sales
of over 2 million
refrigerators, 1.2 million ranges, and 1 million
hot water
heaters.
He went on to request $200 million in
credit from
the NIRA appropriation, but added that the
funds would be
replenished by loan payments, and that increased
business

activity resulting from the sales would approximate
$600

million for the year 1934.

Finally, as he hoped to

convince Roosevelt that the program was politically

expedient as well as economically sound, Lilienthal noted
that appliance manufacturers "have indicated a keen desire
to participate.

Lilienthal

's

grand strategy for consumption-driven

economic recovery was one of the first attempts to
implement a growth-oriented economic program during the
1930s.

His intentions for the EHFA and the power program

at the TVA highlight the emergence of an alternative policy

track within the New Deal, dominated as it was in those
useful overview of the development of installment
financing is, Martha L. Olney, Buy Now. Pav Later; Advertising.
Credit, and Consumer Durables in the 1920s (Chapel Hill,
University of North Carolina Press, 1991)
For a study of credit and appliance purchasing in England,
see. Sue Bowden, "Credit Facilities and the Growth of Consumer
Demand for Electric Appliances in England in the 1930s," Business
History 32 (January, 1990)
'a

^^Lilienthal memo, to Roosevelt, circa December,
Papers, Box 60.

1933,

DEL

first years of Roosevelt's presidency
by the stagnationist
econoinics of the NRA and the first
Agricultural Adjustment

Administration. Although Lilienthal's programs
constituted
a minority tendency, the ideas
underlying his policies were
not new. The pro-growth agenda was the
product of
a

gestation period— shaped over more than

a

long

decade by

a

network of businessmen, economists and planners,
and labor
leaders that had coalesced around the twin goals
of
mass

consumption and economic expansion.''^
Morris Cooke, in particular, was one of the central
figures in the forging of the expansionist constituency.

Cooke and other planners in organizations such as the

Taylor Society, the Russell Sage Foundation, and the

Twentieth Century Fund had come together with businessmen

As noted in chapter 4 above, the work of Steven Fraser and
Peter Friedlander address the development and strategies of this
growth-oriented network. See, Fraser, "The M.abor Question"' in,
Fraser and Gerstle, eds.. The Rise and Fall of the Ne w De al
Order, and Friedlander, "The Origins of the Wei fare State The
Keynesian Elite and the Second New Deal, 1910-1936."
In "The New Deal and the Idea of the State," Alan Brinkloy
argues that pro-growth forces did not coalesce until the 1940s,
after the conservative resurgence of the late 1930s stymied the
regulatory-interventionist wing of the New Deal, and the Second
World War demonstrated that fiscal policy could in effect
subsidize private profit, high employment, and economic growth-in short, the conservative keynesian program.
However, 1 would
argue that the war only brought this agenda to the political
forefront, and merely brought some more reluctant element s of
labor and capital into what was already a fairly consistent
ideological and social movement. See Brinkley in, Fraser and
Gerstle, eds. The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order pp.
85-121.
For an important discussion of the emergence of conservative
or "commercial" keynesian in the United States, see Robert
Collins, The Business Resoonse to Kevnes fl981).
:

,
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from commercial sectors such as the
garment industry and
urban mass retailing, who accepted the logic
of demand-

driven policies and some form of national economic

coordination because of their firms' shared interest
in
mass consumption and due to the internecine chaos
of their
industries.

Cooke had been moving toward an ideology of growth
since the early 1920s.

Expressing his belief in the

efficacy of growth to labor leader Sidney Hillman, Cooke
stated in 1920 that, "in itself any increase in the

production of essential commodities is
end.

"^2

By

a

desirable social

decade, these planners had a

^j^^

clear vision, entailing, in the words of one historian,
"planned, expanded production and state-sanctioned

redistribution of income in the interests of security and
consumption."^^

Until the New Deal, however, this

coalition had lacked the political power necessary to
implement its agenda.

Lilienthal's new agency provided

a rural

counterpart

to the more urban-oriented measures supported by the growth

coalition, such as state support for industrial unionism

and federal income guarantees like Social Security.

countryside was

a

vast and untapped market which would do

^^Cooke to Hillman,
^

Labor Question'"

p.

^^Fraser,

62.

p.

The

60,

April 15, 1920, as cited in Fraser, "The
fn.

9.
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much more than absorb the industrial
capacity which lay
idle due to the Depression.
Integrating these
underdeveloped regions into the national
economy would
create new sources of consumption-driven
growth.
Lilienthal continually referred to Henry
Ford's marketing
strategies as the keys to growth. "What had
proved to be a
good business principle for Henry Ford in the
pricing of
his first automobiles," Lilienthal wrote, "what
was good

business in the mass production field generally,
would be
good business in electricity supply." Lilienthal 's

articulation of the fordist order thus grew out of his
close ties to Cooke, but much like the businessmen who had

embraced the agenda, the logic of his own interests drove
him to identify so closely with Cooke and adopt Cooke's

formulations for his own. Since his tenure at Wisconsin,
his success, and the security of his agencies, was tied to

broadening the regulatory prerogatives of experts and to
greater domestic consumption that would justify the
experts' implementation of low rate structures.''^

Despite Lilienthal

's

ambitious predictions, the

program was not without its critics.

Arthur Krock of the

New York Times launched biting attacks on the EHFA, just as
he had continually dogged the TVA from its inception.

Krock compared the promise of the EHFA to the malarial Eden

Lilienthal, TVA: Democracy on the March (New York, Harper
and Row,

1953,

orig. ed.

1944), p.

23.

.
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promoted by the Charles Dickens character,
Martin
Chuzzlewit.
Krock warned that people would be drawn
in by
the allure of material prosperity, only
to be greatly
disappointed by the empty reality behind the
New Deal's
promises
While Roosevelt paid close attention to his
political
opposition, Arthur Krock 's criticism would not dissuade

the

President from taking action.

As a result of the efforts

of Lilienthal, Richberg, and the appliance manufacturers,

Roosevelt signed an executive order establishing the
Electric Home and Farm Authority on December 19, 1933, and
the EHFA was chartered as a Delaware corporation in

January. However, the President was not prepared to

authorize $200 million for a national program.

Instead,

Roosevelt ordered the EHFA capitalized with $1 million from
the NIRA funds, with an additional $10 million in credit
for the agency from the Reconstruction Finance

Corporation.

The President also limited the program to a

trial run within the confines of the Tennessee Valley.

EHFA became

a de

The

facto subsidiary of the TVA, with the TVA

Board of Directors serving as the new corporation's

Trustees and Executive Officers.''*
^^

New York Times December 20, 19 33, p. 33, col. 1.
Leuchtenberg notes that the Times eventually became a strong
supporter of the TVA. See, Leuchtenberg, FDR and the New Deal
.

p.

55,

fn.

39.

Roosevelt, Executive Order No. 6514, December
1933, RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Box 5; "Certificate of Incorporation
^•^Franklin D.

19,

,
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With a charter secured, Lilienthal then
turned to
putting the program into operation. To ensure
the agency's
success, Lilienthal needed to convince the
manufacturers to
produce affordable appliances, while also securing
lower
electric rates from the utilities. With this in mind,
Lilienthal carried on extensive negotiations with both
groups.

December,
spring.

Meetings with a special NEMA committee began in
1933,

and continued through the following

With advice from Quinn and G.E. production

specialists as well as government engineers and home
economists, Lilienthal provided the NEMA with sets of

technical specifications which the models had to match to
be acceptable for EHFA financing.

Further, while

Lilienthal did not set definitive price levels for the
appliances, he made it clear that the program would not

succeed without "drastic price revisions," and that retail

prices would be as important as technical reliability in

determining acceptability for EHFA financing.^''
The NEMA distributed the criteria, and the

manufacturers sent prospective models to the EHFA for
review.

Home economists from the Department of Agriculture

of Electric Home and Farm Authority, Inc.," January 17,
copy in RG 2 34, RFC/EHFA, Box 4.

1934,

^^Lilienthal-Quinn correspondence, December 1, and 4, 1933,
RG 2 34, RFC/EHFA, Box 85; V.D.L. Robinson, TVA Administrative
Assistant, to W.J. Browne, Gibson Corporation, February 2, 1934;
H.W. Newell, Frigidaire Corporation, to Lilienthal, March 5,
1934, RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Boxes 84 and 80, respectively.
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tested the performance of the various
models, and with only
minor reservations, the USDA personnel
approved almost all
of the appliances as technically sound
and within EHFA
specifications. 18 Final acceptance of all models,
however,

depended upon Lilienthal's approval of retail
prices.
this matter, Lilienthal adeptly used manufacturer
competition to the EHFA's advantage.

m

Hoping to avoid

collusion and confident that none of the companies wanted
to be excluded from the program, the TVA-EHFA Director

ordered the manufacturers to submit prices in sealed bids.
Lilienthal would announce the EHFA's findings at

a

March

meeting and press conference at the NEMA's New York
offices.

Scheduled to publicize the EHFA program and highlight
the agency's cooperation with the business community,

Lilienthal used the media exposure at the New York meeting
to pressure the manufacturers into further price

reductions.

All of the prices were "higher than expected,"

he told the press.

Still, all of the ranges and heaters

were accepted for financing.

refrigerators were acceptable.

However, none of the

The EHFA was disappointed.

^^EHFA correspondence with Manufacturers, February-March,
1934, RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Boxes 80-85.
The EHFA denied approval

based on technical considerations for only one company, the
Rutenber Electric Company of Marion, Indiana. The wiring in its
stoves was deemed inadequate; the first refrigerator it sent for
testing leaked coolant, and the second failed to maintain a
satisfactory internal temperature under extreme external
conditions (external temperatures over 100 degrees Fahrenheit)
See, correspondence with Rutenber Co., Box 83.
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Lilienthal explained, by the lack of
innovative new designs
and by prices that ranged from
$80 to $120, certainly a far
cry from the $35 price Lilienthal
had quoted to Roosevelt
in December.
What people needed, and what the EHFA
expected, he insisted, were not just no-frills
versions of
existing models. what was needed was "a new
base price for
industry," and perhaps "another [Henry] Ford"
to achieve
that breakthrough.''^
Lilienthal was convinced that refrigerators offered
the greatest sales potential of the three appliances,
and
he was adamant that prices had to come down further.

To

effect further reductions, Lilienthal continued to play the

manufacturers off each other, but he also held
card.

a

trump

In the EHFA's articles of incorporation, the agency

was authorized "to manufacture, buy, sell, deal in, and to

engage in, conduct and carry on the business of
manufacturing, buying, selling, and dealing in electrical

appliances and equipment... of every class and description

necessary or useful for the operations of the
Corporation."

If Lilienthal failed to get satisfactory

prices from the manufacturers, he could have brought the
EHFA into the appliance business.

Given that the

government was then entering the power business through the
TVA, and with unused industrial capacity still at

^'"TVA Appliances," Business Week

10-11.

.

March 17, 1934, pp.

.
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Depression levels, the possibility of such
a move did not
seem remote in 1934. Indeed, the threat
seemed real enough
New York Timns to publish a headline story,
announcing, "Federal Corporations Are Enabled
To Engage In
Any Form Of Business," reporting that, "through
six

government-controlled corporations, the Roosevelt
administration is enabled to engage in virtually any form
of business enterprise

Lilienthal never had to move forward with this threat
to private enterprise.

By May, each side came to a

compromise whereby the EHFA approved the proposed models on
a

temporary basis at slightly reduced prices, around $75,

and the manufacturers agreed to submit newly designed

refrigerators by August. Lilienthal realized that his

anticipated "drastic price revisions" would fall far short
of his $35 goal. Independent sets of estimated production

costs provided by T.K. Quinn and by economic consultants
from the TVA corroborated the manufacturers' claims that

they could not afford to go any lower.

What the struggle

over refrigerator prices reveals is that the precise nature

2°"Certif icate of Incorporation of Electric Home and Farm
Authority, Inc.," January 17, 1934, copy in RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Box
4.
New York Times March 25, 1934, p. 1, col. 4 & 5. The other
five corporations were: Commodity Credit Corporation, Public
Works Emergency Housing Corporation, Federal Surplus Relief
Corporation, Subsistence Homesteads, and Tennessee Valley
Associated Cooperatives. The report characterized Delaware
Incorporation laws as "easy" and also reported that the charters
were drawn up "by officials now assisting in the administration
of their [the corporations'] activities.
.
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of the business-government
relationship was as yet unclear,
and each side was attempting to lay
out more sharply

defined rules and limits which were to
their own
advantage
Lilienthal also moved to lower power rates.

Convincing the utilities to cooperate with the
EHFA would
not be easy.
The power corporations were already engaged
in a war with the TVA, and they would not
be won over
readily to a venture run by David Lilienthal as
an adjunct
to the TVA.
Because the utilities held monopolistic
franchises, these companies would not be drawn into the

EHFA program by

a

fear of losing market share to

competitors, as were the appliance manufacturers.

But with

very little territory as yet receiving TVA power,
Lilienthal realized that he had to sell the EHFA program to
the private companies.

If he did gain their cooperation,

Lilienthal knew that increased power consumption across the
region would make TVA

'

s

acquisition of further territory a

much simpler task, for the utilities would have greater
sales despite smaller markets.

As Lilienthal had noted in

his first letter to Marvin Mclntyre, the success of the

EHFA would provide, "some means of increasing the demand

EHFA Correspondence with Refrigerator Manufacturers,
March-July, 1934, RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Boxes 80-85.
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for electricity so as to make room
for the existing systems
as well as the system which we are
creating. "22

By either enticement or coercion,
however, Lilienthal
intended to bring rates down and draw the
utilities into
the EHFA plan.
The shiny lure he cast out was the

load-building promise of the EHFA.

Lower your rates and

join our program, and your bottom-line will
improve,

Lilienthal promised. Resist, he warned, and the yardstick
of lower rates and increased appliance sales in
TVA

territory will win over the public to an increasingly
aggressive expansion of public power throughout the

Southeast and ultimately, across the nation.
Power companies had always been interested in building

their domestic load.

As early as 1909, the power magnate

Samuel Insull employed salesman to sell electric

appliances.

Most utilities had showrooms which extolled

the virtues of electric living, and promotional campaigns

were commonplace.

The companies also devised rate

structures which they believed encouraged greater domestic
consumption, offering substantially reduced rates to heavy

users of current. 2^

However, many industry executives

continued to resist any attempt to lower rates for more

22Lilienthal to Mclntyre, November 21,
2^Hughes, American Genesis

1933.

231-238; Glenn Weaver, The
Hartford Electric Light Company (Hartford, Connecticut, Hartford
Electric Light, 1969), pp. 98-99; "Appliance Bargain," Business
Week, September 17, 1938, p. 27.
,

pp.
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moderate consumers, especially to the
EHFA's recommended
levels of 3 to 4 cents per kilowatt
hour—

50 to 200% lower

than existing rates.

As one executive stated in the

utility industry's trade journal,

Electrical wnr-iH,

privately owned and operated utilities can lower
residence rates materially only as load is
built....
We cannot, like the government
establish highly unprofitable, low residential
rates that it is hoped some day will be
profitable when adequate consumption has been
obtained.
While some utility officers continued their
resistance, Wendell Willkie fully appreciated the

implications of Lilienthal's message.

As chief executive

of Commonwealth and Southern, the giant holding company

which owned the four major utilities in the Valley, Willkie
hoped to profit from this joint venture, and he quickly
came to terms with the EHFA, even while continuing his
legal and political struggles against the parent TVA.

C&S

agreed to bring down rates to EHFA-specif ied levels and
"use their utmost endeavors" to promote appliance sales.

While the C&S chief drew harsh criticism from some
executives, the more pragmatic utility leaders supported
him, noting that lower rates might initially cut profits,

but also admitting that there was the possibility that

their load factors would increase enough to at least offset
the lower rates.

Given the political situation, moreover,

Whitwell, "Only Industry Selling Will Beat
Yardsticks and Taxes," Electrical World March 24, 1934, p. 427.
'^^George E.

.
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few alternatives existed.

As an

editorial in the trade

Electrical World stated, "the lower rates
are
coming, it is written on the wall."25

With the participation of the utility and
appliance
industries tentatively in hand, Lilienthal planned
a

promotional campaign to coincide with an anticipated

mid-May starting date for the program. The Madison
Avenue
advertising firm Young and Rubicam handled the campaign as
part of its work for the TVA.

The advertising executives

approached this government account with

a

great deal of

skepticism. Y&R was one of advertising newer firms, and was

widely regarded as a renegade agency

—

primarily for its

early adoption of hard-sell tactics, and not for any great

concern with radical social issues. In a June 1934 meeting,
Samuel Cherr of Y&R told Forrest Allen that "in any

approach to this market. Young

&

Rubicam would begin with

the idea that the public buys things because they are sold,
not because they are good for the public." And in the case
of the Tennessee Valley, Cherr warned Allen, even a hard-

sell may not work. Mixing equal parts disdain for regions

beyond the Hudson river and dispassionate economic
analysis, Cherr offered little hope for the agency's

Effects A Deal with Southern Utilities,"
Electrical World (January, 1934), p. 120; "Federal-Spending
Compels Utility-Selling," Electrical World (February, 1934),
"^^"T.V.A.

209

.

p.
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success. As Allen reported of the meeting,
Cherr stated
that his firm

was forced to take a realistic view of
our market
area, that wide ranges of its population
have low
incomes; that there was a high degree of
and that there was an attitude throughout illiteracy,
the entire
area which was marked by an indifference to
any
improvement or progress.

Notwithstanding his skepticism, Cherr -s firm accepted
the
campaign and the Authority's $10,000 fee. The proposal
called for heightening EHFA's visibility through permanent
and mobile display showrooms, direct mail efforts using
the

government frank, and sending out door-to-door canvassers
in selected areas. The campaign also involved many joint

promotional efforts between the TVA and the EHFA. The

authorities shared a main showroom in Chattanooga, where
the TVA's fist and lightning bolt emblem was lit in bright
neon.

"EHFA" was added above the fist, and flashed on and

off in sequence with the lightning bolt and the block

letters "TVA" below it.^^
The EHFA began operating in May,

town of Tupelo, Mississippi.

1934,

in the small

As one of the first

municipalities to receive TVA power, the EHFA selected
Tupelo more for its symbolic value rather than for its

particular market strength.

For a few short weeks Tupelo

was besieged by the agency's canvassers, the media, and

^°Forrest Allen to George D. Munger, EHFA Commercial
Manager, June 26, 19 34, RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Box 15; "TVA
Demonstrator," Business Week May 19, 1934, p. 12.
,
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hundreds of curious onlookers. The EHFA set
up a permanent
showroom in the town, with the various approved
appliances
arranged in mock kitchens. EHFA and TVA
literature,
slogans, and pictures were a constant and vivid
reminder

that these public agencies were ushering in the
modern age
of comfort and convenience. The common themes
running

through both agencies' literature emphasized the

administrative and ideological bonds between them, and the
content of the message bore evidence of Lilienthal's

distinctive idiom. One brochure stated,
the EHFA is interested in a constantly greater use of
electricity in all American homes. A fully
electrified nation is the goal. Added leisure and
comfort, lighter and briefer tasks..., a merging of
all classes of American people in a common
understanding and a common well-being, such are the
benefits of electricity.^''

Agency personnel continued their intense promotional
efforts as the EHFA program slowly expanded across the

Tennessee Valley during that first summer of operation. But
despite these promotional efforts, EHFA sales lagged. By
July, the agency had financed only 142 contracts worth just

over $14,000.^® Searching for a sales breakthrough, the

EHFA renewed its efforts to convince manufacturers to

design new refrigerators. Once again, G.E. led the way.

Demonstrator," p. 12; "Budget for Promotional
Division for Fiscal Year Beginning July 1, 1934," and
"Chattanooga Exhibit," RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Box 15.
27„rpY^

^^EHFA Statement of Operations, Installment Contracts
Purchased through August 31, 19 37, RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Box 4.
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submitting a model which met the agency's
criteria for the
lowest possible price combined with
technical reliability.
The new design was a 4 cubic foot
chest-type refrigerator,
opening from the top rather than the front.
Compared to a
cabinet model refrigerator, the chest model
was distinctly
inferior in user convenience and made less
efficient use of
space, but the EHFA believed that the chest's
low cost

outweighed its disadvantages. Citing the G.E. design,
the
EHFA stated in July that, "we [the EHFA] are of the
opinion
that the other manufacturers would be distinctly benefited
by developing new models at this particular time."^^

The

others did follow suit, and EHFA-approved chest models went
on sale during the fall of 1934.

However, the chest models did not generate a sales
boom.

Most people who could afford refrigerators wanted

larger models; the three and four cubic feet of space in
the chests was too small.

Since the EHFA only financed

each manufacturer's base-priced model, customers had to
turn to private financing, or forego their purchase.

Manufacturers and dealers pressured the agency to change
its policy.

A dealer from Mississippi plainly stated the

sentiments expressed by many others when he wrote to inform
the EHFA,
we have several people today that would buy larger
boxes than the T.V.A. models if they could get E.H.
^^George D. Munger, to H.W. Newell,
July 2, 1934, RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Box 80.

&

Frigidaire Corporation,

234
F.

terms

We can't see why you are limiting
us to
""^"'^
this
business and
""^^l
our customers want
refrigeration, but the T.V.A
models are too small. Won't you please
grant u^
authority to sell these larger appliances?

A

It seems that most dealers never
considered the chest

models, with their narrow profit margins,
worthy of any
serious sales push. As an editorial in Electric

Refrigeration Npws stated, dealers "intend to use
the chest
model as a ^nailed-to-the-floor refrigerator,
employing
'

its low price as a bait to draw in store traffic.

While Lilienthal had maintained that the chest model

would become the Model T of refrigerators, establishing "a
new base price" for the industry, he was able to recognize
a sales flop.

In November,

1934, he sought authorization

from the President to change EHFA policy.

Lilienthal

recommended extending EHFA financing to include all models
from manufacturers that produced EHFA-approved base-priced
models.

The new policy went into effect the following

spring.

At same time that the EHFA was working through its

sales problems, organized opposition to the program began
to grow.

Since the agency's formation, local dealers had

been dissatisfied with its intimate ties to the utilities.
Galtney, Galtney Motor Company, to EHFA, no date
(circa Fall, 1934), RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Box 34; Electric
Refrigeration News 8 August 1934, p. 8.
^°D.K.

,

^^Lilienthal Memorandum to Franklin Roosevelt, November 21,
1934; Lilienthal to G.D. Munger, January 29, 1935, both in RG
234, RFC/EHFA, Box 34.
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as power companies competed with the
dealers for consumer

appliance purchases.
in Tupelo,

Coinciding with the EHFA's start-up

ten dealers in Georgia filed suit in Federal

court against the agency, charging that by
coercing the
appliance manufacturers and utilities into joining
the

program, the government was creating a monopoly
which would

destroy the dealers' businesses.

They sought an injunction

preventing the Georgia Power Company (one of the four

Commonwealth and Southern subsidiaries) from selling EHFA
appliances. ^2

The dealers failed to secure an injunction,

and their suit was ultimately unsuccessful, but over the

next year dealer resistance stiffened and new allies joined

their struggle against the EHFA.
During 1935, the merchants' trade association, the

National Retail Dry Goods Association, joined with two

associations from the credit industry. The National

Association of Sales Finance Companies and the National
Retail Credit Association, to lobby against the agency.

Believing that the EHFA-utility relationship "deprived
local dealers of the opportunity of making a sale," and

that "the invasion of the field of instalment credit by the
Federal Government... was operating to demoralize sound

credit practices," these associations used legal action,

^^

New York Times

.

May

9,

1934, p.

35,

col
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political pressure, and public relations
to weaken or
destroy the program."
Lilienthal exhibited little fear of these
efforts.

When he was developing his EHFA proposal the
previous
December, Lilienthal had not even considered it
necessary
to consult these groups, as he had the NEMA and
utility

interests.

The appliance and utility industries were

oligopolies, composed of large-scale corporations wielding

enormous political and economic power.
were central to Lilienthal

's

The larger firms

vision for integrating the

Tennessee Valley into the national economy and for
sustaining consumption-driven economic growth.

The retail

credit and dry goods business sectors possessed neither the
national scale nor the accompanying political clout held by

corporations such as General Electric and Commonwealth and
Southern.

The smaller trade associations did have allies

in Congress, but as long as the EHFA remained insulated

from the legislature by an Executive Order, their

opposition was ineffectual.
As was the case with most New Deal programs,

opposition also emerged to the agency's left. Advocates of

"For

a report on the

coordinated efforts of the three
associations, see, R.E. Baylis, "Liberalized Credit
Its
Disadvantages and Its Effects on Buying Power," Proceedings of
the Silver Anniversary Convention of the National Retail Credit
Association 1937, p. 94; for the quotes, see, NASFC News June,
The NRCA Proceedings and
1935, p. 1, and November, 1935, p. 1.
the NASFC materials are located in the Baker Library of Harvard
Business School.
I am again indebted to Martha Olney for
informing me of the existence of these records.
,

—

,
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more radical solutions to the nation's
economic woes viewed
the EHFA as yet another ill-conceived
attempt to prop up a
discredited capitalist system. In a critique that
was only
partly tongue-in-cheek, J.B. Matthews and R.E.
Shallcross
noted
there is, in fact, arising a school of recovery
preaching the gospel of economic salvation by
gadgetry. According to the editor of Electric
Refrigeration News, the nation is now faced with a
choice between (1) Fascism, (2) Communism, (3) the New
Deal, and (4) Air Conditioning: and he, of course,
favors the adoption of the last-named road.

Lumping the EHFA together with this private-sector panacea,

Matthews and Shallcross insisted that appliance sales and
installment financing would resolve none of the systemic

contradictions plaguing the country. "It should be manifest
to everyone," they continued, "that a gadgetry boom is a

spurious prosperity from which the bottom must inevitably
fall out with a bang."^"*

The split between Arthur Morgan and Lilienthal also

surfaced in regard to the EHFA.
a

Morgan expressed what was

traditional antipathy toward installment sales, calling

such credit "a very questionable process at best."

He

feared that the TVA was abusing its "unique prestige" among

Valley residents to sell appliances which people could not
afford.

Morgan's critique never went beyond an exchange of

memos with Lilienthal, and the program continued to operate

Matthews and R.E. Shallcross, Partners in Plunder.
The Cost of Business Dictatorship (New York, Covici, Friede
Publishers, 1935), pp. 83, 87.
^^J.B.
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under Lilienthal's direction.

consumer debt as

a

Whereas Morgan saw

burden and a morally questionable

activity, Lilienthal believed that credit
expansion and

price reductions would create economic development,

generating jobs, income, and wealth across the country
as
well as within the Valley.
The EHFA's trial run in the Tennessee Valley lasted

fifteen months.

Lilienthal had always intended the EHFA to

be a national program, with its operations initially

restricted to the Tennessee Valley serving only as

a

temporary measure aimed at resolving any operational
flaws.

But when the agency finally did expand in August

1935, the national EHFA bore only a superficial resemblance

to Lilienthal's creation.
As envisioned by Lilienthal, the EHFA's expansion

would not have significantly altered the agency in purpose
or structure.

The EHFA would retain its liberally-drawn

Delaware charter.

The Board of Directors would change to

reflect a more national scope, including one Director from
the TVA (presumably Lilienthal)

,

along with one

representative each from the Treasury, Interior, and

Agriculture Departments, and one member from the Federal

Morgan to Lilienthal, September 7, 1934, and G.D.
Munger for Lilienthal to Morgan, October 20, 1934, RG 234,
RFC/EHFA, Box 5.
^^A.E.
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Power Commission.

As planned, the expansion meant
business

as usual, but on a larger scale.

Before the national program went into
effect, the
Supreme Court decision striking down the NIRA
undermined

Lilienthal's plan.

Without the NIRA, Roosevelt's Executive

Order that authorized the EHFA was invalid, and
Lilienthal
could no longer avoid going to Congress for enabling
legislation.

The "extensive legislative hearings"

Lilienthal feared were imminent, and despite the steadfast

support of public power advocates in Congress, the

legislature did indeed sterilize the EHFA.
followed on top of compromise.

Compromise

The EHFA received a new

corporate charter in the District of Columbia which removed
all of the broad discretionary powers of the Delaware

corporation.

More importantly. Congress removed the agency

from Lilienthal's control, establishing the new EHFA as

a

subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, with
a

seven member Board of Directors drawn exclusively from

the RFC with the exception of one representative from the

recently formed Rural Electrification Administration.^''

^''Lilienthal to Roosevelt,
63

December

3,

1934.

DEL Papers, Box

.

^''Material on this shift can be found in several different
EHFA files. See, Executive Order No. 7139, August 12, 1935,

ending the Delaware corporation; Lilienthal to Roosevelt, July
26, 1935; and. Congressional File, RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Boxes 4,5,
and 31, respectively.
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Under the RFC, the EHFA greatly expanded
its
territory, eventually including areas
such as Los Angeles
County, California; Austin, Texas; and
Hartford,
Connecticut; but its organizational character
was

distinctively different.
promotional activities.

The RFC completely abandoned
The showrooms closed. The neon

signs were turned off and taken down.

Business Week

the

,

journal which had kept the closest watch over the
EHFA

since its inception noticed the transformation.

"The

difference was largely one of attitude," the business

weekly reported.
Back in the Valley, the movement had been a
crusade.
Moved to Washington, it became just
another of RFC's many activities... and fell hei
to the conservatism normally associated with the
banker, rather than the promoter.
The conservatism of the RFC exerted an increasingly

powerful influence over the EHFA.

Morris Cooke served as

the first Chairman of the newly reconstituted agency, but
as the sole representative on the board of directors from

outside of the RFC, he was unable to control EHFA policy;
he resigned his post in 1936.

A dispute in 1938 reveals

how conservative the agency had become.

The REA field

representative for the Puget Sound area was repeatedly
stymied by regional EHFA officials in his attempts to get
local RA co-operatives signed onto the EHFA program.

^''"EHFA
1936, p. 37.

Pussyfoots Successfully," Business Week

,

The

August 15,
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regional EHFA office operated out of
space freely provided
by the Portland Gas and Electric Company
in Portland, and
EHFA men used vehicles owned by the private
utilities to

travel through the area.

Reluctant to anger their local

patrons who were also the source for most of
their
contracts, the EHFA representatives showed little
interest
in working with the RA co-operatives.

The private

utilities had many more customers than the co-ops, and
since the new EHFA was much more interested in contracts

than it was in social goals, the EHFA ignored the co-ops
until Washington, D.C., RA officials raised enough

objections to force the EHFA to accommodate them.

As R.C.

Brummer, the EHFA representative explained the incident in
a

report to Washington,
told him [the RA official] that we were not
interested in any of the political affairs, that
we had kept out of the squabbles, [and] that we
had to operate in a business way.
I

The EHFA continued to operate until 1942, when war-time

restrictions on credit and appliance production led to its
dissolution.^'

Judged solely on the number of sales financed by the
program, the EHFA was never more than a minor-league

operation.

During its 15 months in the Tennessee Valley,

the agency purchased just under 5,000 contracts, amounting

^^EHFA-RA Relations, Correspondence, October, 1938, RG 234,
RFC/EHFA, Box 32; Executive Order No. 9256, October 13, 1942,
liquidating the EHFA, RG 234 RFC/EHFA, Box 4.

242

to almost $760,000.

At the end of 1940, its last year
of

significant activity, the EHFA's cumulative
total was
254,000 contracts worth $36.1 million, which
was

less than

2% of electrical appliance installment paper and
less than

0.1% of all consumer credit in that period.^''

Joseph Coppock, an economist who studied the
EHFA for
the National Bureau of Economic Research in
the late
1930s

and wrote a retrospective assessment of the
program in
1964,

attributed its marginal impact to the bureaucratic

conservatism of the RFC, and to the bewildering series of
contractual arrangements among utilities, manufacturers,
dealers, consumers, and the EHFA.

In order to minimize the

opposition of private lenders and Congressional opposition,
Coppock claims, the RFC administrators were unwilling to

aggressively publicize the program and maintained real
annual percentage rates at

9

to 10%, only one or two points

below private sector rates, rather than the

3

to 4% which

would have induced significantly greater consumption.

The

utility agreements, rate reviews, approved appliance lists,
and dealer participation requirements further inhibited
expansion.
^°"Memorandum.
Re: Operations of Electric Home and Farm
Authority," no date, circa 1938, RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Box 5. Joseph
D. Coppock, "Government As Enterpriser-Competitor: The Case of
the Electric Home and Farm Authority," Explorations in
Entrepreneurial History 1(1964), pp. 190-192.

Joseph D. Coppock, Government Agencies of Consumer
Instalment Credit (New York, National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1940); Coppock, "Government As Enterpriser-Competitor,"

.
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Certainly, lower real interest rates
would have
created greater demand for EHFA financing,
but the lack of
publicity and the administrative obstacles
which Coppock
cites as sources for the agency -s marginal
impact do not
explain the dismal sales performance during
the

fifteen-month trial run in the Tennessee Valley.

Lilienthal's guidance, the EHFA conducted

a

Under

major

advertising campaign, and also had the cooperation of
the
four major private utility companies in the region,
yet

the

agency financed very few sales.

Even expanding the number

of models eligible for financing following the chest

model's low sales only generated

a

modest increase in

contracts
The EHFA's greatest limitation while linked to the TVA

was the regional underdevelopment that would continue to

block the full realization of Lilienthal's goals for

economic reconstruction.

The Tennessee Valley was one of

the poorest and most rural regions in the United States.
In 1932, per capita retail sales in the region were

one-half the national average.

Only 3% of the farms had

electricity, compared to a national average of 11%, and
rural electrification programs took years (and for some
areas, decades) to string wire across America's rural

landscape. Despite lower electric rates and slightly

moderated finance charges and appliance prices, many people
pp.

188-198.
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Of the Tennessee Valley still could
not afford

refrigerators or electric ranges
As a national program, the agency faced
insurmountable
structural economic barriers which prevented it
from

becoming the engine of national recovery that
Lilienthal
had intended it to be.
Lilienthal believed that price
reductions and credit expansion would be enough to fuel
mass consumption.

However, cheap prices for consumer

durables were not the primary obstacle blocking economic
recovery. Job and income insecurity due to wage cuts,

unemployment, short work weeks, and the absence of social

insurance legislation stifled popular consumption by

limiting the amount of debt which families were willing to
incur. Lilienthal could not control these matters, and the

EHFA could not realize his goal of sparking

a

broad-based

economic recovery.
As a measure for national recovery, and as a finance
agency, the EHFA met with little success.

However, as one

component in the TVA's efforts to increase electric
^^"Expenditures for Electrical Appliances by Workers in 42
Cities," Monthly Labor Review 46(February 1938): 447-454; Ted
Leitzell, "Uncle Sam, Peddler of Electric Gadgets," New Outlook
164 (August, 1934), pp. 51-52.
.

^^For studies of the emergence of this mass production-mass
consumption synthesis, see, Michel Aglietta, A Theory of

Capitalist Regulation. The US Experience trans, by David
Fernbach (London, New Left Books, 1979, orig. ed. 197 6) Mike
Davis, "^Fordism" in Crisis: A Review of Michel Aglietta's
Regulation et crises: L'experience des Etats-Unis " Review
2 (Fall, 1978): 207-269; and, Mike Davis, Prisoners of the
American Dream (New York, Verso Books, 1986), pp. 52-117.
,

;

.

consumption through lower rates, the
EHFA was successful
easing the Valley Authority's political
situation.

i

As

rates declined, people who could not buy
items such as
refrigerators or electric ranges still used
more
electricity, by turning on lights for longer
periods and
buying less expensive items such as fans, radios,
and
irons.

The results of lower rates were clear and

unmistakable.

in both TVA territory and in regions

supplied by private companies which had lowered rates
to

EHFA-specified levels, consumption increased dramatically.
Even without heavy appliance buying, consumption was up 83

after six months of low TVA rates.

More illustrative of

the role that the EHFA played in generating power

consumption, is the increased load among the Commonwealth
and Southern subsidiaries.

In 1935,

for all utility

companies east of the Rocky Mountains, the top three

utilities for average customer consumption were the three
C&S companies in Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee.

These

companies' rates were slightly higher than the national

average in 1933, but when they topped the consumption
rankings in 1935, their rates of 3.63 cents per

kilowatthour were more than
average.

2

5% lower than the national

By 1939, utilities using the EHFA plan and thus

meeting the agency's low rate requirements averaged over
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60% greater per customer consumption than
did companies not
on the EHFA plan/^

Ultimately, the EHFA's minimal impact
on appliance
sales and its greater influence on
electric load were
secondary to its role in the process of
experimentation

during the 1930s and 1940s, which resulted in

a

reconstituted political economy in which the state
helped
mediate the formal juncture of mass production and
mass
consumption. Needing to create a market for TVA power,
and

believing the Depression to be

crisis of

a

A recent study of the RFC during the New Deal by James
Olson asserts that the EHFA was "an instant success," financing
the sale of over 70,000 refrigerators during 1934.
This estimate
appears greatly inflated, as agency records in the National
Archives indicate a total of 4,886 contracts financed from the
EHFA's start in 1933 through the end of June, 1935. Given this
small number of contracts, Olson's figure of 70,000 refrigerators
seems quite impossible.
For Olson's appraisal, see, James S.
Olson, Saving Capitalism. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation
and the New Deal. 1933-1940 (Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 1988), p. 142.
My appraisal is based on reports made by
the EHFA.
See, Untitled Statement of Operations, through August
31, 1937, KG 234, RFC/EHFA, Box 4.
Fiscal Year
# of Contracts
Amount of Contracts
1933- 34
142
14,290.75
$
1934- 35
4,744
745,421.02

During House debates on power policy, Mississippi
Congressman John Rankin, whose district included Tupelo and other
TVA and EHFA territory, read excerpts from letters written to him
by his constituents which described how they made use of more
power due to reduced rates. He read fifty or more of the
accounts, noting that he had many more back in his office. While
some letters listed a wide array of appliances and electric
tools, all of them listed at least three basic items
lights,
fans, and radios.
For examples, see. Speech of John Rankin,
March 25, 1936, Congressional Record pp. 4346-4350.

—

,

McCraw, TVA and the Power Fight pp. 75-76; and, EHFA
Statement of Operations, 1939, pp. 5-6, and chart 1, RG 234,
RFC/EHFA, Box 31.
,
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underconsumption, Lilienthal designed

a

program aimed at

expanding, not simply maintaining, the
economy.

Influencing the appliance trade through
product
design, retail prices, electric rates,
and credit terms,
Lilienthal envisioned the EHFA as a catalyst for
business,
opening up new markets to private enterprise,
while also

enlarging the state's responsibilities as the broker
among
the various interest groups within the marketplace.
The

TVA-EHFA director forged alliances with manufacturers
such
as Gerard Swope, who recognized the benefits of closer

business-government cooperation and stood to gain from
revitalized consumer purchasing.
The Electric Home and Farm Authority reflected the

vision of a political network which supported an activist
state and expansionary economic policies.

Even as the EHFA

was proving to be less successful than planned, Lilienthal
and his allies remained convinced that the New Deal must

turn to other expansionary measures, and they understood
that there were different means of achieving this goal.

In

mid-summer 1934, Lilienthal wrote to Felix Frankfurter,
stating,

one angle of the New Deal which I wish could be made
clear to the public mind and carried out in action, is
the necessity of reestablishing and maintaining a
stable purchasing power among the masses of the
people. NRA may have stopped the downward course, but
it is obvious that it has not, and certainly if NRA is
to be self government will not reestablish an adequate
purchasing power. ... I wonder if it would be sound to
frankly face the issue of reestablishing purchasing
,

s

.

"
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^^^dit expansion but through
su^t^inoH^ ambitious program of
sustained,
public works.

a

While agencies such as the NRA, shaped
by the vision of
economic stagnation and industrial maturity,
proved

unworkable and increasingly unsatisfactory, the
EHFA was
one of the first, halting steps toward a
keynesian
pol it ical economy

^^Lilienthal to Frankfurter, August
63

7,

DEL Papers, Box

1934,

.

For studies of the growth-oriented coalition which shaped
America's post-War economy, see, Robert Collins, The Business
Response to Keynes (1981); Kim McQuaid, Big Business and
Presidential Power (New York, 1980)
and, Alan Wolfe, America
Impasse, The Rise and Fall of the Politics of Growth (New York,
Pantheon Books, 1981)
For a provocative study of which
industrial sectors joined the New Deal coal it ion see Thomas
Ferguson, "From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party
Competition, and American Public Policy in the Great Depression,
41-94.
International Organization 38(Winter, 1984)
'

;

.

,

:
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CHAPTER

7

THE ••FEUD" REVISITED:
ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY AND THE LILIENTHAL-MORGAN
CONTROVERSY

Despite facing an array of obstacles
during the
agency's first five years, the TVA-s original
directorate
oversaw considerable progress in their dam-building
and

hydroelectricity programs. By 1938 the TVA had four of
an
anticipated ten dams in operation; three (Norris,
Pickwick
Landing, and Wheeler) were constructed by the agency,
and

the fourth was the Wilson Dam at Muscle Shoals—inherited

from the Army Corps of Engineers. The fifth dam,

Guntersville, would go on line the following year. The

Authority had 13,000 employees, the great majority of them
at work on dam construction crews. Other TVA crews had

stretched out 4,600 miles of transmission lines across the
Valley. In those five years, forty-three municipal power

companies and nineteen rural cooperatives had contracted
for TVA power, along with several direct industrial

consumers. Total annual power production had just exceeded
2

billion kilowatt hours (kwh)

.

TVA's low rates drove up

consumption throughout the Valley; residents consistently
drew over twenty percent more power than their counterparts
in other regions. At the same time, the Authority had also

successfully rebuffed

a

series of legal challenges that

effectively settled the issue of the agency's
constitutionality. Its statutory legitimacy secured, TVA

gained added leverage in its negotiations for more

.
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territory, as the private utilities were
slowly reconciled
to its existence.^

The economies exacted by the agency in its

construction program and the gradual easing of
legal
pressures proved to be a great boon for Lilienthal.

Cheap

power was the cornerstone of his efforts to induce
economic
recovery through effective demand management. Lower
rates

spurred dramatic surges in consumption and protected the

agency against attack from private utility interests. The
fordist gambit played out by Lilienthal since his arrival
in 1933 looked like a smashing success. The success of his

power program was fortuitous, for as the threat of attack
from without receded, Lilienthal became entangled in

renewed hostilities within the agency.
By the winter of 1935-1936, the tensions evident among

the directors prior to the Lilienthal-H. A. Morgan coup of

August 1933 had resurfaced. For three years, the situation

grew progressively worse, from an internal power struggle
of little note outside the agency to a notorious public

^Marguerite Owen, The Tennessee Valley Authority (New York,
Praeger Publishers, 1973), pp. 38-39; testimony of Julius Krug, 7
December 1938, Joint Investigation of the TVA pp 5227-5228.
A succinct, account of the legal issues can be found in
McCraw, TVA and the Power Fight pp. 118-119. Neither of the
Supreme Court's decisions on the TVA (in the Ashwander and TEPCO
cases) provided a sweeping affirmation of the Authority's
constitutionality. However, the Court's general shift by the late
1930s toward granting broader discretionary powers to the federal
government, coupled with the utilities' gradual recognition of
the TVA's business-like demeanor, settled the constitutional
issue
.

,
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scandal, complete with bitter charges
of personal

malfeasance and political treachery, with
Harcourt Morgan
remaining largely in the background, but still
decisively
with Lilienthal, the dispute pitted Lilienthal
against
Arthur Morgan. Lilienthal emerged as the victor.

Reflecting his fondness for boxing, it is safe to say
that
he won by a knockout in the late rounds. The
president
removed Arthur Morgan from the board, Lilienthal helped
name Morgan's successor, and, ultimately, Lilienthal even

succeeded his ally

H.

A.

Morgan as chair of the TVA board.

This chapter examines the Lilienthal-Morgan conflict.
However, this will not be a descriptive study of the
struggle, and only a brief recapitulation of the events

will follow. On a personal level, both men certainly

disliked, and even despised, each other. In addition, their

policy differences were quite real, and triggered the

conflagration that engulfed the directorate. But the axis
around which the particulars of the conflict spun was an

unbridgeable ideological gulf between these two men. This
gulf shaped the contours of their specific policy disputes,
and to an extent was echoed in the personality traits that

created such

bitter and lasting enmity.^

a

Thomas McCraw s 1970 monograph, Morgan vs. Lilienthal: The
Feud within the TVA remains the definitive chronicle of the
bitter power struggle. Still, McCraw 's work, along with most
other analyses of the conflict, tend to emphasize the directors'
disputes regarding specific policy initiatives at the Authority
as well as the personal enmity between Lilienthal and A. E.
Morgan. McCraw 's title best illustrates this tendency,
^

'

.
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The intellectual divide between Morgan
and Lilienthal
is reflected in their economic philosophy
and the

understanding of the TVA as an experiment in
decentralization. In his promotional efforts, Lilienthal

quickly appropriated Harcourt Morgan's rhetoric describing
the TVA as an experiment in "grassroots democracy."
For

Lilienthal, however, grassroots democracy was purely an

administrative measure,

a

technigue designed to locate the

federal bureaucracy close to the place of its

implementation and not in Washington. "What

I

have been

describing," he wrote in TVA: Democracy on the March

,

"is

the way by which the people of one region have been working
out a decentralized administration of the functions of the

central government." Lilienthal never intended grassroots

democracy as

a

means for dispersing the country's economic

—

characterizing the struggle as a "feud"
with all its
implications of a blood-level vendetta.
Also, McCraw's account is somewhat sympathetic toward
Morgan. For an alternative perspective, see Richard Lowitt,
George W. Norris. The Triumph of a Progressive. 1933-1944
(Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1978), chapter 17:
"Trouble in Paradise." Another portrayal of the conflict can be
found in Roy Talbert, Jr., FDR's Utopian. Arthur Morgan of the
TVA (Jackson, University Press of Mississippi, 1987) Most
studies of the New Deal written since 1970 tend to rely very
heavily upon McCraw.
Morgan's own account of the story can be found in the memoir
he composed shortly before his death. The Making of the TVA
(Buffalo, NY, Prometheus Books, 1974); Lilienthal's published
journals offer his edited version. At over 6,000 pages, the
records of the 1938 congressional investigation of the TVA Joint
Investigation of the TVA are the voluminous, but indispensable,
primary guide to the conflict and, in fact, to the entire scope
of TVA operations during the 1930s.
.

(

)
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development, because he was never enamored
of the regional
approach. He advocated using the lure
of cheap and

plentiful power to attract energy-intensive,
large-scale
industries to the Valley. These national firms
would be
subject to federal industrial relations
regulation, and

would thus create the demand for

a

high-wage, unionized

labor force. In turn, these high-wage jobs would
spur

greater domestic consumption and generate enough demand
to
integrate the Tennessee Valley into a dynamic national
economy. Lilienthal wanted to knit the region into the

nation's modern industrial economy, not isolate it. He

wanted to revive and expand the nation's industrial base,
not turn away from it.
For his part, Arthur Morgan was deeply distressed by
the mass consumption policies pursued by Lilienthal, and
the two offered divergent routes for the TVA's role in

remapping the Valley's economic pathways. The ultimate
success of Lilienthal capped the triumph of one path toward

economic development with an impact far beyond the confines
of the Tennessee Valley. The triumph of Lilienthal

's

vision

at the TVA was accompanied at the national level by the

political ascendance of a keynesian strategy. By the late
1930s, the disparate forces supporting this agenda began to

coalesce, gaining increased influence among organized
labor, sectors of industrial capital, and within the state.

Lilienthal

's

was thus a shared vision, and as it emerged in

.
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Sharper relief, it cut an economic pattern
and a set of
policy initiatives that would dominate the
nation's
economic order through the midcentury.^
There were many reasons for the escalation of
the

Lilienthal-Morgan conflict, but it is clear that their

temperamnets exacerbated the ideological tension on the
board. Headstrong and very ambitious, often to the
point of

being brash, Lilienthal enjoyed maneuvering within the

political arena and cultivated attention from the media. As
was clear from the earliest days of his appointment,

associates and advisors of the youngest TVA director, from
George Norris to Morris

L.

Cooke and Felix Frankfurter, fed

this ambition and urged him forward at every point in his

struggles against Morgan as well as the private utilities.

Morgan was austere and judgmental

—

contemptuous of

politics and reluctant to compromise. An autocrat by nature
and an engineer by training, Arthur Morgan craved

regimentation; his version of

a

Utopian social order was

reflected in his life-long devotion to the writings of
^Lilienthal, TVA: Democracy on the March p. 138.
To further complicate matters, it is clear that H. A.
Morgan's call for "grassroots democracy" carried a distinctly
regionalist message, albeit of a different strain than that of
Arthur Morgan. As suggested by Philip Selznick, Harcourt Morgan's
vision entailed cooperating "at the grassroots" with the South 's
conservative (and quite powerful) agricultural oligarchy. This
implied acquiescence to the low-wage, segregated labor market of
the South that would have been undermined by the full
articulation of Lilienthal 's agenda. As will be noted below,
these contradictions between the philosophies of the two allies
on the TVA board crippled the full realization of the keynesian
agenda
,
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Utopian novelist Edward Bellamy, of whom
Morgan wrote

a

biography/
The lack of any definitive administrative
format

heightened the tensions, and the 1933 truce that
balkanized
the directorate and created, in essence, three
functionally
autonomous agencies within the TVA reflected and
reinforced
the ideological split. Lilienthal felt that each
member of
the board was coequal. Morgan believed that while
each

board member had one vote, his appointment as chair made
him primus inter pares. The tripartite division of power
forced on to A.

E.

Morgan had given each director certain

managerial prerogatives within their administrative sphere.
However, the demarcation between the divisions was
imprecise, and Lilienthal

's

power engineers were often

engaged in jurisdictional disputes with Morgan's dam
engineers. Even if the lines of responsibility had been

completely clear, these two divisions had to work together,
and the breach at the top of the agency ran as a fault

through the respective divisions.
For over two years, the factions circled one another,

then came to blows during the winter of 1935-1936. Arthur

Morgan intended to resolve the troubles that plagued the

^In his sympathetic (but not hagiographic) study, Roy
Talbert, Jr. describes Morgan as a puritan-utopian or as a
puritanical progressive. See, "The certainty with which he knew
what was best for people sprang from a streak in him that was
,

probably puritan and that at time seemed genuinely
authoritarian." FDR's Utopian p. 41.
,

^
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board. The TVA chair went to Roosevelt
and requested that
Lilienthal not be reappointed to the board.
The term of TVA
directors was to be nine years, but the
first set of

appointments were staggered at nine, six, and
three years;
Lilienthal came up for renewal in 1936. Roosevelt

characteristically did all he could to avoid any
resolution. He told Morgan that he sympathized
with his
position, but Lilienthal had backers, including
Robert

M.

La Follette Jr., that made it impossible to cut
the junior

director loose

—

especially in an election year. The

President left Morgan with the impression that he would
take some appropriate action after the campaign was over.

Shortly after the election, the rancorous Democratic
congressman, Maury Maverick, wrote, in his own inimitable
style, of the impending struggle.

"King Arthur Morgan of

the Round Table," Maverick noted

wants all the Utility Knights, good and bad, public
and private, to sit around and make goo-goo eyes at

each other. Little David Lilienthal wants to slay the

Power Goliath, and possibly to kick the whole table
over. In the following months, it became increasingly

difficult to get King Arthur and Little David to even
come together at the same table.

^Maury Maverick,

Republic

.

"T.V.A. Faces the Future," The New
18 November 1936, p. 64.

21

The election passed and Roosevelt took
no action.
Morgan's brittle commitment to quiet diplomacy
shattered.
In 1937, the chair issued a series of
public statements

criticizing his fellow board members. Morgan's
tone
gradually became bitter and the critiques became
ever more
personal. Morgan described Lilienthal as implacably
hostil

to the even the conciliatory elements of the
private power
sector, and intimated in an Atlantic Monthly article
that

he was either blinded by fanaticism or hiding his true

ambitions. "The abuses of the private power industry,"

Morgan claimed,
have bred in some men an attitude of bitter hatred...
This attitude may be exploited by other men who have
no such convictions, but who will endeavor to ride to

political power on the issue.

Morgan went on to accuse Lilienthal of buying off

politically influential landowners through the land
condemnation process for the agency's dams. By the end of
1937, Arthur Morgan's charges had cast a long shadow over

Lilienthal, and over the TVA as well.*^

Answering Morgan's charges that he was

a

public power

zealot bent on destroying the private sector, Lilienthal

countered with his own innuendo. The more skillful
tactician, however, Lilienthal covered his trail as he

"Arthur E. Morgan, "Public Ownership of Power," Atlantic
Monthly 160 (September 1937) p. 340.
,
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moved against Morgan. Rarely did Lilienthal
attack his
senior colleague in public. Instead, he
relied on the press
contacts he had cultivated to air his views.
George Fort
Milton, editor of the Chattanooga Npw^ and a
strong backer
of Lilienthal, wrote caustic editorials against
Arthur

Morgan's policies. National correspondents and columnists
sympathetic to the Lilienthal faction frequently reported
information available only from internal and confidential

agency memoranda. Morgan, the press claimed, was hopelessly
naive concerning the private power interests and their

supposedly conciliatory policies which actually endangered
the TVA and the administration's entire power program.

Morgan claimed that, in particular,
"Washington Merry-Go-Round,

"

Drew Pearson's column,

seemed to have specific access

to material distributed only at the highest levels within

the Authority

—

in effect charging Lilienthal at least

indirectly with the leaks. The allegations lack definitive
proof, but were probably justified.

Excerpts from Morgan

memoranda on the subject published by various reporters
seem to justify this characterization; but their

publication also implicates Lilienthal or one of his aides
in some shrewd media practices.^

Tor Lilienthal

relations with Milton, see their indexed
correspondence in the Lilienthal Papers. On the specific claim
regarding Pearson, see testimony of A. E. Morgan, 20 July 1938,
Joint Investigation of the TVA pp. 460-461.
's

.
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In early 1938 the situation became
increasingly

untenable, and a serious liability for
the Roosevelt

administration. Already weakened by the battles
surrounding
his court reform and executive reorganization
plans, the

president had little choice but to finally pick
sides and
stop offering equivocal support to both factions.
Bothered
by Arthur Morgan's public airing of the dispute,
Roosevelt
convened

a

meeting with Lilienthal and his TVA chair. Never

the diplomat, Morgan refused to substantiate his charges,
or even discuss them with the president. After meetings at

the White House on the llth, 18th, and

s of

March,

Roosevelt fired Morgan for his "contumacious" conduct, but
the struggle dragged on for another year. Morgan refused to

acknowledge Roosevelt' dismissal, then requested and
received a full Congressional hearing in which he could
defend himself. For six months, the joint committee heard

testimony in both Washington and in the Valley. For all the
thousands of pages of testimony, the committee's findings

profited little from the experience. The Democratic

majority used the hearings to support the Administration's
sacking of Morgan, and more broadly of the TVA's power

program

—

easily the most visible and popular aspect of the

agency. The Republicans used the investigation as a

platform for tirades against the TVA.

In the end,

although

questions were raised regarding certain practices of
Lilienthal

's

legal and power divisions, the committee found
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little evidence to support Morgan's most
grievous charges
of malfeasance. Media attention had
already waned, and
Morgan moved quietly back into private life.
More than
ever, the TVA was Lilienthal s.
•

In his memoirs, Arthur Morgan outlined the

philosophical chasm that would always separate the two men.
"There is one issue on which we were most centrally
in

disagreement," he wrote.
David Lilienthal assumed that the motives of people in

general tended to be sound and that their primary need
was for information and the opportunity, through the

resources of communication, technology, and science,
to give expression to their motives. In contrast,

I

believed that information and resources were not
sufficient for human well-being because the mass of
people, with selfish motives and purposes, are likely

to put information and power to poor use.

Lilienthal

's

development strategy, based on materialist

assumptions and geared toward unfettered mass consumption,
stood in sharp contrast to the human engineering that

Morgan believed would effectively redesign the moral and
economic landscapes of the Tennessee Valley.®
In all of his work, Lilienthal stressed that the

foundation of progress was material growth. He distanced

himself from the social planners, at one point stating that
8

Morgan, Making of the TVA

.

pp.

181-182.

.
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"I Wish to call this a discussion
of regional development.

prefer the word development to the word
planning because
the word planning has so often been misused
and
I

misinterpreted." In another coded attack on Morgan,
Lilienthal offered that "the Government's function is
not
to devise forms and molds in which to pour the
average man,

but rather to give the average man his chance to show
what
is in him." No elite, he charged,

"should prescribe for the

people a set of standards and institutions... and then
impose those, willy-nilly, upon the men and women of the

community." After

a

meeting at the White House where he

spent some time talking with Eleanor Roosevelt,

Lilienthal

's

notes in his journal laid out his deep

mistrust of social planning. "Mrs. Roosevelt said
things about the TVA story that pleased me

a

a few

lot," he

wrote
I

have long felt that she was a beautiful spirit, but

that she had the social worker angle on a world that
is tough and bitter and hardly amenable to such

tampering with symptoms. Her efforts at Arthurdale and
Crossville [two of the early resettlement programs]
always pained me.
The causes of social ills were economic, he believed.

Healing these ills was the government's responsibility.'
^Lilienthal, Address to Seminar on Planning, Harvard
Graduate School of Public Administration, 22 November 1941;
Address to Knoxville Rotary Club, 1 August 1933, Lilienthal

s
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By contrast, Arthur Morgan hoped to
make the Tennessee

Valley the site of a bold and massive
experiment in social
planning and regional development. His ideas
were part of a
strong current in American social thought among
critics of
large-scale industrialization. This critique, voiced
most

prominently by Lewis Mumford and sociologist Howard Odum
southern regionalists decried the unchecked growth of

•

,

industrialism that choked the life out of the cities and

overwhelmed the rural periphery. The Depression confirmed
their worst fears. The lines of unemployed factory workers
and the drawn faces of the rural poor served as graphic

evidence of the failures of unplanned development. The

regionalists envisioned diversified and decentralized
industry in the countryside. Electricity was an integral

component of most decentralist programs; electric power was
clean power. The scattered towns in which homes were heated
and factories powered by the silent servant were not

poisoned by the coal-burning furnaces that cast

a pall

over

so much of the modern industrial landscape. Because the

power could be strung out to villages blessed with neither
coal nor waterpower sites, the dispersal of industry would
be both technologically and economically viable. In their

landmark work, American Regionalism

,

Odum and co-author

Papers, Boxes 60 and 18, respectively; Lilienthal, Journals
p.

236.

,

I,

.
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Harry Moore claim that regionalism "offers
a medium and
technique of decentralization and redistribution.
To Morgan, the TVA seemed to be the perfect
vehicle
for effecting this transformation. Not only
would the

agency's commitment to hydropower fuel regionalism,
but its
legislative charter afforded the type of discretionary
powers that Morgan's planners would need. In charge of

a

federal agency with a mandate to coordinate previously

disparate activities within the Tennessee River's basin,

Morgan implicitly understood that the agency's
administrative autonomy gave planners more actual power
than they enjoyed in any other government niche. As board
chair, he devoted the first meetings of the three directors
in 1933 to lengthy monologues on policies that ranged from

plans for confiscation and reforestation of exhausted
farmland to studies of "the proper functions of the real
estate man in an organized society." It was precisely this

commitment to "human engineering" that precipitated the

administrative coup of that first August. Lilienthal and
Harccurt Morgan had no desire to see the Tennessee Valley
turned into a laboratory for the social planners from what
^°Howard W. Odum and Harry E. Moore, Southern Regionalism
(New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1938), p. 9.

Thomas Hughes's recent synthesis, American Genesis explores
Morgan's intellectual ties to Mumford and the other regional ists
As I will argue below, however, Hughes perpetuates the notion
that regionalism was the philosophy underlying development
strategies at the TVA. See Hughes, chapter 8, "Tennessee Valley
and Manhattan Engineer District."
,
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Lilienthal once derisively labeled "the Survey
Grap h in
group," for the journal through which many of
the planners
circulated their ideas."

Through the early years at the agency, it became
increasingly clear that Lilienthal and Arthur Morgan

differed over economic as well as social philosophy. The
chair's uneasiness with Lilienthal

's

credit expansion

policies at the EHFA reflected Morgan's fundamental

opposition to the entire consumptionist program. Morgan's

hostility was probably deepened and made much more rigid by
his personal affinity for austere and simple living

—

a

remnant, his biographer suggests, of the puritanical

influences of his youth. As he had stated in discussions of
the EHFA, Morgan opposed drawing people into debt for goods

that in his considered opinion they did not really need.
His regionalist sensibilities also led him to oppose

attracting large-scale industry to the Valley. He did not
want his agency to turn the region into another stark
industrial landscape, similar to so much of the Northeast
and Midwest; he did not want the Tennessee Valley to
become, as one writer had proposed, "the American Ruhr."

What Morgan did want was the TVA to foster the

development of mixed industrial-agricultural communities,

^Arthur Morgan memorandum to H. A. Morgan and Lilienthal,
30 July 1933, reprinted in Joint Investigation testimony of
Harcourt A. Morgan, 2 6 May 1938, Joint Investigation of the TVA
I, p.
pp. 100-102 and 98-99, respectively; Lilienthal, Journals
;

,

.
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Similar to those in the Interior Department's
Subsistence
Homesteads program and Agriculture's Resettlement

Administration (later the Farm Security Administration),
in
a memo prepared for the introductory
meetings of the TVA
board, Morgan suggested studying the possibilities
of

developing small industries in "industrial and agricultural
communities." The economic assumptions underlying these
ideas were linked to the overproductionist theories

associated with the first Agricultural Adjustment Act and
the National Recovery Administration. Designed to stem the

tide of urbanization, advocates of such projects maintained
that the small plots of land worked by the community

residents would provide food crops for home use, taking

pressure off the glutted markets for staple crops. The
light industries in the towns, producing smaller domestic
and farm items such as shoes, clothes, simple furniture,

and hand tools for local consumption, would offer

employment that was insulated somewhat from the cyclical

vagaries of market forces. During the occasional slack
periods in these factories, families could turn to more
intensive cultivation of their small plots for subsistence
and perhaps even some truck produce if wages fell short.
^^Morgan memo to Lilienthal and H. A. Morgan, 30 July 1933.
For more on the various resettlement programs, see Conkin
Tomorrow a New World for studies of the overproductionist theme
in the AAA and NRA, see Gilbert C. Fite, George N. Peek and the
Fight for Farm Parity (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press,
Joseph Dorfman, The Economic Mind In American
1954)
Civilization. Volume 5. 1918-1933 (New York, Augustus M. Kelly,
;

;

•

.

,

In a speech at the University of
Tennessee, Morgan

elaborated on his regionalist vision. What if,
he
suggested, one town set up a small shoe factory,
and

another town set up

a

furniture plant. Morgan admitted that

these firms "may be relatively inefficient," lacking
the

supposed benefits of economies of scale, "but those people
[Valley inhabitants] are sitting there doing nothing."
with

complementary light industries scattered through the
Valley, the TVA could assist in the formation of

distribution cooperatives that would allow people to help
themselves instead of "doing nothing." Morgan maintained
that this came at no cost to the national economy. "This is
not taking away business from the rest of the country," he
claimed,

"because they don't have any money to spend."

From Morgan's perspective, the greatest obstacle to

this program's success was the dominant sway of mass

production industries. "In the furniture town," he noted in
his University speech
the people buy their shoes not from this little shoe
factory, but from St. Louis; they have got their

credit and advertising lines, they have got their

and, Ellis W. Hawley, New Deal and the Problem of
Monopoly. A Study in Economic Ambivalence Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1966)
Regionalists never made clear why these small-scale shoe and
garment shops would not be subj ect to the grave cycl ical swings
that had traditionally hit that sector as hard as producer goods
1969)

;

(

firms
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traveling men out, the channels of trade
all run to
those big mass production centers.
It would take new institutions and some
modest economic

compulsion to break away from the region's unhealthy

dependence on the industrial core. The cooperatives
would
be the institutional innovation; the compulsion
would

come

in the form of regional scrip. The TVA chair
suggested that

the cooperatives would buy the local products using a
local

currency, good only within the Valley. The small factories

would pay wages in the scrip and, "in that way, home shoes
would, in some degree, outlaw St. Louis shoes." Compelling

the Valley's workers to buy from each other in this manner

was necessary, Morgan argued, "to break across the deep-

worn channels of trade which all lead into and out of the
great commercial centers." His speeches were often laced

with an air of millenarianism. Led to the new world by the
TVA's social planners, Morgan envisioned that the Valley's

inhabitants "can be the individualist [s] of American
industrial life. With artistic and scientific guidance, he
can make the goods which America needs to take the curse
off its mass-production civilization." Morgan insisted that
a regionalist solution was the only cure for the ills that

plagued the Valley.
^^Material from the speech can be found in Morgan's
testimony, 19 July 1938, Joint Investigation of the TVA pp. 331333, and in Talbert, FDR's Utopian pp. 124-125; individualist of
American industrial life quote as cited in Jonathan Mitchell,
.

,

"Utopia

—

Tennessee Valley Style," The New Republic

.

18 October
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The core of Morgan's message was lost
as critics
focused their scorn on what they considered
the more naive
aspects of his remarks. Morgan's nemeses in
the press
jumped on the call for a local currency; in a
biting
parody, George Fort Milton made Morgan the target
for some

editorial barbs, portraying the scrip issue and Morgan's
support for reviving regional crafts and culture as

a

silly

proposal for folk dancing and a currency based on
coonskins. After a visit to the Valley, Maury Maverick

explained to readers of The New Republic
the atmosphere is
since

—

I

^

cannot express myself exactly,

am only a congressman, and therefore lack the

I

cultural and scientific knowledge possessed by some of
the TVAers. But the air somewhat rarified, and
sure

I

I

am

heard the swishing of long wings and saw Green

Pastures and De Lawd (Morgan)."

Other critics were equally harsh, if less sarcastic. In The
New Republic

.

Jonathan Mitchell advised that "Dr. Morgan

1933, p. 272.
In a 1984 article, social critic Jane Jacobs claimed that
the TVA "failed" to develop a prosperous and balanced regional
economy because it never implemented this agenda. Using the work
of theorists such as Charles Sabel, she pointed to the emergence
of localized industrial sectors that have embraced "flexible
specialization" as a contemporary example of the economic mode
promoted by Morgan. Laying aside the issue of flexible
specialization's relative merit as a system and as a tool of
analysis, Jacobs seems to have overdrawn the comparison.
Advocates of flexible specialization see it as an alternative or
a complement to mass production, but they situate their model
within a global economy. Morgan's regionalism was autarchic and
anti-modern
with little resemblance to either the theory or
practice of flexible specialization.

—
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and his associates ought to drop, at
once, their fantasy of
an independent, sovereign Tennessee Valley."
Mitchell

declared the idea that the Valley could turn inward
for its
economic and moral sustenance to be "so much romantic
mush." Throughout his years at the TVA, and indeed
well
beyond, Morgan found himself constantly explaining his

comments regarding real estate brokers and

a

coonskin

currency. The more germane points of his developmental

agenda were lost.^^

Morgan certainly had

a

Utopian vision that featured

some of the more ambitious elements of social planners.
However, Arthur Morgan was no lone eccentric. For many
years, the back-to-the-land ideas underlying the drive for

decentralized agricultural-industrial villages had been

percolating through various networks of intellectuals and
policy-makers. The massive unemployment that hit especially

hard in the industrial core lent credence to these
analysts, and the New Deal created the institutional

possibilities for such experimentation. If Morgan's critics
in the press found much to ridicule in his proposals, the

TVA chair did find supporters as well. Chester Crowell

portrayed the dream of regional Utopias in much more
sympathetic terms. Echoing Morgan, Crowell noted that mass

production industry was not suited to the Tennessee Valley,

^^Milton editorial, Chattanooga News
TVA style," p. 272.
Mitchell, "Utopia

—

.

November 1933;
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but the rich resources of the region are
"usable in

a

self-

contained community of small industries living
to serve the
surrounding agriculturalists." Crowell also defended
the

"native handicrafts and arts" that George Milton
skewered.
For some, the decentralist path to Utopia was considerably

more than "romantic mush."^^

Support was not limited to ivory tower thinkers who
invaded the federal bureaucracy during the 1930s. As

Governor of New York, Franklin Roosevelt had supported
small-scale resettlement ventures; as president, Roosevelt
continued to encourage these programs, appointing

decentralists such as

M.

L.

Wilson and Morgan to

administrative posts in several agencies. As late as 1939,
by which time Morgan was gone and the New Deal's community

programs marginalized, Roosevelt was still making speeches
that resonated with the timber of his original TVA
chairman. On a trip to his Warm Springs home, the President
stated,
I

"I went to buy a pair of shoes,

and the only shoes

could buy had been made in Boston, or Binghamton, New

York, or St. Louis." To be sure,

little more than

a

by 1939 decentralism was

vestigial remnant within the Roosevelt

administration. The President's sentiment nonetheless

illustrates his lingering affinity for

a

philosophy that

figured prominently in the early New Deal's commitment to

"Tennessee Valley, A Prevision of
Utopia," The Literary Digest 17 March 1934, p. 6.
^^Chester T. Crowell,

,
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"bold, persistent experimentation." Rather
than the

ramblings of an eccentric Utopian, Arthur Morgan's
policies
were squarely situated within one of the currents
in the

New Deal mainstream J*^
Yet Arthur Morgan was less concerned with being in any

mainstream than he was with being on what he saw as the
"right" side of any issue. This became clear as he turned
his critique of the mass production system against the

TVA's own cheap power policy

—

easily the most visible and

popular of the agency's programs. Morgan was more than
hostile to the philosophy driving the program; he disputed
Lilienthal's claim that the low rates had spurred the great
increases in domestic consumption. The massive promotional

efforts of the TVA and the agricultural extension service,
speeches by the President in Corinth and Tupelo, and

canvassers for the EHFA had made the Valley "intensely

power conscious," Morgan claimed. In essence, he believed

Wilson and the Subsistence Homesteads program,
see Conkin, Tomorrow A New World on the Resettlement
Administration, see Sidney Baldwin, Poverty and Politics; The
Rise and Decline of the Farm Security Administration (Chapel
Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1968); Roosevelt
speech, 30 March 1939, as cited in Schulman, Cotton Belt to
Sunbelt p. 7. Reflecting the influence of Conkin and a personal
affinity for the Morgan faction at the Authority, Thomas McCraw
described Morgan's ideas as "sound and desirable" if "frankly
experimental and tentative." McCraw, The Feud p. 35.
The notion that Morgan's ideas were eccentric persists in
the contemporary historiography. Even in his sympathetic
biography, Roy Talbert Jr. describes Morgan's plans as
"fascinating simply because of the unconventional activities that
he considered proper in the social and economic development of a
region." Talbert, FDR's Utopian esp. chapter 6, "TVA Utopia."
^"^On

M.

L.

;

.

,

,
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that the promotional efforts were appealing to the most
base material desires. These practices ran across the

entire grain of Morgan's personality. Not only did they

encourage what to his mind was excessive consumption, but
they also hid the true cost of TVA power, thereby

undermining the validity of the yardstick. For Morgan this
was sheer pretense; Lilienthal was disingenuously hiding

subsidies that never made it into the account books of the

power division. He also charged that the TVA coerced
farmers seeking the extension of power lines into buying

appliances that would guarantee a set load before the
agency agreed to string a line into the potential
customers' area. At the congressional hearings, Morgan

explained that in these cases "it was not so much

a case of

having the establishment of low rates followed by

a

spectacular and immediate increase in use as it was a

matter of compelling prospective customers to commit
themselves in advance to use amounts far in excess of the
national or local average." Morgan balked at the use of

compulsion to spur the takeoff of a Fordist economy,
willing, as he was, to use compulsion to nurture small-

scale industry, or to confiscate lands exhausted by the

region's hardscrabble farmers. "For some of these
consumers," Morgan concluded, "smaller use [of electricity]
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at higher rates, with less money invested in appliances,

would have been better personal economy.

"^^

By the time he testified before Congress in 1938,

Morgan had little political influence. He and his core
supporters remained convinced that he was morally right,
but an ethical vocabulary did not translate well in

Washington, nor did it in the households of Americans (in
and outside of the Tennessee Valley) who were receiving

lower utility bills in their mail. The mass consumptionist

solution that Lilienthal had pressed since his years at the

Wisconsin PSC was clearly ascendant.''^
Lilienthal

's

ideas stood as the antithesis to

virtually every component of Morgan's regionalism. The

younger director favored large-scale industry, mass
production, and unabashed materialism. In a 1934 speech to
the region's policy-makers at the University of

testimony, 25 May 1938, Joint Committee
Investigation pp. 44-48. Requiring rural districts to contract
for a predetermined floor on kwh consumption was common practice.
Ontario Hydro, the model for so much of the TVA's power program,
had set this precedent in order to justify the cost of rural line
extensions. See Fleming, Power At Cost pp. 136-143.
^'^Morgan

,

,

August 1939, Morgan sent a letter to the approximately
350 people that contributed over $28,000 to a "defense fund" for
him. Not deterred by the committee's findings, Morgan charged
that the investigation was "inadequate as to the manner of its
conduct, as well as to the report." Morgan circular, 7 August
1939, copy in William Leiserson Papers, Box 27, State Historical
Society of Wisconsin.
As will be noted below, the labor economist Leiserson had a
strong personal loyalty to Morgan dating to their years together
at Antioch College, although Leiserson also had strong
reservations regarding Morgan's position on organized labor.
^^In
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Chattanooga, Lilienthal delivered an obvious rejoinder to
Morgan. Adherents of regionalism, he stated,

suggest that it might be better to go back to an ideal
of a self-contained economy-- an economy in which

handicraft and small industry takes the place of
large-scale manufacturing....
foreboding, nor do

I

I

do not share this

see an avenue of escape from our

problems in the economic order they propose. It seems
to me plain that our first duty must be in some way to

increase the flow of goods, for it is only in terms of

goods that we are hungry or well fed, are able to
enjoy life's riches or have them denied.... It is not
the abundance of goods that makes men starve in the

presence of plenty. A return to scarcity would better
the lot of all.

Lilienthal continued, "the income of our people in terms of

goods must be increased, or all our hopes must die. And

large-scale industry, controlled in the interest of the
community, can provide us that increased flow of goods."

The Fordist solution was the only alternative, he

insisted

^'
.

While Lilienthal hoped to attract

a

variety of

the energymanufacturers to the Valley, he concentrated on

around sources of
intensive sector commonly found clustered

Institute,
Lilienthal, Address to the Tennessee Valley 18.
Box
nooga, 21 April 1934, Lilienthal Papers,
Chattanoog
19
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Cheap power, for which, he noted, "power is a
dominant cost
factor." Many could use the mineral resources of the
region. Electroprocessing industries, including aluminum

and chemical plants were a key. The aluminum giant Alcoa

already had a presence in the Valley, and Reynolds came as
well. Lilienthal enjoyed maneuvering on the national scene,

and the plants he helped draw to the region read like a
list of the country's mining and chemical giants. Electro-

Metallurgical, a division of Union Carbide and Carbon,

Wolverine Tube, a Calumet and Hecla subsidiary, and
Chemstrand, one of Monsanto 's artificial fiber groups, all

came to the Valley. The TVA's power section found the

larger firms particularly suited to the agency's load
forecasts. The big corporations had the capital sufficient
to build their own stand-by power plants, and could buy

large blocks of secondary power in addition to contracting
for primary, or uninterruptible, kilowatts. This provided a

stable market for all TVA power, enabling the Authority to
sell this secondary power when the dams had to release

water for flood control purposes. Lilienthal personally
oversaw much of the negotiations with the national firms.
The smaller plants, often textile and garment mills already

common to the South, did not become direct customers of the
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TVA, buying their power from the municipalities and
rural

cooperatives that purchased wholesale power.
It comes as no surprise that the missing piece in

Lilienthal's Fordist solution was high wages. Low labor
costs, after all, had been the traditional calling card

when southern boosters had gone knocking on industrialists'
doors. Geographically uneven development and the

distortions of the Jim Crow labor market had left factory
wages in the entire South far below the national average.
By any measure, the Tennessee Valley lagged behind the rest
of the country; it was a drag on national recovery. Looking

at the numbers, Lilienthal admitted to being daunted. "No

one need point out to you the tragedy behind those

figures," he told an audience at the University of Georgia.

Nonetheless, "our job was not to wring our hands but to
face these facts, and to set about to do something to

change them.

...

We cannot have a sound national prosperity

if any region of the country suffers under a low income."

^°Lilienthal Address of 21 April 1934; James Dahir, Region
Building. Communitv Development Lessons from the Tennessee Valley
(New York, Harper and Brothers, 1955), pp. 82-93; Testimony of
Julius Krug, 7-8 December 1938, Joint Investigation of the TVA
pp. 5228-5233, and 5293-5305.
On the development of industry in the Niagara region and
around the Bonneville Power Administration, see Robert Belfield,
"The Niagara Frontier: The Evolution of Electric Power Systems in
New York and Ontario, 1880-1935 (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation,
University of Pennsylvania, 1981), and Paul J. Raver, "Government
Action and Private Enterprise in River Valley Development: A
Public Administrator's View," American Economic Review 41 (1951),
p. 292.
,

,

.
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Development in the Valley and recovery for the country

depended on the expansion of high-wage employment
For Lilienthal, part of the solution lay in his large-

scale industry strategy. The lumber and textile industries

already in place thrived in

a

low-wage environment, and

Morgan's regionalist approach would bring no capital for

development or for wages. The national firms, however,
would create the kind of jobs that Lilienthal sought. Their
wage scales were relatively high, and likely to go higher

because of unionization. Beginning with section 7A of the
National Industrial Recovery Act, and later with the

passage of the National Labor Relations Act, the federal

government had created

a

more favorable environment for

organized labor. This was particularly true among larger
firms engaged in interstate commerce. James Dahir, an

economist who studied the TVA's development program in the
1950s, explained the approach.

"Big companies not only

bring big payrolls, but often good labor-management
relations." The (need name), affiliated with the Congress
of Industrial Organizations, represented workers at

Electro-Metallurgical beginning in 1939, and the company
went through its first fifteen years without

a

strike. An

the debilitating effects of the segregated labor
market, see Gavin Wright, Old South. New South. Re volutions in
the Southern Economv since the Civil War (New York, Basic Books,
1986), esp. pp. 196-217; also see the introduction to Schulman,
From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt Lilienthal, Address to the Institute
of Public Affairs, University of Georgia, 29 October 1936, as
cited in Schulman, p. 37.
^^On

;
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American Federation of Labor union (again, need name) was
the collective bargaining agent for Reynolds Aluminum
workers, and the company's labor relations were

model of

a

job and wage security— the prerequisites for establishing
a

consumption-driven economy. By the 1950s, over two-thirds

of the workforce were long-term employees with benefits

that included paid vacations and health insurance. In the

event that management proved uncooperative, coercion was an
option. The regulatory force of an activist state could

compel recalcitrant firms to deal with organized labor, as

Lilienthal had implied when he stated in Chattanooga that

"large-scale industry" could be "controlled in the interest
of the community

"^^
.

^^For an overview of the New Deal's labor legislation,

see

Christopher L. Tomlins, The State and the Unions. Labor
Relations^ Law, and the Organized Labor Movement in America,
1880-1960 (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1985)
Dahir,
Region Building p. 105.
Lilienthal delivered the Chattanooga speech in 1934, well
before the passage of the NLRA. However, many pro-labor elements
inside and outside the administration were using the NRA's
section 7A as a wedge for organizing, and were pressing for
further legislation. See J. Joseph Huthmacher, Senator Robert F.
Wagner and the Rise of Urban Liberalism (New York, Atheneum,
;

,

1968)

.

French political theorist Michel Aglietta explained the
importance of factors such as job security and insurance in
maintaining a consumptionist economy. Purchases of houses, cars,
and various consumer durables, the so-called big-ticket items,
"presupposed a vast socialization of finance.... It still
remained essential to limit the consequences of capitalist
insecurity on employment and on the formation of individual
wages, so as not to break the continuity of the consumpticpn
process, and in order to enable the workers to meet the financial
commitments contracted with the acquisition of their consumer
goods." Aglietta, trans, by David Fernbach, A Theory of
Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience (London, Verso, 1979) p.
159.
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The Authority itself was one of the largest employers
in the Valley. One of Arthur Morgan's first decisions at

the TVA was to break with the standard government practice
of contracting out construction projects. Morgan had

considerable experience in flood control, and he was

dissatisfied with the inefficiencies and delays he believed
were inherent to the public contracting procedures.

Alienated as well by the harsh labor practices of the
private contractors that he had seen building various dams,

Morgan got the board's approval to build TVA dams by "force
account." The TVA hired its own people and supervised its
own construction. At its height in the late 1930s, the

agency employed over 13,000 people, most of them in work
crews at the dam sites.

Morgan and Lilienthal became involved in shaping
labor relations policy for the agency. Both shared

a

a

commitment to creating a positive environment for labor-

management relations, and shared the progressive faith in
using administrative machinery to avoid such supposedly
irrational practices as strikes and work slowdowns. They
had more pragmatic reasons for this commitment as well.

Morgan's reputation as an expert hydraulic engineer would
be severely tested by the massive building program and the

intricacies of water control on such a grand scale.

"owen. The TVA pp. 21-23; Testimony of Gordon Clapp,
August 1938, Joint Investigation of t he TVA. pp. 1550-1551.
.

5
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Lilienthal understood that building the dams quickly
and

efficiently would put more power on line faster,
facilitating lower electric rates. Even with their

different visions for the agency, both poured their hearts
into the Authority, fully aware

that efficient execution

of their program would provide political security against

critics in the private sector and in Congress.
In formulating an employee policy for the Authority,

Arthur Morgan called upon William Leiserson, an old friend
from his years at Antioch College. A student of the

patriarch of labor economics, John

R.

Commons, Leiserson

had taught at the Yellow Springs school during Morgan's
presidency. Described by one historian as "one of the most

important figures in the development of labor relations

policy during the New Deal," Leiserson relished the chance
to draw up from scratch an employee policy for the new

agency. He brought with him another significant figure in

the field

—

Otto Beyer, the architect of a well-known

cooperative plan on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. They

designed

a

program that closely resembled the

B & O Plan,

setting up joint cooperative committees to discuss work
practices, safety, and morale.
^^Tomlins, The State and the Unions p. 79; on Leiserson's
involvement with the TVA, see the Leiserson Papers, Boxes 5, 27,
and 40, "Beyer," "Arthur Morgan," and "TVA" folders, SHSW; two
surveys of the TVA's Employee Relations Policy are Robert S.
Avery, Experiment in Management. Personnel Decentralization in
the Tennessee Valley Authority (Knoxville, University of
Tennessee Press, 1954), and Avery, "The TVA and Labor Relations:
,
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But despite Morgan and Lilienthal's shared
commitment

to labor-management cooperation, the two directors once

again split. In this instance, the conflict centered upon
the proper role of organized labor in the cooperative

program and more generally in the collective bargaining
process. Morgan was deeply ambivalent about the labor

movement. Although he was highly critical of company unions
such as that on the Pennsylvania Railroad, serving only as
a tool of management,

Morgan believed that a truly

cooperative environment would eliminate the need for
independent unions. National unions, industrial or tradebased, were the institutional response to hostile

management and perpetuated the outmoded system of class
conflict, which Morgan maintained would wither away upon
the birth of a new cooperative era. These ideas troubled

even Leiserson, who remained loyal to Morgan throughout the

conflict with Lilienthal, but who privately described some
of the chairman's writings on the subject as "Morgan's

effusion on Company Unions.

"^^

The early drafts of the Employee Relations Policy
(ERP)

reflected Morgan's ambivalence. Initially, the ERP

skirted the issue of labor's right to choose its own
representatives, and would have established the TVA as an
A Review," Journal of Politics 16 (1954): 413-440.
^^Morgan testimony, 29 August 1938, Joint In vestigation of
the TVA pp. 3126-3127; Leiserson to Beyer, 23 July 1935,
Leiserson Papers, Box 5.
.
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open shop employer. By the time the ERP became
policy in

August 1935, there was, according to the agency's
personnel
chief, Gordon Clapp,

"considerable change in fundamental

principles from the policy which was tentatively
suggested

The essential change," Clapp explained,

was to remove any equivocation with respect to whether
or not the rights of labor to organize would be

recognized without qualification, and whether their
rights to designate representatives of their own

choosing would be recognized without qualification.
With these amendments, the ERP guaranteed TVA employees the
right to bargain collectively. It did equivocate slightly
in regard to the closed shop, which the TVA was politically

unable to authorize; with some bureaucratic sleight of
hand, however, the ERP effectively granted the closed shop

by making union membership a "positive factor" in the

annual merit evaluations for employees. As Gordon Clapp

explained this circuitous route toward the closed shop to

a

Civil Service assembly in 1937,
in general employee organizations include those

employees who are most concerned about the problems of
the service and consequently should be the ones with

whom management should deal.... Individual employees
and non-union employees if they become sufficiently
concerned, will then seek an opportunity to align

themselves with those organizations that are

283

recognized and attempting to assure some
responsibility.
Even the president, who on several occasions had dismissed
the notion of collective bargaining for government workers,

supported the TVA program, hailing it as "the most
significant, if not the only, instance of genuine

collective bargaining in the public service anywhere in the
United States." The final draft of the ERP also highlighted
the Authority's "prevailing rates" payscale which mandated
the TVA to "show due regard for those rates in private

industry that are arrived at through collective

bargaining." Pegging the prevailing wage to union rates
skewed upward the wage cohort against which the TVA's rates

would be set. Reviewing labor policies with the agency's
salaried supervisors, often the least cooperative

participants in the efficiency committee meetings,
Lilienthal cajoled his audience, telling them, "we are not
simply not anti-labor, we are
organization.

a

pro-labor policy

"^^

"The TVA and Labor," pp. 413-419 (Clapp 1937 and
Lilienthal speeches as cited on p. 413, and Roosevelt speech as
Gordon Clapp testimony, 29 August 1938, Joint
cited on p. 419)
Investigation of the TVA pp. 3139-3145.
Avery noted that the cooperative program had been moderately
successful, "but they have fallen short of their goal of
caused
developing a fully effective spirit of teamwork.
primarily by the fact that there are still segments of management
who have never been completely sold on the value of the program."
"TVA and Labor," p. 423.
^^Avery,

;

.

.

.

.
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Clapp noted that these changes in the ERP
emerged as
the direct result of "negotiations with organized
labor."
M. H.

Hedges of the International Brotherhood of Electrical

Workers testified at the Congressional hearings that it was
David Lilienthal who brought the unions into the process.
As early as September 1933, Lilienthal was holding

conferences up and down the Valley with union
representatives. He brought together thirteen building
trade unions affiliated with the AFofL and sought their
counsel. These unions comprised the crafts that were needed

to construct the TVA's dams and install its massive

hydroelectric generators. With Lilienthal

's

support, the

local officers of the thirteen building trades formed the

Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council, which oversaw
the cooperative committees at all dam sites and coordinated
the bargaining activities of its constituent

organizations
Unlike Morgan, Lilienthal believed that unions were
integral to his development program. Collective bargaining

would maintain a high-wage economy, but it would also
ensure industrial peace and elevate the productivity of

a

disciplined workforce. He spoke about the ERP to labor
audiences across the country promoting the program, and not
incidentally, promoting as well his own role in its
Hedges, Joint
p. 3145 and pp. 3361-3364,

^''Testimony of Gordon Clapp and M.

Investigation of the TVA
respectively.

,

H.
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formation. In fact, after the board members endorsed
the

policy in August 1935, they postponed announcing its
implementation until Labor Day, at Lilienthal's suggestion,
as "a sort of Labor Day gift." He went to Detroit to

present the "gift" and in his speech made only passing
references to Arthur Morgan's pivotal role as the architect
of the Authority's force account construction program and

the initiator of the ERP process. This bothered Morgan, who

quite correctly saw it as brazen self-aggrandizement on the

part of the agency's most junior director. Irrespective of
this self-promotion, it is clear that without Lilienthal,
the ERP would not have provided any protection for

organized labor; he factored unions into the TVA equation.
By 1938, over 90 percent of the Authority's wage-scale

employees were members of the thirteen craft unions

comprising the Trades and Labor Council.
Lilienthal went to Detroit not simply as

a

ploy for

greater self -exposure, but because he understood the
national implications of his plans for regional
development. He spoke outside the Valley because he

believed that the Authority's programs must economically
integrate the region into the nation. The Fordism embraced
by Lilienthal had no use for isolated pockets of economic
growth. In this scheme, the Tennessee Valley could be

Leiserson Papers, Box
40; Clapp testimony, Joint Investigation of the TVA p. 3147.
^^Morgan to Leiserson,

23 April

1938,

,
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neither an economy unto itself, regenerated but
unable to
mesh within a broader economic tapestry, nor could it
remain a backwater of unproductive agriculture and

sweatshop industries. Spurred by his high-wage, cheap power
policies, Lilienthal envisioned the Valley as
the scene of an expansion of industry which in the

course of the coming decade will change the economic
life of the South.... Fitted into a national program,
it will stimulate and regenerate the industrial life

of all America. We in the Tennessee Valley area,

very real sense, face a new frontier

—

in a

an industrial

frontier.

Lilienthal did not limit his vision to increased power
consumption, or to a more prominent role for himself.
Rather, he linked the Authority's success to national

recovery and economic growth.^'
It was fairly common for advocates of a growth-

oriented economy to frame their positions in terms of the
frontier. The notion that the closing of the western

frontier foreclosed certain avenues of economic opportunity

persisted into the 1930s, reinforced by the deep
retrenchment of the Depression. Growth proponents

maintained that the mass consumption program opened

a new

frontier. Gardiner C. Means thus stated that "the closing
of the geographical frontier and the declining rate of
29

Lilienthal, Chattanooga Speech, 21 April 1934.

.
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population growth" did not have to lead inevitably
to "a
decline in markets and a contracting economy. If
increased
buying power were to become available to the mass of
consumers, some of the increase would be saved but the bulk

would be spent on consumption." Underdeveloped and its
potential for mass consumption untapped, the Tennessee

Valley was part of this new industrial frontier. ^°
If the Valley's prosperity depended upon national

recovery, then the region's growth could not come at the

expense of the ailing industrial core. Lilienthal was not
interested in attracting old firms in flight from the

industrially mature Northeast and Midwest. No revival could
be sustained in the South if it was built upon the

misfortune of workers and communities in other parts of the
country. "It will be a sad day for Southern industry,"

lectured Lilienthal,
if the presence of a new factory here means merely the

creation of an industrial graveyard in New England, or
some other section. What

I

see for this area is an

economically sound growth of commerce and
manufacturing, which will fit itself into

a

national

economy

^°Gardiner C. Means, "Basic Structural Characteristics and
the Problem of Full Employment," in, National Resource Planning
Board, The Structure of the American Economy. II. To ward Full Use
of Resources (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1940), p. 7.

—
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Lilienthal understood that the various regions were

mutually dependent. Regional growth derived from an
economic equation that needed to be balanced on both sides.
Lilienthal had asserted that subsidized appliance purchases
in the South meant manufacturing jobs in the Northeast and

Midwest. Similarly, a vibrant industrial core would create

demand for the Valley's products. Mutually balanced growth

would move the country beyond
shrinking or stagnant economic

zero-sum scramble over a

a

pie.''^

To a degree, Lilienthal succeeded. From 1940-1948, the

Tennessee Valley region added over 1,400 new manufacturing
and processing plants to its industrial base; only nine of

these were "transplants" drawn away from another region. In
1929, the size of the Valley's industrial workforce had

stood at only 49 industrial workers per 1,000 inhabitants
less than one-half the national average. Twenty years
later, the Valley had over 80 industrial workers per 1,000,

still less than the national figure of 107, but a

proportional improvement. Over the same period, the
region's wages and salaries had increased by 255 percent,

whereas the national increase had been 127 percent.
Undoubtedly, the Tennessee Valley was still poorer and less

developed than the country taken as a whole, but after two

Lilienthal, Chattanooga speech.
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decades of cheap power and TVA-induced growth,
the region's
second-class status was considerably less pronounced.
But despite advances, the region remained the
nation's

poor country cousin, and the limits to Lilienthal's

expansionary policies mimic the strategic flaws in the
later New Deal's entire economic program. During 1936-1938,

Roosevelt had attempted to break the power of the
conservative Congressional Democrats, and had tied these
efforts to

a

total reconstruction of the Southern economy

through legislation such as the Fair Labor Standards Act,
which, in its initial form, would have established

a

national minimum wage, broad in its reach, with no regional

differentiations. Despite briefly grasping victory in
Claude Pepper's successful 1938 senatorial campaign, this

strategy fell short. The southern Bourbon Democrats
retained considerable political power and were able to

prolong the death rattle of the region's dual labor market.
The administration curtailed the reformist implications of
the later New Deal, including any cautious steps toward

social democratic fiscal and labor policies that would have

initiated

a

modest redistribution in the national income.

"The Impact of the TVA upon the
Southeast," Social Forces 28 (1950), p. 438.
^^William E. Cole,

see James T.
Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal. The
Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933-1939
on the "Southern
(Lexington, University of Kentucky Press, 1967)
Strategy" and the implications its failure had upon national
policies, see, Fraser, "The Labor Question," and Brinkley, "The
^^For an overview of the southern Democrats,

;
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But the collapse of Lilienthal's vision for a
new

social order in the Tennessee Valley resulted as much
from

inherent flaws in its design as from external political
forces. In fact, choices made by Lilienthal in his

formulation of TVA policy that provided short-term benefits
to the agency ultimately undermined Lilienthal's

realization of the most radical implications of his

keynesian agenda. Three issues in particular highlight
this

—

his decision to join forces with H.A. Morgan, the

close ties forged between the agency and the AFofL building
trades, and the political alliance with the so-called

"power roughnecks" such as Lister Hill, John Sparkman, and

John Rankin. All of these steps worked at cross-purposes.
They strengthened Lilienthal's position and secured the

Authority's existence, but they also effectively narrowed
the range of political possibilities. In the late 1930s,

the language of redistributive keynesianism was an

insurgent ideological discourse, spoken in the North by
industrial unionists and their political allies. In the
South, there was no institutional counterpart to the

northern insurgency. Still, there were social forces,

however malnourished, that represented oppositional
politics in the South. Lilienthal would have had to forge
alliances with these groups, but they lacked the political

New Deal and the Idea of the State," both in Fraser and Gerstle,
eds.. The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order
.

.
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capital that he sought in the short-terra. As a
result of
the ties he made with conservative political forces,

Lilienthal ensured the ultimate collapse of his own
agenda
To create a democracy of mass consumption in the
valley, Lilienthal would have had to challenge the

segregated labor market that debased the wage structure for
blacks and whites in the South. Not only did the low wage
levels limit in

a

very practical way people's ability to

consume, but the rhetoric of the Jim Crow system undermined
any challenges to the political and economic status quo.

Lilienthal

's

carefully measured tactical steps made such a

strategic leap impossible. Whenever the Authority was under
fire,

Lilienthal turned to the "power roughnecks" in

Congress. Working closely

with Rankin and Lister Hill, one

of the original co-sponsors of TVA's enabling legislation,

Lilienthal found allies who fought hard for cheap power and
for bringing modern conveniences such as electric irons

into their region's homes. However, when the logic of

Lilienthal

's

agenda led to reforms that might disrupt the

segregated labor market, these men balked. They resisted
efforts to integrate the TVA workforce, and fought

a

successful rearguard battle against the FLSA that greatly

weakened the law and helped perpetuate, for

a time,

the

the nature of this movement in the North and its
weakness in the South, see Fraser, Labor Will Rule pp. 289-406.
^^On

,

;
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segregated southern labor market. The roughnecks also
struggled with the industrial unionists for control of the

Democratic party, battling to weaken the influence of the
union's policy arm, CIO-PAC.
As in the national struggles, their efforts at the

Authority had

a

profound impact. For example, the agency

was proud of a stated policy of hiring blacks in direct

proportion to their percentages within the region's
population, approximately eleven percent. However, almost
every black person employed by the TVA worked in unskilled

laborer positions. Even the most modest, painfully cautious
steps toward an integrated labor force brought down these
roughnecks' ire, and further narrowed the TVA's ideological
range. When John Rankin berated the agency for

administering its clerical staff aptitude tests to several
black women, Lilienthal wrote in his journals, "felt it
[administering the exam] was right, but untimely as hell."
He never did say when the time would be right. Lilienthal

's

ties to the AFofL building trades also contributed to the

Authority's caution. These craft unions had virtually no
apprentice program in the South for blacks, and by agreeing
to draw on the local labor pool, the TVA could not move

beyond the South 's traditional labor practices.

the race issue at the TVA, see Grant, TVA and Black
Americans Lilienthal, Journals, I, p. 630;
^^On
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Working so closely with the AFofL's building trades,
noted for their staunchly racist membership practices,
and

unwilling to move too far beyond the racial sensibilities
of its Congressional backers, the TVA crippled its own

efforts to forge regional prosperity through mass
consumption. A Monthly Labor Review article in 1938

outlined the implications of these policies for the TVA.
Studying the amount spent on electrical appliances by
"working-class" families across the country, the article
noted that white families in the South had annual average

expenditures almost identical to the other regions. Black
families in the South, however, fell far behind. Incapable
of challenging the dual labor market, the TVA could not

break that system's grip on the region's economy. Despite
some gains wage levels for both black and white workers

would remain depressed, and

a

significant portion of the

region's population would continue to be excluded from the

economic mainstream

—

and thus from the mass consumption

equation.
By 194 0, when the New Deal's retreat from reform was

nearly complete, Lilienthal still maintained that multi-

purpose development and water control projects could

transform both the economic and social relations of the
country. After meeting with Culbert Olson, Governor of

^^"Expenditures for Electrical Appliances by Workers in 42
Cities. Monthly Labor Review 46 (1938), p. 448.
,

.
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California, Lilienthal noted that they had discussed
Carey

McWilliams's

Factories in the Field

,

which details the

emergence of agribusiness in California's irrigated desert
valleys. "I suggested," he wrote,
the proposition that public control and ownership of

essential water supply might serve as a fulcrum for
the effecting of great land reforms in California,

whereas developing the water supply and then turning
it over to large landowners without any thought of the

consequences to average people and smaller farmers

might simply be fastening the chains that already
chafe

Such pronouncements, already a familiar theme for
Lilienthal, remained his most common refrain for decades,
as he sold the TVA development model across the world. From

Colombia's Cauca Valley to the Khuzestan region of Iran,
Lilienthal promoted the TVA as

model for bringing

a

economic growth and social progress to the less-developed
nations.
It seems clear that Lilienthal believed that the TVA

was an engine for both social and economic change. It seems

equally clear, however, that the Authority achieved no

Journals, I, p. 242 there is no literature on
Lilienthal 's years as head of Development and Resources
Corporation, which served as a consultant on numerous river
valley projects. A very brief review of this work can be found in
Lilienthal 's obituary in the New York Times 16 January 1981, p.
Al:4.
^''Lilienthal,

;

,
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great social transformation. The agency did little
to

challenge the region's racial status quo, and the increased
use of electricity and consumption of consumer goods
did
little to redistribute wealth or power. Indeed, what

economic growth the TVA did bring to the region came at

a

high price. Blurring the line between irony and tragedy,
the long-term implications of the TVA's cheap power

policies were environmental degradation and the

entrenchment of an unresponsive and unaccountable

bureaucracy that does not have to answer to even the
"shareholder democracy" so touted by private corporations.
By the 19 50s, consumption of TVA power had far outpaced the

capacity of its hydroelectric generators, and the agency
had embarked on an ambitious coal plant program. The power

remained cheap because the agency's demand revived the
ailing Eastern coal industry, and supported the expansion
of strip mining across the mountain valleys of Appalachia.
It embraced pollution controls only reluctantly, even

purchasing in 1993 options to pollute from other utilities
under the market-driven reforms of the Clean Air Act. The

Authority developed one of the nation's most extensive
nuclear power programs, hoping to fill the continued growth
in demand that was paced mainly by industry and the

government's atomic research and processing facilities at
Paducah, Kentucky, and Oak Ridge, Tennessee. As rates rose,
for neither coal nor nuclear power were as cheap as
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hydroelectricity, and pollution worsened, Valley residents

who tried to alter the TVA's course met with little
success. These people discovered that the agency that had

inscribed on its dams "Built for the People of the United
States" was itself constructed such that it was

inadequately answerable to the citizens it supposedly
served.

Of course the TVA alone could never achieve some

startling social transformation, and the agency's options
were constrained by the political environment. By the late
1930s, the Roosevelt administration had been defeated on

several fronts by a rejuvenated conservative opposition.
Even the institutional centers of social keynesianism in
the country's industrial core had suffered a series of

setbacks. In conjunction with a growing concern with

international events, the once-rising tide for reform had
turned, and was now at an ebb. But it was not simply the

case that external forces served as the Authority's
undoing. At most these forces accelerated the articulation
of tendencies inherent to the TVA and to David Lilienthal's

ideology. Lilienthal was convinced that managerial

technique and material prosperity were the answers to
social progress. He forged an agency molded by that faith.

Unfettered by virtue of its incorporation as

a

public

authority, the TVA was never a democratically responsible
institution. Driven by a political agenda, Lilienthal never

questioned the technological imperative that lay at the
base of his entire program. He never questioned the

necessity of the bond between production and progress. He
never lost faith in the assumptions of the fordist logic,
and never losing it, he never pushed his political agenda

beyond that faith.

CHAPTER

8

CONCLUSION.
THE POLITICS OF CONSUMPTION AND THE POLITICS OP
ACCOMMODATION: THE NEW DEAL ORDER IN THE POSTWAR ERA

The Second World War accelerated the conservative

drift at the TVA. The power demands of the defense
industries located in the valley spurred what was

ostensibly a dramatic redefinition of Lilienthal's TVA
power policies. During the war, the Authority sold an
increasing proportion of its power to industrial consumers,

particularly to the energy-intensive plants of the Aluminum
Company of America (Alcoa)

.

But the ties between the TVA

and such firms went much deeper than simply buying and

selling electric power. For example, TVA worked closely

with Alcoa in the planning of the Valley's power supply.

TVA bought several hydroelectric power plants from Alcoa,
thus securing unified control of the regional water-control
and power system, and in return provided the company with a

guaranteed power load that exceeded the total output from
the dams ceded to the agency. This coordination served the

interests of both public and private-sector bureaucrats.

Along with the wartime supply of power to the

government's atomic research and processing facilities at
Paducah and Oak Ridge, Kentucky, military-industrial

consumption supplanted the TVA's mandated commitment to
provide cheap power to domestic customers. In fact the TVA
sought to discourage greater domestic use during the war
that might siphon off current needed for military purposes;
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Lilienthal proscribed rate cuts by the rural cooperatives
and municipal systems. The shift in priorities was not

simply a function of the war, however, as industrial and

defense-related consumption continued to increase, so that
by the 1950s residential usage accounted for less than half
of the TVA's sales. In the war mobilization the agency had

abandoned its commitment to rural and residential use, and
it never found its way back.

The conservative resurgence of the late 1930s and the
need to meet the demands of the war emergency certainly

contributed to the agency's transformation, but the new

direction of the 1940s also reflected the accommodationist
tendency with Lilienthal

's

keynesianism. Since his early

work with appliance executives crafting the EHFA program,
Lilienthal had found common ground with business interests
that supported the TVA's existence. Coordinating the power

needs of the defense industries, Lilienthal discovered the

opportunity to fortify his Authority by pursuing closer
ties to cooperative sectors within corporate America.

Lilienthal

's

proprietary interest in the TVA meshed well

with the more conservative political climate. His

commitment to an economic reconstruction of the Valley and
to a redistribution of wealth and power faded.
It is clear that Lilienthal 's unrelenting efforts to

strengthen the TVA's hand had a corrosive effect upon the
agency itself and ultimately exacted

a

heavy toll on the
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agency's self-expressed ideals of
order.

a

more equitable social

In the process of securing the TVA's future,

Lilienthal and the power staff began to sublimate the

agency's ultimate goal of a grand reconstruction of the

Tennessee Valley that would alter the existing power
structure as fundamentally as it altered domestic

consumption patterns.

They began to equate the

legitimation of the agency as an end in itself, rather than
as a means to bolder socio-economic reform.

As Philip Selznick observed, the TVA's rather unique

administrative genesis left it open to overtures by
interest groups that could offer long-term political
support.

Selznick shows that this process resulted in the

"co-optation" of the agricultural programs by the most

conservative forces within the Southern farm establishment-the Extension Service and Farm Bureau bloc.^

In the case

Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots see esp. pp.
259-262, "The Cooptative Mechanism."
While Selznick deftly pierces the agency's protective
facade, his study is almost completely focused upon the
I believe that this poses two
agricultural programs.
problems.
First, because the TVA's activities and its
social identification became increasingly dominated by the
power program, the agency's commitment to a democratic
agenda must be tested by the words and deeds of its power
Second, Selznick helped perpetuate the common
section.
assumption that the power section did in fact embrace and
pursue economic reformist policies that are ultimately
tainted only because Lilienthal gave free rein in the farm
realm to H.A. Morgan and the conservatives in order to
Thus Selznick does for the power
isolate A.E. Morgan.
program what he would not do for the agricultural section;
he accepts the public identity that the power group created
for itself, without examining the implications of its
actual deeds.
,
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of the power program, the agency was not
co-opted by

outside forces but instead imploded, collapsing
into the
most conservative implications of its own agenda.
From
within, the power branch began replacing the goal of
reform

with the goal of institutional preservation; and although
the two goals may have at first seemed indistinguishable,

they were not.

What began to emerge was an institutional

conservatism that slowly moved the TVA away from using
cheap power to foster democratic initiative in the valley.

Lilienthal's insistence that the TVA kilowatts themselves
bore some kind of inherently democratic power pushed the

agency closer toward identifying mass consumption as

a

goal

rather than as a means of redressing the maldistribution of

wealth and social power that would remain intact long after
domestic power use reached then-unimagined levels.^
Even if Lilienthal had come closer to appreciating the

broader limits of his strategy, he could not possibly have
reconciled those limits within his bureaucratic agenda. The

followed
a remarkably similar trajectory.
H. Vivian Nelles observed
that Hydro's controversial origins fostered within the
commission "a heightened instinct for self-preservation."
Forests, Mines, and
Nelles, The Politics of Development.
Hvdro-Electric Power in Ontario, 1849-1941 (Hamden, CT,
Archon Books, 1974), p. 465.
What this suggests, I believe, is that certain kinds
of political imperatives are embedded within the design of
these quasi-autonomous agencies. The artifacts do indeed
have politics. I am not proposing a rigid institutional
determinism here, but instead argue for the contingent
relationship between the agencies and the ideological
interests of their administrators.
^The TVA's Canadian progenitor, Ontario Hydro,
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reorganization of America's economy was not simply

a

product of technocratic tinkering. The consumer
revolution
of the post-war era emerged out of a long process
in which

contending social forces struggled to assert their
interests. The rise of industrial unionism, the war-induced

economic resurgence, and the ideological discipline imposed
on the New Deal state during the 1940s provided the

foundation for

a new set of

institutional groundrules where

the state mediated an uneasy truce between industry and

organized labor. Labor received higher wages and relative
job security; business received higher profits through

increased productivity, reduced labor militance, and

carefully prescribed state intervention directed toward
smooth operation of foreign and domestic
markets. Lilienthal could not impose from above such

conditions upon the people of the Tennessee Valley.
Leaving the TVA at the war's end, Lilienthal went on
to become the first chair of the Atomic Energy Commission.

His leadership of the new agency and political challenges
he faced there suggest the ideological consolidation of

conservative keynesianism, and the extent of the state's

accommodation with capital. Most politicians and the press
viewed Lilienthal as

a

progressive voice on atomic energy

matters; in a sense he was, but his positions at the AEC

stand in marked contrast to those he held during the TVA's
first years. One of the central concerns at the AEC was who
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would control atomic energy. The military had
directed all
research and development during the war. if electricity

generated by atomic fission remained linked to the
weapons
program, then the armed services would retain control.

Lilienthal opposed this, but the alternative he favored

reflected the permanence of the ideological transformation
that had occurred since the late 1930s. Lilienthal urged
the privatization of atomic energy, with significant state

subsidies for the fledgling industry, and with minimal

regulatory guidelines enforced by the AEC. The political
range had shifted rightward. Once an advocate of extensive

public regulation, and once the overseer of the federal

government's largest experiment in public enterprise,
Lilienthal became a spokesman for private power.
In the 1950s Lilienthal himself turned to a career

that reflected this altered ideological spectrum. With

assistance from the investment house of Lazard, Freres, he
formed the Development and Resources Corporation to market

TVA-style development to less-developed countries. This
enterprise demanded his skills as a bureaucratic
entrepreneur. He tied the firm to the burgeoning American

foreign aid apparatus, and forged close ties to political
leaders in nations that accepted the dual imperatives of

open markets and anticommunism that shaped American foreign
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policy in the emerging Cold War world. ^ D&R
Corporation,
then, reflected the very essence of the new
accommodation

between corporate capital and the state.
Lilienthal also continued to exercise his promotional
skills, turning his pen in the 1950s toward the cultural

legitimation of the new order. Lilienthal was one of many
New Dealers who began to proclaim the beginning of

a

truly

New Era, unlike the false prophecy of the 1920s, and

heralded the onset of unparalleled material prosperity.
These rhetoricians were assured by the modest regulatory
that remained from the New Deal and by personal bonds
forged in wartime associations between state managers and

corporate executives that business and government were both

committed to a new partnership. The tracts literally poured
off the presses. Lilienthal
(1953)

,

's

Big Business: A New Era

was one of a series of works that announced the new

economic order, accompanied by A. A. Berle's The Twentieth
Century Capitalist Revolution (1954)

,

and John Kenneth

Galbraith's American Capitalism (1952), among others. Other
studies, such as Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s The Vital Center

,

were testaments to the political durability of the system.

^The Iranian regime of Shah Reza Pahlavi was one of
D&R's long-standing clients. In fact, the overthrow of the
Shah forced the firm into bankruptcy after it suffered huge
losses on an unfinished dam and power development project
in the Khuzestan valley. D&R had never been a hugely
profitable endeavor, and instead had existed as an
appendage to the Cold War policies of the United States.
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David Lilienthal was one of the architects of a

politics of consumption that emerged out of the ideological
struggles of the 1930s and 1940s as the conservative

keynesianism that defined the political economy of the
United States during the short-lived "American century."
This postwar system was not monolithic, nor was it as

immutable as its heralds proclaimed. Instead, this order

provided a set of rules for behavior to be followed by the
country's dominant economic and political forces. The rules
were subject to constant revision, as power ebbed and
flowed among the contending forces. Jarred by the domestic
and international turmoil of the early 1970s, the postwar

order frayed and then split apart.
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